



UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON LIBRARIES

Estate of Solomon Katz

•

THESSALY
IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

•

THESSALY

IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

by

H. D. WESTLAKE

FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE

WITH A MAP



METHUEN & CO. LTD. LONDON
36 Essex Street W.C.2

First published in 1935

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

THIS book has grown out of a short essay on Jason of Pherae, who remains its central figure. It might have grown still further and become a history of Thessaly from the end of the Dark Ages, had the ancient authorities afforded material for a continuous account of the sixth and fifth centuries. In the case of Thessaly, however, the Dark Ages may scarcely be considered at an end until the close of the fifth century; and, in particular, the origin and early development of the national state is a subject of baffling obscurity, upon which I do not feel myself competent to throw new light. Accordingly I have dealt only with the fourth century, though in my historical introduction I have attempted to outline the earlier evolution of the Thessalian people, hoping thereby to render the subsequent narrative more intelligible. In this section (Chapter II) an article by Kahrstedt has been of great value to me.

I regret that I have been unable to make use of two recent publications, *Pagasai und Demetrias*, by F. Stählin, E. Meyer, and A. Heidner, and an

article by J. Hatzfeld on the relations between Jason and Athens (*Rev. Et. Anc.*, XXXVI, 1934, No. 4). Neither was accessible to me until my work was already complete.

To ensure that my map should be as clear as possible, all Modern Greek place-names have been omitted. These, together with a very few ancient names to which I do not refer more than once, may be found on the admirably complete map at the end of Stählin's *Das hellenische Thessalien*.

Two visits to Thessaly have made me familiar with the plains and with the shores of the Bay of Volò. Everywhere I found friendliness and hospitality, for the Thessalian peasant classes, though their sufferings have been bitter and protracted, are conspicuously charming and good-natured.

My sincere thanks are due to those who have assisted and encouraged me while I have been writing this book ; to Professor F. E. Adcock for advice and criticism ; to Mr. M. P. Charlesworth, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude which I cannot attempt to define ; to Mr. D. E. W. Wormell, who has read the manuscript ; to Mr. N. G. L. Hammond, who has read the proofs ; lastly, to several relatives and friends, who have helped me in a number of important ways.

H. D. W.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
February 1935

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
I THE COUNTRY	I
II THE PEOPLE	21
III LARISA AND LYCOPHRON OF PHERAE	47
IV JASON AND THE UNIFICATION OF THESSALY	67
V JASON AND THE GREEK WORLD	84
VI JASON AND HIS ACHIEVEMENT	103
VII ALEXANDER AND ANARCHY	126
VIII PHILIP AND THE END OF THESSALIAN FREEDOM	160
IX THE ARCHONSHIP OF PHILIP	196
X ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND AFTER	217
APPENDIX	237
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	240
INDEX	243

MAP OF THESSALY	<i>facing 248</i>
---------------------------	-------------------

ABBREVIATIONS

- | | |
|--------------------|--|
| Beloch | = K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> , 2nd edit. |
| Costanzi | = V. Costanzi, <i>Saggio di storia tessalica</i> . |
| Ditt. ³ | = W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edit. |
| Geyer | = F. Geyer, <i>Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II.</i> |
| Kaerst | = J. Kaerst, <i>Geschichte des Hellenismus</i> , Vol. I, 3rd edit. |
| Kahrstedt | = U. Kahrstedt, <i>Grundherrschaft, Freistadt und Staat in Thessalien</i> (Gött. Nach., 1925, Phil.-hist. Klasse). |
| Meyer, G.d.A. | = E. Meyer, <i>Geschichte des Altertums</i> . |
| Meyer, T.H. | = E. Meyer, <i>Theopomps Hellenika mit einer Beilage</i> . |
| Niese | = B. Niese, <i>Beiträge zur griechischen Geschichte</i> (Hermes, XXXIX, 1904). |
| Schwahn | = W. Schwahn, <i>Heeresmatrikel und Landfriede Philipps von Makedonien</i> (Klio, Beiheft XXI). |
| Stählin | = F. Stählin, <i>Das hellenische Thessalien</i> . |
| Swoboda | = H. Swoboda, <i>Griechische Staatsaltertümer</i> . |
| Swoboda, J. | = H. Swoboda, <i>Zur griechischen Künstlergeschichte</i> (Jahreshefte d. österr. archäol. Institutes in Wien, VI, 1903). |

CHAPTER I
THE COUNTRY

*τὸ μέσον δὲ τούτων τῶν λεχθέντων
ὁρέων ἡ Θεσσαλὴ ἐστὶ ἐοῦσα κοίλῃ*

(HERODOTUS)

GEOGRAPHICAL conditions were largely responsible for the distinctive characteristics of political and social life which obtained in ancient Thessaly. Thanks to its physical conformation and climate, which were in marked contrast to those of other districts in Greece, Thessaly followed a course of development strangely remote from the main channel of Greek civilization. It is for this reason essential that an attempt should be made to outline a picture of the country as it was in antiquity. This picture must remain in many respects incomplete, since reliable and first-hand information is supplied in very meagre measure by ancient literary authorities,¹ while strict caution is to be exercised in drawing inferences from modern conditions.

¹ See Appendix, pp. 237-9.

PHYSICAL FEATURES AND PRODUCTS

Thessaly proper is to be sharply distinguished from the mountainous Perioecis by which it is surrounded. It is composed very largely of plainland, only a low range of hills separating the upper plain from the lower. Originally the country had been a huge inland sea, until erosion caused the outlet of Tempe, through which the basin was drained.¹ The extreme flatness of so vast an area is in Greek lands most remarkable and renders Thessaly more closely akin to the monotonous steppes of Macedonia and the northern Balkans than to the broken and varied landscape of Greece. The total extent of the plains, together with the intervening hill-country, amounts to some 2,400 square miles, or rather less than the area of Lincolnshire. Livy describes the magnificent view from Thaumaci,² which is situated on the edge of the Othrys range, and no traveller from the south can fail to be impressed by the sudden change from tortuous mountain passes to spacious plainland. Of the two plains the upper or western is the larger, but the lower

¹ Herodotus (VII, 129) and Strabo (IX, p. 430) attribute it to an earthquake, but this tradition is disproved by modern science.

² XXXII, 4—*repente velut maris vasti sic universa panditur planities ut subiectos campos terminare oculis haud facile queas*. This description is derived from Polybius, an eye-witness.

or eastern contained most of the leading cities and throughout history enjoyed a greater prominence, in that the roads from central Greece to Macedonia and the north crossed it. This plain alone has access to the sea, though it in no way resembles the coastal plains which are so common in other parts of Greece. Magnesia, whose rocky and wind-swept coast is harbourless, interposes a mountain barrier between the plain and the sea, so that there remains but one outlet to good harbours—the low pass of Pilaštepe at its extreme south-east corner. Hence the interior of Thessaly is essentially continental, whereas the shores of the Bay of Volo are strongly reminiscent of the Peloponnese.

In climate also Thessaly resembles Yugoslavia and southern Russia rather than Mediterranean lands. Parching summers alternate with very severe winters, and the extremes of temperature are greater even than those of Boeotia,¹ which proved so distasteful to Hesiod. The climate must have been somewhat milder before the country became so largely denuded of its forests, but the Thessalians are said to have worn heavier winter clothing than other Greeks.² Olive-growing is now unusual except on the Bay of Volo and was not at all general

¹ Neumann and Partsch, *Physikalische Geographie von Griechenland*, p. 55.

² Strabo, XI, p. 530. In summer they wore a 'petasus', a broad-brimmed, shady hat, which is illustrated on many coins.

4 THESSALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

in ancient times,¹ while the vine is not extensively cultivated in the plains. The bulk of Thessalian wine comes from the slopes of the Ossa and Pelion range, and a cluster of grapes, a familiar coin-type in Greece and the islands, was very rare save on the coins of Magnesian villages, such as Meliboea and Rhizus.² Yet these climatic conditions combined with the extensiveness of the plains to make Thessaly an ideal country both for the rearing of horses, cattle and sheep and for the growing of corn. Thessalian horses were proverbial,³ Thessalian cavalry the best in Greece.⁴ A large proportion of cities had horses or horsemen represented upon their coins. For sheep-farming the plains in winter and the surrounding mountain slopes in summer provided excellent pasturage, and cattle-ranching, as coin-types of Larisa and other cities indicate, must have been general in antiquity.⁵ The plains produced an abundance of corn, which was at times

¹ Theophrast., *C.P.*, V, 14, 2-3.

² Scotussa is the only notable exception.

³ *Oracle ap. Anth. Pal.*, XIV, 73 ; *Soph., El.*, 703-6 ; *Eur., Andr.*, 1229 ; *Plato, Leg.*, p. 625 d ; *Ephorus* fr. 97 (Jacoby) ; *Theocr.*, XVIII, 30. Bucephalas, the famous horse of Alexander the Great, was Thessalian (*Plut., Alex.*, 6). In local marriage ceremonial the bridegroom was required to lead in a horse and present it to the bride (*Ael., Vit. Anim.*, XII, 34).

⁴ *Hdt.*, VII, 196 ; *Isocr.*, XV, 298.

⁵ Sheep and cattle, *Theocr.*, XVI, 36-9. General fertility, *B 695* ; *Thuc.*, I, 2 ; *Ps.-Scymnus*, 607-8.

even cut down or grazed to prevent it from reaching maturity too fast.¹ Alexander the Great once censured some captured Thessalian mercenaries because 'although they owned the best land, they did not farm it'.² Indeed, for the production of cereals of all kinds Thessaly has always been potentially richer than any other district of Greece.³ In ancient times, as in modern, the Peloponnese was more intensively cultivated, but despite primitive methods of agriculture Thessaly was more than self-supporting. Although trade in foodstuffs was not very prevalent between one Greek state and another,⁴ corn and meat were exported in considerable quantities to the south.⁵ Yet the productiveness of their land was not always a boon to the inhabitants; for it was in Thessaly that Mardonius wintered his Persians and from Thessaly

¹ Theophrast., *H.P.*, VIII, 7, 4.

² Plut., *Mor.*, p. 181 B (cp. Isocr., VIII, 117).

³ *A Handbook of Greece* (Admiralty Publications, 1920), p. 137; cp. [Herodes] 14, on which see below p. 49.

⁴ A. Jardé, *Les céréales dans l'antiquité grecque*, pp. 193-4, declares that traffic in cereals between Greek states was permitted only in exceptional cases. But it is these cases that are likely to be recorded. His argument is very weak, for he can adduce no evidence of any such prohibition.

⁵ Corn, Xen., *Hell.*, V, 4, 56, VI, 1, 11; Ephippus fr. 1 (Kock); Philostr., *Vit. Soph.*, p. 526. Meat, Hermippus fr. 63, l. 6 (reading *Θερραλλας*); Plut., *Mor.*, p. 193 D. The Thessalian *χώνδρος*, a kind of pudding, was famous (Alexis fr. 191; Antiphanes fr. 34). There appears to be no evidence for the export of hides or wool.

that several Roman armies operating in the Balkans derived a part or the whole of their supplies.¹

The most serious obstacle to agriculture was an irregular distribution of the water-supply, which was largely dependent upon melting snows and periodic rainfalls on the encircling mountain chains. The Peneius, which is one of the largest rivers of Greece and comparable to those of Macedonia, rises in Pindus and flows across both plains before passing through the gorge of Tempe and finally into the Aegean. On its course it is swelled by a great number of tributaries, which also have their sources in the mountain ranges and are therefore subject to considerable seasonable variations. Consequently the plains are liable to be inundated in winter, whereas in summer they suffer from severe drought,² since all but the largest rivers are reduced to dry water-courses. The Peneius, in particular, caused swamps south of Pharcadon; its winter floods were sufficient to form Lake Nessonis, which lay to the north-east of Larisa. Nessonis is said to have occasionally covered a wider area than the permanent Lake Boebe,³ which stretched between

¹ App., *Mac. fr.* 18, 3 (against Perseus); App., *Mithr.*, 30 (Sulla); Caes., *B.C.*, III, 5 (Pompey); *ibid.*, 34 (Caesar); App., *B.C.*, IV, 100, 108, 117 (Antony and Octavian).

² Livy, XLII, 57. Drought at Crannon, Antigonus of Carystus, *Hist. Mir.*, 15—this explains the hydria on Crannonian coins.

³ Strabo, IX, pp. 430, 441. Homer (*B* 711), Herodotus (VII, 129), and Pliny (*N.H.*, IV, 30) mention Boebe only.

Pherae and the mountains of Magnesia, but as in modern times, the former was probably a mere swamp rather than a lake. There is scope for irrigation,¹ but none has ever been attempted on a large scale, though the Lariseans at one time protected their estates by building embankments and also drained an area of marshland.² To-day both plains are remarkably treeless, especially the eastern, which is the drier, but in ancient times the extent of woodland must have been very much greater.³ This fact may explain the otherwise unaccountable paucity of ancient sites in some districts. But these forests were inconveniently remote from the sea, so that Thessaly, unlike Macedonia, never developed an export trade in ships' timber.⁴

CITIES, NEIGHBOURS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Thessaly was composed of four districts, known as tetrads—Thessaliotis, Hestiaeotis, Pelasgiotis, Phthiotis—whose confines were based on physical

¹ Miller, *Greece*, p. 276.

² Theophrast, *C.P.*, V, 14, 2-3; Strabo, IX, p. 440; Pliny, *N.H.*, XVII, 30. An attempt was perhaps made to reclaim part of Nessonis.

³ The eponymous magistrate at Thetionion in the fifth century was an *ὕλωρος* (*I.G.*, IX, 2, 257, cp. Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 234).

⁴ Kahrstedt (p. 146), who infers from the absence of timber export that no extensive area of woodland can have existed, fails to appreciate the difficulty of transportation.

8 THESSALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

divisions of the plainland. Under the designation of tetrarchies these districts had some political significance, which will be described in the following chapter, and it was from their union that the Thessalian national state was created.¹ But in the fifth and fourth centuries the development of urban communities had become so pronounced that for purposes of local administration the newly formed city-states, in which a city exercised a centralized control over its surrounding territory, had virtually supplanted the rather unwieldy tetrarchies. Hence in a brief survey of Thessaly it is more convenient to take the city as a unit, especially as the importance of each was largely determined by its geographical position.

Most consistently powerful throughout history was Larisa Pelasgis, whose name is pre-Hellenic and of great antiquity. It is not mentioned in the Homeric Catalogue, but was a Pelasgian settlement and possessed a wealth of local legend. The site would not appear to be an especially favoured one, for though the hills which separate the two plains are not far distant, Larisa does not stand on a projecting spur of the encircling mountain ranges, as do several Thessalian cities, but its acropolis is a low knoll rising out of the plain.² This knoll, however,

¹ See below, p. 25.

² Livy, XXXVI, 10—*urbis sitae in plano, aperto et campestri undique aditu*.

is sufficiently steep to be easily defensible and is the most suitable eminence in the exceptionally level plain of northern Pelasgiotis. It is further protected by a bend of the Peneius, which flows broad and deep at this point. Larisa must have been strongly fortified at least as early as the beginning of the fourth century, though no trace of ancient walls survives. The city dominates a wide area of cultivatable rather than grazing land, extending on the north to the hills of Perrhaebia, on the east to those of Magnesia. It is also an important road-junction, since here converge two routes from Macedonia—the one through the defile of Tempe, the other by Oloosson and the Perrhaebian passes—to meet the highroad through Pharsalus to central Greece. A third road leads to Tricca and the passes of Pindus, a fourth across the dusty plain to Pherae and the sea.

The acropolis of Pherae is the site of a large prehistoric settlement. It was the legendary home of Admetus and Alcestis, whose son Eumelus was a skilled chariot-driver and took part in the expedition against Troy.¹ In historical times Pherae did not challenge the supremacy of Larisa until Thessaly had reached a comparatively advanced stage of development. From its situation in the south-east angle of the Pelasgiotid plain looking towards Lake Boebe and the Magnesian mountains, it could

¹ Ψ 288; B 711.

command but a small area of arable land. The ears of corn which are represented on its coinage symbolize rather the export trade of Pheraean middlemen, who seem to have bought up crops from other districts, than any extensive local production.¹ Nevertheless, the vegetation of the immediate neighbourhood, which Polybius describes as 'thickly wooded and full of walls and gardens',² is astonishingly rich, and the number of large trees is exceptional. The city itself derived a liberal water-supply from the famous fountain of Hypercia.³ Strategically its position was a strong one, the acropolis being built on a hill of considerable steepness, while later the town spread to another hill and down the slopes into the plain.⁴ In recent years the French School has discovered the foundations of a temple, which dates from the beginning of the seventh century, but was reconstructed, perhaps by Jason or Alexander, in the fourth. Many of the votive offerings found on the site consist of bronze figurines of horses.⁵ A little to the east the road from Pharsalus joined that from Larisa to the Bay

¹ See below, p. 49.

² XVIII, 20. The district was also rich in flocks and herds (Livy, XLII, 56).

³ Pind., *Pyth.*, IV, 125 ; Soph. fr. 911 (Pearson) ; Strabo, IX, p. 439.

⁴ Stählin, p. 106.

⁵ Some are in the Volo Museum, others in the National Museum at Athens. The temple was at first thought to be that of Zeus Thaulios, but this is very doubtful.

of Pagasae, but Pherae did not directly command either road, being hidden away, like Mycenae, in a recess. The happiest feature of its location lay in its proximity to the sea, which was less than eight miles distant, and this advantage, unique among Thessalian cities, was to a large extent responsible for the swift rise of Pheraean power towards the close of the fifth century. At a somewhat earlier date the western shore of the inner bay was wrested from Magnesia, so that Pagasae became the port of Pherae.¹ This land-locked bay affords excellent anchorage. The natural choice of a site for a harbour-town would be that of the modern Volo, but the situation of Pagasae was determined by the fact that the western shore has several flat-topped knolls and was more easily defended ;² it also possesses a sheltered beach on which ships could be drawn up. How dependent Pherae was on its control of a harbour is illustrated by the immediate collapse of the Pheraean tyranny when Philip took Pagasae and restored it to Magnesia.³

By far the most impressive of Thessalian cities is Pharsalus,⁴ which is probably identical with Phthia,

¹ Theop. fr. 59 ; Strabo, IX, p. 436. Stählin, Meyer, and Heidner, *Pagasai und Demetrias*, has appeared since this chapter was written.

² Iolcus would be still powerful at the time of the foundation of Pagasae.

³ See below, p. 181.

⁴ Stählin, *Pharsalos* (a pamphlet published in 1914), gives a succinct topographical and historical account.

the home of Achilles, and in historical times dominated the tetrad Phthiotis. It lies at the south-eastern extremity of the western plain against a background of Achaean mountains. A magnificent crag with a double, saddle-shaped crest rises very steeply out of the plain, and this furnishes an acropolis so formidable that, if treachery had not so often discounted its natural defensive strength, it would have remained impregnable in ancient times. Natural defences were reinforced by strong walls, of which some part is still standing, and in the middle of the fifth century Pharsalus was able to hold out through a siege of considerable duration.¹ In the course of time the town spread down the northern slopes and began to encroach upon the plain, in which the squalid modern village of Fersala is for the most part situated. This plain, which on the north-west extends unbroken as far as the eye can reach, is well watered by the Enipeus and Apidanus and is very fertile.² Here were trained the famous Pharsalian cavalrymen, who are portrayed on coins in the act of striking down a hoplite. Eastwards an upland valley stretches towards Pherae and Pagasae, while the important highroad from the south threads its way beneath the acropolis and over the plain in the direction of Larisa and

¹ Thuc., I, 111; Diod., XI, 83, 3-4.

² The plain is swampy near the modern village, and these swamps already existed in antiquity (Plut., *Brut.*, 6).

Macedonia. But the situation of Pharsalus was not in reality so happy as would appear, and its history was a very chequered one, though for a brief period during the archonship of Philip and Alexander it was the first city of Thessaly. It suffered from all the disadvantages of a border town, for to any southern power aiming at the conquest of Thessaly possession of Pharsalus must be the first step. Moreover, it had not the central position enjoyed by Larisa and was cut off from the sea by Pherae; another possible outlet to the Bay of Pagasae—over the hills to the Achaean coastal plain—was too difficult to be of much value.

Other Thessalian cities could never shake the predominance of these three. Crannon and Scotussa were hill-towns in the rather barren range which separates the two plains. Though Crannon was powerful in early times and both cities possessed some cornland,¹ they suffered from the proximity of stronger neighbours, Larisa and Pherae. In the western plain the largest and probably most ancient city was Tricca,² whose name appears in the Homeric Catalogue³ and whose temple of Asclepius was said to be the earliest of that cult in Greece.

¹ Crannon, Livy, XLII, 64; Polyæn., II, 34. Scotussa, Polyb., XVIII, 20.

² Pharsalus overlooks the western plain, but scarcely belongs to it. Arne, the prehistoric Boeotian settlement (Thuc., I, 12) lay near Cierion in Thessaliotis.

³ B 729.

In spite of a coinage which dates from the beginning of the fifth century, Tricca, with its neighbours and rivals, Pharcadon and Pelinna, is barely mentioned in history before the Macedonian conquest. This western plain contains few defensible hills and is swept in summer by hot winds from Pindus, which spread havoc among men, beasts, and crops alike.¹ Nevertheless, these disadvantages hardly suffice to account satisfactorily for the absence of important sites, especially in the vicinity of the modern Karditsa, where the soil is extremely fertile and is watered by many tributaries of the Peneius. It may be assumed that in Thessaliotis, and to a lesser degree in Hestiaeotis, considerable tracts of plainland were still occupied by woods throughout ancient times. At all events, western Thessaly remained a backwater and, as a result of its isolation, preserved an even less developed civilization than the lower plain.

While Thessaly in many respects presents a contrast to other districts, it possesses one physical trait which is prevalent throughout the Greek peninsula : there is no considerable area of undulating foothills, the demarcation between plain and mountain being very abrupt. Perrhaebia, Magnesia, and Achaea, known collectively as the Perioecis, which enclose

¹ Theophrastus (*De Ventis*, 45) describes the effect of this wind upon the district round Cierion. Many inhabitants of Trikkala to-day spend the summer in the mountains of Epirus.

the plains on three sides, are as mountainous as Phocis or Arcadia and are blessed with even fewer upland plains. They could not maintain a large population, although their hill-sides afforded admirable summer pasturage for sheep. Perrhaebia commanded the roads leading to the north. Usually under Thessalian control, it served less as a buffer-state than as a vantage-point which gave the Thes-salians access to Upper Macedonia, until Philip shrewdly appropriated these northern passes.¹ A small upland plain stretches southwards from the Perrhaebian capital Oloosson, being separated from Pelasgiotis by the Meluna pass, from Macedon by those of Petra and Volustana. The hinterland of Magnesia was very sparsely inhabited, for its mountains form an almost unbroken massif extending from Ossa to Pelion, and in antiquity the belts of forest were denser than they are to-day. Along its harbourless coast and the claw-shaped peninsula encircling the Bay of Pagasae were situated a number of villages, which were sufficiently remote from the sea to be free from the attentions of pirates. Within the bay Iolcus was an important harbour in early times, and above it the southern slopes of Pelion, enjoying a mild climate, abounded in vines, olives, and fruit-trees. Achaea, for the most part almost

¹ See below, p. 179. In the 'Thirty Days' War' of 1897 control of the Perrhaebian passes gave the Turks an overwhelming advantage.

as mountainous as the other districts, has a broad and typically Greek coastal plain, at whose extremities lay Phthiotic Thebes and Halus, each possessing a good harbour.¹ It is also fortunate in the fertile basin of Lake Xynias and some sheltered and productive slopes near Larisa Cremaste, which look towards Euboea. The Perioeci, though pursuing a course of development parallel to that of the Thessalians, were always many steps behind. From archaeological evidence it is clear that, whereas Iolcus and Phthiotic Thebes might be termed cities in the fifth century, only in the fourth did the process of urbanization become marked elsewhere.² Even then these 'cities', except for those of the Achaean coastal plain, can have been little more than walled villages.

Other neighbouring districts were less intimately connected with Thessaly. Between Thessaliotis and the higher peaks of Pindus lay Dolopia, whose mountain masses were relieved by several valleys watered by tributaries of the Peneius, but it had no plainland. More important was the valley of the Spercheius, which separated the massifs of Othrys and Oeta. This valley could have supported a single independent state of some consequence; it was fertile, possessed good beaches on the shallow

¹ Trade from the port of Thebes was considerable in the Hellenistic period (Livy, XXXIX, 25).

² Kahrstedt, pp. 154-5.

and protected Malian Gulf, and commanded the vital route past Thermopylae. But in historical times it enjoyed no political unity and little independence, being divided between the Aenianes, the Malians, and the Oetaeans, whose feuds other powers turned to their own advantage. In periods when the Thessalian national state was particularly strong, as in the lifetime of Jason, these tribes owed allegiance to it. Geographically, however, the Spercheius valley is not a natural adjunct of Thessaly, since the intervening passes over Othrys are but little easier than those leading to the Cephissus valley and central Greece. Nor has it any of the features characteristic of the Thessalian plain, being in every respect a softer country and resembling somewhat in appearance and products the western valleys of the Peloponnese. Still less Thessalian are the northern Sporades—Sciathos, Peparethus, Scyros and others—which are sometimes misleadingly termed ‘Islands of Thessaly’. Though no doubt a geological continuation of Magnesia, they are essentially Aegean in character and not Thessalian. Thus it is natural that they should have belonged to the Athenian maritime confederacies rather than to Thessaly, on which they were never dependent.¹

The political isolation of Thessaly throughout

¹ The raids of Alexander of Pherae (see below, p. 153) were not undertaken with a view to conquest.

history was largely due to the difficulty of communication with the outside world. Access to the sea, which afforded to most Greek states a means of ready intercourse with one another and with more distant lands, was denied to all but a very small section of the Thessalians. Pagasae, however, was fortunately situated, in that ships sailing from its bay could reach the coast of Attica without venturing into the open sea, a great boon to ancient navigators. The north coast of Euboea, with its plain around Histiaea, could be reached by ferry from the Achaean shore, but this does not seem to have been a regular trade-route.

Communication by land involved the crossing of mountain barriers in every direction.¹ To the north-west the Zygos pass led over the watershed of the Peneius and Achelous towards Epirus, while farther south Gomphi commanded two routes, one by Porta to Athamania, the other by Mouzaki to the Achelous gorge and the Ambracian Gulf. Each of these traversed the Pindus range and reached a high altitude, so that in marching from Illyria to Pelinna within seven days Alexander the Great accomplished a notable feat, as did several Roman armies in crossing from Ambracia. On the north there were four practicable routes to Macedonia. The most westerly led from Aeginion to the upper

¹ Cp. Hammond, *B.S.A.*, XXXII (1934), pp. 139-47, and Hansen, *Early Civilization in Thessaly*, pp. 13-18.

reaches of the Haliacmon ; ¹ another from Oloosson by Azorus and the Volustana pass to Phylace ; a third also from Oloosson over the western spurs of Olympus to Petra ; the fourth through the gorge of Tempe and thence along the coastal strip of Pieria. All these were sufficiently difficult to preclude extensive intercourse between primitive communities, and except the last all were rendered impassable in winter by deep snow.² The road through Tempe, though by no means easy,³ involved fewest hardships and was the regular trade-route followed by pack-animals, but it was little used in military operations, because the gorge is so narrow that a handful of men could hold it against the frontal attack of a large army. The flank of a defending force could be turned by following paths over the mountain-sides of Olympus or Ossa, but these paths were devious and difficult.⁴ Most generals seeking to enter the Thessalian plain from the north preferred to use the passes of

¹ A minor track from Perrhaebia by Diskata joined this route at Grevena.

² Livy, XLIII, 18.

³ Livy, XLIV, 6—*sunt enim Tempe saltus, etiamsi non bello fiat infestus, transitu difficilis*. Ancient descriptions of Tempe are many and tend to be fanciful.

⁴ Herodotus (VII, 172) mentions a track leading to Gonnus. Alexander the Great had steps cut in the slopes of Ossa (see below, p. 218). Marcius Philippus reached Pieria by a precipitous route past Lake Ascuris, thereby causing great suffering among his troops (Livy, XLIV, 2-6).

Petra or Volustana, which were not so readily blocked.

Southwards there was only one recognized route to the Spercheius valley.¹ This was from Pharsalus by Thaumaci and Lake Xynias to Lamia, forming part of the regular highway from northern to central Greece. Here also the passes reached considerable altitudes, but as Achaea is slightly less mountainous than Perrhaebia, alternative routes might be taken in several places. These tracks across the Othrys range were no more formidable than many in the Peloponnese, and it was rather the remoteness of Thessaly from the centres of population that lent to the country its air of detachment from the rest of Greece. Larisa was two hundred miles distant from Athens, and wide tracts of broken and comparatively unfrequented country lay between Pharsalus and the Boeotian border. It was for this reason that Thessaly never became completely Hellenized and was regarded rather as a bulwark against the barbarian north than as a genuine and fully privileged member of the Hellenic world.

¹ Xerxes with part of his army followed the coast from Pagasae by way of the Achaeian plain and Alope to the Malian Gulf (Hdt., VII, 197-8, with Macan's notes). This lengthy detour must have been undertaken to maintain contact with the fleet.

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLE

*δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομία ἐχρῶντο
τὸ ἐγγώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί*

(Thucydides)

EARLY HISTORY AND THE NATIONAL STATE

ARCHAEOLOGICAL research has proved that in prehistoric times Thessaly looked rather northward than southward. Its earliest culture, which is largely independent of external influences, resembles in some degree that of Macedonia, but has little affinity with contemporary development in Greece. Towards the close of the second millennium some connexion with the south was established, but the impress of Mycenaean civilization was very slight except in the extreme south-east. Here Achaean Phthia became the centre of a powerful tribal union, whose advance under Mycenaean influence is attested both by epic tradition and by archaeological evidence.

Shortly after the Trojan War Greece was disturbed by that gradual influx of northern peoples

whose final wave is known as the Dorian Invasion. This movement caused a breakdown of communications, so that Thessaly once more became completely isolated. The Dorians themselves pressed on southward, but the Thessali, who came across the Pindus range from Thesprotia, settled in the Thessalian plains and gave their name to the country.¹ The conquerors were a hardy race and won their victories not by superior numbers but by superior arms. In the course of time they adopted the language of the conquered and formed a dominant aristocracy together with a limited free peasantry, while the former Pelasgian and Achaean inhabitants suffered a varied fate. The Boeotians, who had dwelt around Arne in Thessaliotis, migrated to Boeotia ; others fled to the mountain districts girdling the plains, where they became known as Perioeci ; the majority were compelled to remain as Penestae in serfdom to their conquerors. At a rather later date all sections of the population contributed to the Aeolic migration, while a northerly movement of the Thessali was responsible for the foundation of the Macedonian kingdom.²

Thessaly was geographically well suited to the feudal system which ethnic circumstances produced. The new aristocracy could draw upon an ample supply of Penestae for the cultivation of its broad

¹ The position and name of the tetrad Thessaliotis suggests that they spread over the country from the south-west.

² Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria*, pp. 160-2.

domains, and its wealth became proverbial. Outside the baronial estates room was left for the small-holdings of the free peasantry, so that for many years these remained undisturbed. The Thessalians were fortunate in their immunity from the land-hunger which was responsible for so many economic crises in other parts of Greece. The strength of this social fabric encouraged political development, so that from the Dark Ages Thessaly emerges as a formidable power, which must, in view of its achievements, have enjoyed a measure of national unity. Unfortunately the origin and constitution of this national state is shrouded in mists which the ingenuity of modern scholars has served rather to deepen than to dispel.¹ The ancient evidence is scanty and contradictory in the extreme, for historians and political theorists neither fully understood nor regarded as worthy of study a system which bore small resemblance to their own city-states. A few facts may be stated with some confidence, though even these would not pass unchallenged by the more destructive critics.²

¹ The following summary of this early constitution is confined, so far as is possible, to such parts as have important bearing upon fourth-century developments.

² As Hiller von Gaertringen, *Aus der Anomia*, pp. 1-16, whose arguments are recapitulated and enlarged by Ferri, *Riv. Fil.*, VIII (1930), pp. 300-5. Their view that this constitution is a specious fabrication evolved in the time of Jason seems against the weight of evidence.

When the invaders had become settled in their new domain, there began to appear, as elsewhere in Greece, tribal-units which in the absence of towns would be known by the indefinite title of *ἔθνη*. Thessaly with its broad plains was too large to form a political unity at this early stage, and the combinations of baronial estates thus fell into four districts, which seem to have existed as separate and independent states.¹ These districts correspond to the later tetrads or tetrarchies—the former is a purely geographical term, the latter signifies the same area regarded as a political entity—but they cannot have been described as such until the Thessalian national state had been formed. Their boundaries were not perhaps clearly defined in the first instance, but each would cover an area approximately equal to that of a normal Greek *ἔθνος*. Some natural boundaries existed, such as the line of hills between the two plains which divided Hestiaeotis from Pelasgiotis, though in Thessaly the physical barriers which cut up other parts of Greece into self-contained divisions were not especially prominent. It does not seem that a separate clan of the Thessali occupied each of the four districts, for in spite of some differences of dialect no ethnic distinction was apparent in later times between the inhabitants of one tetrad and the next.

¹ Phthiotis was perhaps formed somewhat later than the other districts.

The organization of each district must have been extremely loose and political development slow, but these plain-dwellers had little difficulty in establishing their authority over their immediate neighbours in the mountains of the Perioecis. Hence Perrhaebia became dependent on Pelasgiotis, Achaea on Phthiotis.

Finally, towards the close of the seventh century the ambitious project was conceived, probably by the famous Aleuas, of uniting the whole country into a single national state.¹ Since racial ties between the *ἔθνη* were strong, their interests would in most cases coincide. It was not thought practicable to form a permanent union, but only an organization for common defence against an invader or for concerted action in a campaign outside Thessaly. Thus the Thessalian *κοινόν* or national state—it would be an anachronism to call it a League—was primarily a military organization, which can have had little real existence in time of peace. Its main function was in the event of war to elect a national commander and to mobilize a national army. This commander, who was known as a *ταγός*, was in theory appointed only for the

¹ An important passage in Aristotle (fr. 497, Rose) does not mean, as it is commonly interpreted, that Aleuas divided an existing unity into four *μοῖραι* but rather that he found Thessaly consisting of four *μοῖραι* and—the extant fragment does not record this further step—united them into a single state.

duration of the current crisis, but on one pretext or another unscrupulous barons usually succeeded in prolonging their term of office almost to a life tenure.¹ Although the *tageia*, and in fact the whole constitution, had a legitimized foundation, the power of the aristocratic families was still practically unlimited. The retention of his office by a *tagus*, though bitter enough to his aristocratic rivals, was not really irksome to the peasant classes, who were free to resume their normal occupations. And after his campaign the *tagus* had in practice little more authority than the heads of other families.

The national army was recruited according to a system which is attributed to Aleuas and was based upon *κλήροι* or landed estates. In time of war the *Perioeci* were directly subject to the *κοινόν* and not to an individual tetrarchy; and a war-tax was levied on them in accordance with the organization of a somewhat later and less shadowy prince named Scopas. The systems of Aleuas and Scopas will be briefly described in a later chapter, when the use made of them by Jason is discussed.² The four original districts, now known as tetrarchies, also

¹ Daochus I was *tagus* for twenty-seven years during the period of the Peloponnesian War (Ditt.³, 274). He probably claimed that Thessaly, as an ally of Athens, was technically at war with Sparta and that he had thus a legal right to retain the *tageia*. Actually his power was so negligible that it was never revoked.

² See below, pp. 104-5 and 114.

had their place in this new constitution, and their existence can be traced throughout the historical period.¹ Each was governed by a tetrarch, who was in charge of all local administration and doubtless presided over a cantonal council. In time of peace the tetrarchies held control over the Perioecis,² just as they had before the days of Aleuas when they were still separate states. In a later age after the growth of city-states, the tetrarchy became otiose as a unit for local government, but in theory it still maintained a position intermediate between the *κοινόν* and the city, until eventually Philip secured its revival as the best method of subduing recalcitrant cities.

In a position below the free inhabitants of Thessaly stood the pre-Thessalian Penestae,³ who must

¹ The main evidence before the Macedonian conquest is: Aristotle fr. 497; Eur., *Alc.*, 1154; Ditt.³, 274 (Acnonius as tetrarch in the early years of the fifth century); *I.G.*, II², 1, 175 (the Attic inscription, on which see below pp. 135-8). Ferri, *Riv. Fil.*, VII (1929), pp. 359-70, believes that a tetrarchy is the union of four *ἀρχαί* and hence the whole of Thessaly was a tetrarchy. This is questionable Greek, and he neglects the evidence of the Attic inscription, which vouches for the political importance of the tetrarchies in the fourth century.

² Kahrstedt (p. 152) argues that the Perioecis was conquered by the tetrarchies after the formation of the national state, but this is certainly not proved by the fact that the Perioeci had separate votes at the Amphictyony.

³ The arguments of Kahrstedt (pp. 144-5) against the conventional view of a racial distinction between the Thessalians proper and the subject population do not seem convincing. The evidence of dialect is quite inconclusive, since the con-

have formed a large proportion of the total population in the plainland. While they are described as serfs, their serfdom was milder than that of the Laconian Helots, with whom they are often compared,¹ and risings against their masters were not very frequent.² Under the terms of a compact struck with the invading Thessali they could be neither banished nor put to death by their owners,³ and their status was little inferior to that of the free peasantry, the distinction between the two classes often becoming blurred. They were dependent not on the state but on their aristocratic overlords, whose power was largely built upon them.⁴ Normally they were not liable to military service, but their presence was of immense value to the national state, in that they could be employed as agricultural labourers, thus enabling the Thessalian army to be kept at full strength even in harvest-time.

During the first half of the sixth century enlightened administration of their national state so united the Thessalians that they formed the strongest military power in Greece. Moreover, by their

querors adopted the language of the conquered (Jardé, *Formation of the Greek People*, p. 83).

¹ Theop. fr. 119; Harp. and Etym. M. s.v. *πενέσται*; Pollux III, 83.

² Plato, *Leg.*, p. 776 d, implies that the system was successful, so that Arist., *Pol.*, p. 1269 a, probably exaggerates the frequency of such risings.

³ Archemachus fr. 1 (Müller).

⁴ Theocr., XVI, 34-5.

control of the Amphictyony at Anthela they were enabled to exert a wide influence over the lesser peoples of the north. After the first Sacred War the Amphictyony was transferred to Delphi, and its reorganization welded almost the whole of northern Greece into a Thessalian empire. Phocis was now subject, and it seemed that Boeotia too must soon be conquered. But here the tide of success turned. An aggressive foreign policy was continued throughout the half-century which preceded the Persian Wars, but the scanty notices of Thessalian affairs in this period present a catalogue of almost uninterrupted set-backs. This remarkable change in the course of Thessalian imperialism must be attributed to internal decay within the national state. It is, however, extremely difficult to determine the origin of this decay. In a less backward district factors of social and economic development might have been held responsible ; frequently the transitional stages from feudal aristocracy to urban democracy were attended by anarchy and bloodshed. But in Thessaly the supremacy of the barons was as yet unchallenged, for the growth of urban democracies did not become a serious menace until the middle of the fifth century. It was rather the intense rivalries of the baronial houses that hampered the efficient working of the national state, an influence which so often spelled disruption during the Middle Ages. Had one of these families been

sufficiently strong to monopolize the tageia, Thessalian history might have followed a very different course, but the earlier tagi came from at least three rival houses—the Aleuadae of Larisa, the Scopadae of Crannon, the Echekratidae of Pharsalus¹—whose equality afforded a disastrous source of weakness. Owing to repeated feuds national patriotism tended to be supplanted by loyalty to a local aristocracy. It may be conjectured that a tagus engaged in a foreign campaign would be deserted by a section of his army, and his consequent failure would cause the transference of the tageia from his family to another. Towards the close of the sixth century the Scopadae were overtaken by a mysterious disaster, whether accidental or the result of a conspiracy, which removed them from the field. However, the rivalry between the other two houses continued and seems to have caused them to take different sides when Xerxes invaded Greece.² The Aleuadae held the tageia at the time, but thanks to recent failure against the Phocians, their supremacy was somewhat precarious; their intrigues with Persia were clearly designed to set themselves permanently at the head of the national state, while the existence of a party loyal to the Greek cause was probably

¹ The Scopadae and Echekratidae seem to have become united by marriage.

² Cp. my article, *The Medism of Thessaly*, which is to appear in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, probably in 1935.

the result of counter-intrigues on the part of the Echekratidae. The miscalculations of the Aleuadae left their rivals temporarily supreme, but another influence quite distinct from baronial jealousies was now at work, which was to prevent Thessaly from playing a leading role in Greek history until a whole century had passed.

CITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIFTH CENTURY

After the Persian Wars the foreign policy of Thessaly was directed by the Echekratidae, who in 462 concluded an alliance with Athens. Some years later a force of Thessalian cavalry was dispatched to assist the Athenians against Sparta, but it treacherously deserted its allies during the battle of Tanagra.¹ This action must have been due to the unpopularity of the Echekratidae, for shortly afterwards Orestes, the head of the family, was banished from Thessaly and took refuge at Athens. Here he induced the Athenians to espouse his cause, and an army was sent to restore him, but after a fruitless siege of Pharsalus it was compelled to return home with its purpose unaccomplished.²

This series of events is symptomatic of a social revolution which was gathering strength throughout Thessaly. When the Aleuadae are said to belong to Larisa or the Echekratidae to Pharsalus, this

¹ Thuc., I, 107 ; Diod., XI, 80, 3-6 ; Paus., I 29, 9.

² Thuc., I, 111 ; Diod., XI, 83, 3-4.

does not mean that the family had its head-quarters in the town but that it dominated the surrounding district.¹ Thus the expulsion of Orestes signaled a victory on the part of the township of Pharsalus over its local aristocracy. For many years discontent had been growing among the poorer classes : as is common under a feudal system before the growth of towns, large estates tended to engulf small, and the small-holders began to fall into a state of dependence little higher than the serfdom of the Penestae, save that they retained their personal freedom. A system of clientship seems to have arisen, which Dionysius of Halicarnassus compares with that of Rome,² but the more ambitious spirits among the peasantry could scarcely be satisfied with an existence which supplied very little more than a bare livelihood. These grievances caused an influx of the country population into the newly formed towns, which would be regarded as oases in a desert of landed estates.

This process was naturally a slow one, but it began to be appreciable soon after the Persian Wars and is marked by the commencement of coinage by the principal Thessalian cities.³ There

¹ They lived rather in baronial castles, such as that at Amphanae (Kahrstedt, p. 135).

² *Ant.*, II, 9.

³ Larisa had started somewhat earlier. Thanks to the intrigues of the Aleuadae the earliest issues were struck on the Persic standard.

was indeed little inducement towards urbanization, and it is questionable whether Thessaly would ever have possessed considerable cities, had not this social unrest furthered their development. There was no staple industry,¹ and the export of corn, which later became so important for Pherae and some part of the Pelasgiotid plain,² cannot have been general throughout the country owing to the difficulty of external communications. The introduction of coinage provided a stimulus to local trading, but though Thessalian traders are found in Scyros in the time of Cimon,³ commercial dealings with other states were doubtless very slight. The coinage-standard adopted by the cities was Aeginetic, so that in the first half of the fifth century their meagre trade must have been conducted mainly by land with Phocis and Boeotia rather than by sea with more promising commercial centres such as the Euboean cities and Athens.⁴ Nevertheless, the gradual development of culture brought with it, as always, the need for fresh industries, and these would contribute towards the process of urbanization.

Among the growing cities Larisa at once sprang into prominence. In virtue of their superiority the Lariseans now put themselves at the head of a

¹ Absence of industry is proved by the export of slaves (Aristoph., *Plut.*, 521 ; Hermippus fr. 63 l. 19).

² See below, p. 49.

³ *Plut.*, *Cim.*, 8.

⁴ Head, *Historia Numorum*³, p. 291.

Coinage League which comprised most of the Pelasgiotid and Hestiaeotid towns together with Perrhaebia.¹ At first the members of the League continued their individual types, but soon the issue of all except the smallest coins became practically a Larisean monopoly. Pharsalus alone of the greater powers appears to have stood outside the League, while Pherae and Scotussa seceded about the middle of the century. Though no certain conclusions can be drawn from the silence of literary authorities, it seems unlikely that the Lariseans made any attempt to transform an essentially economic union into a political domination. This curtailment of their ambitions was a wise one, since the issue of coinage by the towns was a gesture of independence on which the barons very naturally frowned; and baronial estates still occupied almost the whole of the plain-land.

The struggle between the aristocracy and the citizen-bodies of the towns continued throughout the fifth century, but so far as can be judged from the scanty evidence, it rarely resulted in actual bloodshed. To swell their numbers the towns attracted as many outsiders as possible and did not scruple to admit even liberated Penestae to their citizenship. That the towns steadily gained ground

¹ Herrmann (*Z.N.*, XXXII, 1921, pp. 33-43) is responsible for the discovery of this League. His case appears to be established, if some of its details are conjectural.

is proved by archaeological evidence, for before the end of the century Larisa, Pharsalus, Pherae, and others had become *poleis* of considerable dimensions. In addition to urban development, these began to absorb adjoining land in conformity with Greek conceptions of a city-state, although in the Thessalian plains the limits of city-territories were not so easily defined as elsewhere. Hence, apart from the urban population, there arose a strong class of small proprietors living in the vicinity of the towns and enjoying a vote in the local assembly. This movement curtailed the baronial estates to some extent, but the aristocracy was not by any means a spent force. Some nobles were content to retire to their castles, keeping the still extensive residue of their former domains; others, and among them the Aleuadae, who had been associated with Larisa long before it became strictly a *polis*, were determined to regain their authority over the poorer classes by assuming control of city politics. While still retaining possession of their rural estates farmed by Penestae, they now made their home in town-houses within the walls of the city;¹ and since the structure of Greek political life virtually demanded the existence of two mutually destructive factions, this counter-stroke proved remarkably successful. Consequently by a curious paradox the aristocratic Aleuadae began towards the end of

¹ Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 235.

the Peloponnesian War to play a prominent role in Larisean party politics.

This social development naturally had its effect upon the subject populations. As has been already explained, the Perioeci were, according to the traditional system, subject in peace to the tetrarchies, in war to the *κοινόν*, but thanks to their inaccessibility they often enjoyed in practice some measure of political independence. When the tetrarchies had become almost obsolete and the national state had sunk into degeneracy, they fell under the control of cities, Perrhaebia being dominated by Larisa,¹ Achaea by Pharsalus ; ² and their surveillance by city-states may have been stricter than under the old organization. Nevertheless coins were issued by Perrhaebia as a tribal state in the fifth century and by several cities throughout the Perioecis in the fourth. The status of the Penestae seems to have been improved by the social revolution. It became a common practice to liberate individual serfs, and these freedmen, like those of Rome, frequently became wealthier than their masters,³ so that they would be welcomed as citizens of the towns.⁴ Occasionally an aristocrat would arm his

¹ Strabo, IX, p. 440.

² Probable, though not conclusively proved by Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 8, cp. Kip, *Thessalische Studien* (Diss. Halle, 1910), p. 57.

³ Archemachus fr. 1 (Müller).

⁴ Arist., *Pol.*, p. 1275 b. The new Larisean citizens who are the subject of Gorgias' joke would be mostly freed Penestae.

Penestae as a fighting force,¹ but this was exceptional, and Jason intended to employ them only as rowers for his fleet.²

Social unrest caused the prestige of the Thessalians to sink to a very low ebb throughout the Greek world, and the part which they played in Greek history at this time was an almost negligible one. Just as the jealousies of the aristocratic families had been a source of weakness in an earlier period, so in the latter half of the fifth century this new form of discord proved fatal to the organization of the national state, which appears to have fallen into abeyance. Foreign policy was conducted by the cities ; Thucydides expressly states that the army of cavalry sent to assist the Athenians in the first year of the Archidamian War was composed of city contingents.³ This army, after sustaining a trifling defeat at the hands of the Boeotians, apparently withdrew, and when some years later the Athenians sent an embassy to Pharsalus to beg for aid, no further support was forthcoming.⁴ Both cities and barons, fully engrossed in their own domestic problems, must have been anxious to avoid participation in a conflict which did not directly concern them.

¹ Dem., XXIII, 119.

² See below, p. 112.

³ Thuc., II, 22. The Larisean contingent was led by two commanders, 'one from each faction'.

⁴ Aristoph., *Vesp.*, 1270-4, with Schol.

So long as the interest of foreign powers in the Thessalians was confined to attempts to enlist the support of their valuable cavalry, there was little cause for alarm. Soon, however, this interest began to assume a new shape, so that until the final extinction of their autonomy they were seldom free from the menace of external intervention. Since their weakness and disunion was so patent, it seemed that by blending force with diplomacy an ambitious power might annex the country and thereby secure the use of both Thessalian man-power and Thessalian economic resources. In practice the task was an arduous one, and the prize was eventually gained only by the genius of Philip. The first state to entertain such ambitions was Sparta,¹ and the foundation of a Spartan colony at Heraclea in Trachis in 426 marks the beginning of a new era in which the Thessalians were gradually drawn into the struggle between Sparta and her successive enemies. It was but seldom that the Spartans founded a colony, and their action could only indicate that they intended not only to control the Spercheius valley but also to encroach upon the Thessalian plains. The establishment of an outpost on their very borders was naturally resented by the

¹ The Spartan expedition to Thessaly soon after the Persian Wars may have been undertaken in order to conquer the country, but the object of this expedition is problematical and its details inadequately recorded.

Thessalians, who made constant raids against it,¹ but a concerted attack was impossible owing to the prevailing unrest. Symptomatic of these dissensions is the story how Brasidas, aided by several Thessalian nobles, successfully smuggled through the country the expeditionary force which he was leading to Chalcidice before the cities could organize effective opposition.² Later, however, the influence of Perdiccas stirred the Thessalians to action, so that two subsequent relief forces from the Peloponnese were prevented from reaching Chalcidice.³ Heraclea had a stormy history, suffering as much from the misgovernment of Spartan officers as from the attacks of local tribes. In the winter of 413-412 King Agis led an army northward from Decelea, terrorized the tribes of the Spercheius valley into submission, and in spite of Thessalian protests extracted hostages from Achaea Phthiotis,⁴ thus disclosing the imperialistic ambitions of Sparta. Nevertheless, Heraclea scarcely fulfilled expectations, and its existence continued to be most precarious.⁵

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Racially the Thessalians had an indisputable claim to be classed as Hellenes. They lived on the outskirts of the Hellenic world, but unlike the

¹ Thuc., III, 92-3. ² Id., IV, 78. ³ Id., IV, 132 and V, 13.

⁴ Id., VIII, 3.

⁵ Xen., *Hell.*, I, 2, 18.

Macedonians and Epirotes, they were not hybrids ; the subject peoples are described by the indefinite terms Pelasgian and Achaean, which are applied to the population of the entire Greek peninsula in the period before the migrations, while the Thessalians were an integral branch of the invading race from the north-west which swept onwards and occupied the Peloponnese. It is even possible that the Thessalians, in virtue of their isolation, maintained a purer stock than seafaring Greeks, who came into closer contact with foreign races. Thus the attitude of many ancient writers who tend to regard them as semi-barbarian cannot be justified on ethnic grounds, but is due rather to the fact that the Thessalian way of life was, owing to the geographical peculiarities of the country and the slow advance of civilization, fundamentally different from that of most other Greek peoples.

In the eyes of the average Greek the Thessalian was chiefly remarkable for his proverbial wealth.¹ This does not refer so much to the comparatively easy circumstances of the peasant proprietor, but to the enormous riches of the land-owning baron, which enabled him to live a life of almost oriental splendour. These nobles were of a type which was rapidly becoming extinct in Greece at the close of the sixth century, but which constituted the ideal of Pindar.

¹ Critias fr. 8 (Diels) ; Plato, *Meno.*, p. 70 a ; Isocr., VIII, 117.

Thanks to their wealth they could hire the greatest of lyric poets to sing their praises ; Simonides wrote in honour of the three leading houses,¹ and the earliest extant ode of Pindar was composed about 498 at the command of Thorax, an Aleuad of Larisa.² Critias believed that this baronial magnificence was a legacy from the Persian occupation of Thessaly,³ but Simonides and Pindar received splendid hospitality some years earlier, and it must date back to the hey-day of the national state. Many years later Polydamas of Pharsalus is praised by Xenophon because he entertained with typical Thessalian liberality,⁴ but Isocrates, remarking that Gorgias spent long periods among the Thessalians 'when they were the most prosperous of the Greeks', implies a serious decline in aristocratic wealth in the early years of the fourth century.⁵ Thessalians of all classes were notorious for prodigious orgies of eating and drinking,⁶ and their appetites became a constant butt of Athenian comic poets,⁷ whose audiences would have welcomed similar opportunities.

Thessalians had more sympathy with athletic

¹ Plato, *Protag.*, p. 339 a ; Theocr., XVI, 34-47.

² *Pyth.*, X. ³ Fr. 31 (Diels). ⁴ *Hell.*, VI, 1, 3.

⁵ XV, 155, the date of publication being 353.

⁶ Theop. fr. 51 and 153.

⁷ Aristoph. fr. 492 (Oxford) ; Crates fr. 19 (Kock) ; Philetaerus fr. 19 ; Alexis fr. 213 ; Eriphus fr. 6 ; Mnesimachus fr. 8.

than with intellectual pursuits. Fine horsemanship was an innate quality, and the most characteristic local sport was that of *ταυροκαθάγία* or bull-throwing, which is vividly represented on the coins of Larisa and other cities.¹ A horseman would approach the bull and grasp it by the horns, hurling himself off his mount, which galloped away riderless. Thes-salians were interested in many other types of sport and won many prizes at the Hellenic festivals, their earliest victory being in the horse race at Olympia on the first occasion that this event is mentioned.² The nobles could well afford elaborate training for their athletes and horses, but it is remarkable that three brothers, who were apparently aristocrats, being members of a prominent Pharsalian family and sons of a tetrarch, won victories in person in such events as the pancration, the stadion, and wrestling.³ The decline of aristocratic wealth is mirrored in the subsequent paucity of Thessalian victories, for after Pulydamas of Scotussa, who was the most famous athlete of the Greek world at the end of the fifth century,⁴ Thessalian names do not figure prominently in the lists of victors.

Thessaly was not the special province of any single deity, perhaps because the summit of Olympus was the traditional home of them all. Particular

¹ Seltman, *Greek Coins*, p. 80 ; cp. Artemidorus, I, 8.

² Paus., V, 8, 8 ; cp. the list of Afranius in Eusebius.

³ Ditt.³, 274. ⁴ Paus., VI, 5, 5 ; VII, 27, 6.

reverence was paid to three major divinities—Zeus, lord of Olympus, Poseidon, the god of horses, who was believed to have drained the plains by cleaving the outlet of Tempe, and Athena Itonia, whose worship, being general also in Boeotia, was probably a survival of pre-Thessalian days. All of these or their symbols are represented by the coin-types of cities, while the healer Asclepius appears on the bronze coins of Tricca. The Thessalian hero *par excellence* was Achilles, and an embassy was annually sent to sacrifice to his tomb at Troy; this practice was occasionally discontinued, the result perhaps of an attempt by the Aleuadae to substitute their own Aleuas as the national hero in place of the Phthiotid Achilles.¹ The worship of Artemis-Hecate, whose centre was at Pherae,² marks the boundary between formal and magical cults, the latter being especially prominent in Thessaly. In more developed communities primitive superstitions tended to be suppressed, thanks to the rationalizing influence of Greek culture, but Thessaly remained through the centuries a home of witchcraft.³

Absence of native writers adversely affected Thessalian reputation, since works dealing with local

¹ Philostr., *Heroic.*, XX, 25-31; cp. Radet, *Rev. Et. Anc.*, XXVII, 1925, pp. 81-93.

² Lycophr., 1180; Callim., *Hymn III*, 259. Hecate figures on many Pheraeon coins.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 513 a; Aristoph., *Nubes*, 749, with Schol.; and frequently in later authors.

history and constitutional forms were written mostly by outsiders, whose treatment was often unsympathetic. Thessalian writers were very few in all periods,¹ and only two of these, Cineas, possibly the minister of Pyrrhus, and a Suidas who may have lived in the first century B.C., are known to have composed local histories, whereas Hellanicus from Mitylene, Critias from Athens, Aristotle from Stagirus, Staphylus from Naucratis are all credited with *Θετταλικά* of various kinds.² The stigma of lawlessness was richly deserved at certain times during the fifth and fourth centuries, but Greeks from other districts failed to realize that this was largely due to social evolution and that their own states had at an earlier date passed through similar periods of turbulence. Thessalians were also notorious for their treachery, though they do not seem to have been conspicuously less trustworthy than their fellow Greeks. This accusation, which like that of lawlessness³ dates only from the close of the fifth century,⁴ must have been originally lodged

¹ Polycleitus and Medius, both of Larisa, and Cyrsilus of Pharsalus wrote accounts of the campaigns of Alexander in the East (Jacoby, *F.G.H.*, II *b*, pp. 667-73). Timolaus of Larisa performed the curious feat of 'doubling' the Iliad.

² The provenance of Archinus and Philocrates, who also wrote such works, is unknown.

³ Isocr., VIII, 119 and *Ep.*, II, 20; cp. Livy, XXXIV, 51.

⁴ Eur. fr. 422 is apparently the earliest reference; cp. Dem., I, 22 and XXIII, 112.

by the Athenians when disappointed by the paltry results of their Thessalian alliance. Another charge was older and had a far surer foundation—namely, that of Philistinism and intellectual sterility. Culture never thrived in any form, and as early as the days of Alcman the Thessalians had gained a name for rustic stolidity which he contrasts with the intellectual refinement of Asiatics.¹ Simonides actually considered them too stupid to be deceived by him.² When in the opening of the *Meno* Socrates says that the Aleuadae and other nobles have ‘fallen in love with wisdom’ thanks to the teachings of Gorgias, this is clearly one of those passages of polite irony from which he leads up to the discomfiture of his victim.³ More sincere is the opinion which he makes the ‘Laws of Athens’ express in the *Crito*, that Thessaly is not a fit place in which to hold conversations about virtue.⁴ An obvious lack of artistic sense was displayed in the construction of the monument erected at Delphi by the Pharsalian Daochus, a haphazard collection of figures dissimilar in style and size, which nevertheless contained the magnificent Agias, probably a genuine work of Lysippus.⁵ Daochus spared no expense in the glorification of his family, but his methods were crude and tasteless. From a cultural

¹ Fr. 24 (Bergk-Schaefer). ² Plut., *Mor.*, p. 15 D.

³ Plato, *Meno*, p. 70 a-b ; cp. Philostr., *Vit. Soph.*, p. 481.

⁴ Plato, *Crito*, p. 53 e. ⁵ Poulsen, *Delphi*, pp. 265-93.

standpoint, therefore, the Thessalian might well be classed as a semi-barbarian, for he possessed none of that lively imagination which is characteristic of the Greek genius. The question might be raised at a meeting of learned doctors whether the Boeotian was more civilized than the Thessalian,¹ but few would doubt that the latter had an even stronger claim to the Boeotian nickname of 'swine'.

¹ Athen., VIII, p. 350 a.

CHAPTER III

LARISA AND LYCOPHRON OF PHERAE

καταφρονεῖται μὲν ἡ δύναμις τῆς χώρας, καταγελώμεθα δ' αὐτοί
(PSEUDO-HERODES)

THE political and economic condition of Thessaly towards the close of the fifth century bears some resemblance to that reached by other Greek states nearly two hundred years earlier. The usual outcome of this situation in the Greek world was a tyranny, but in many respects the Thessalian position was unique. Thessaly was not a single city-state nor, while the germ of national feeling survived, a mere collection of isolated city-states, and owing to the vast extent of plainland there was no land-hunger to aggravate the social problem. Further, the power of the nobles, built upon a foundation of age-long tradition, was strengthened by their unusual wealth, by their legal ownership of the Penestae, and by their facility for transforming themselves into a city aristocracy. In consequence, tyranny became firmly established in

one city only,¹ though in this case it proved remarkably durable.

It was shortly before the end of the Peloponnesian War that the rivalry between nobles and commons resulted in civil war. The democratic movement made a false start in the attempt of Critias, later one of the Thirty at Athens, and an unknown Prometheus to raise the Penestae against their overlords.² Critias failed, but his scheme had far-reaching consequences, since it was probably under the shadow of this rising that Lycophron made himself tyrant of Pherae. This city controlled the maritime trade-route for the export of Thessalian corn and the import of manufactured goods. Trade, as usual, brought an influx of radical ideas, and the Pheraean demos was the most progressive in Thessaly, holding an additional advantage in the absence of a dominating local family. However, it was not sufficiently developed to dispense with the intermediate stage of a popular tyranny, and, as it happened, the final stage of absolute democracy was never reached.

It would be a mistake to reduce the Pheraean tyrants to a mere series of successful corn-merchants. Lycophron, however, was evidently no aristocrat,

¹ Kahrstedt, pp. 136-7, has no justification for assigning the tyranny of Simus at Larisa to the opening years of the fourth century.

² Xen., *Hell.*, II, 3, 36 and *Mem.*, I, 2, 24; Philostr., *Vit. Soph.*, XVI, p. 213. The date is about 406.

and despite the absence of definite evidence it seems more than likely that he owed his tyranny, and his descendants their wealth,¹ to the creation of an export trade. At a time when the havoc caused by the Peloponnesian War had made Greece less self-supporting than ever before, corn from Thessaly would find a ready market. Commercial development of local resources was a new venture, but Lycophron perhaps bought up the produce of the eastern plain and shipped it from Pagasae. There is evidence of resentment at Larisa that the profits derived from local corn-production found their way into the pockets of merchants, and these middlemen were probably Pheraeans.² Lycophron may well have amassed a fortune by commercial enterprise and thereby enriched a section of the plebeian classes, who naturally supported him.³ Mercenaries were readily hired by any one who could pay them, for at the time many Greeks were left unemployed, whose only profession was soldiering, and these were not yet absorbed by the enlistment of the 'Ten Thousand'. From this point it but required a successful coup, and the tyranny would be his. At all events, when once tyrant, he acted with all

¹ Jason's mother and brothers were rich (Polyaen., VI, 1, 2-7).

² So Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 281-3, interprets a difficult passage in [Herodes] 14.

³ The earlier Pheraean tyrants were popular with the masses (Diod., XV, 61, 2).

the energy of an upstart, and bringing his city at once into prominence, declared it his ambition to rule over the whole of Thessaly.¹

Meanwhile it was at Larisa that the struggle between the classes was most bitter and most lasting. Here the nobles stood their ground longer than elsewhere owing to the immense power of the Aleuad family, which had been conspicuously successful in changing itself from a feudal baronage into a city aristocracy. Evidence referring to the early years of the fourth century proves that the aristocratic party, headed by the Aleuadae, had regained much of its former prestige. Aristotle states that only a privileged class was admitted to a certain 'free market',² while an inscription gives a list of noble Larisean families, probably those to whom a particular magistracy was open.³ Soon, however, this party was forced to fight for its very existence.

In the approaching conflict the confusion was increased by foreign intervention, which except for a brief period during the targeia of Jason remained a constant menace throughout the century. Thessalian party politicians, abandoning the former policy of isolation, did not hesitate to employ a fatal artifice of short-sighted statesmanship—the enlistment of foreign aid to settle their domestic

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, II, 3, 4.

² *Pol.*, p. 1331 a.

³ *I.G.*, IX, 2, 524.

disputes.¹ These methods were frequently successful in their primary object, but it was scarcely to be expected that extraneous powers would lend disinterested support to the disputants. Sparta and Macedonia, who now became intimately involved in Thessalian politics, were prepared to answer appeals, but the rewards which they demanded in return for their services were equally exorbitant. The Spartans had, of course, been long interested in northern Greece, and when after the fall of Athens they were eager to enlarge their sphere of influence, Heraclea formed an excellent base from which to establish their hegemony over Thessaly. Macedonia had similar ambitions. Archelaus had greatly improved the organization of his kingdom² and, abandoning the vacillating foreign policy of Perdiccas, was ready to carry out far-reaching schemes for the formation of a Macedonian empire. Before the end of the fifth century he too was plotting to turn the disputes of the Thessalians to his own advantage.

The story of these disturbances, and especially of the revolutionary movements at Larisa, where the parties are not clearly defined, can only be reconstructed with the greatest difficulty. The

¹ Condemned by [Herodes] 15.

² Thuc., II, 100. The best account of Archelaus is that of Geyer, pp. 84-104.

authorities consist of incidental notices by Xenophon and Diodorus, together with a curious pamphlet entitled *περὶ πολιτείας*, which is extant under the name of Herodes Atticus, the well-known rhetorician of the second century A.D. This pamphlet deals with a political crisis in an unnamed city, which has for some time been dominated by Archelaus ; the extreme oligarchs are anxious to continue this connexion with Macedonia, but the author, who belongs to a more moderate party, counsels the acceptance of a Spartan offer to intervene. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus has preserved any record that Archelaus ever extended his influence into Thessaly, but a fragment of Thrasy machus proves that he did interfere at Larisa,¹ and this contemporary evidence is supported by an anecdote in Aristotle's *Politics*.² Hence the city whose misfortunes are the subject of the pamphlet is certainly Larisa, and the situation described by the author cannot be wholly imaginary. A rhetorical exercise composed at least five hundred years later than the events with which it deals would be almost worthless as an historical authority ; but several scholars have concluded that it is in fact a contemporary document belonging to the closing years of the fifth

¹ Fr. 2 (Diels), from his speech 'For the Lariseans'—*Ἀρχελάῳ δουλεύσομεν, Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρῳ*.

² p. 1311 b, where it is implied that Archelaus could have restored a Larisean to his native city, if he had so wished.

century.¹ Although this theory has encountered strong opposition, it is now generally accepted. Few believe that a competent master of rhetoric, even though writing in a consciously archaic style, could produce a composition so utterly devoid of literary distinction; it is rather the work of an author who is passionately interested in his subject but incapable of expressing his opinions artistically or even lucidly. Perhaps the pamphlet was studied in the Antonine 'schools' as an example of early rhetoric and thus became associated with the name of Herodes Atticus.² The author possesses considerable knowledge of the social and economic conditions obtaining in Thessaly,³ while his less perfect understanding of the general situation in the Greek political world is consistent with the belief that he was a Larisean. Of the many dates to which the pamphlet has been assigned, the most convincing is 400 B.C. It is true that relations between Sparta and Elis were not in that year so cordial as the author appears to believe,⁴ but as the latter state would be remote and unimportant in

¹ Notably by Drerup, *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums*, II (1908); Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 259-83; Beloch, III, 2, pp. 16-18.

² Philologists cannot agree whether it contains words and phrases from later Greek. If it does, these are no doubt the result of tampering by the rhetoricians, who would be less likely to alter historical facts.

³ 14-15.

⁴ 28.

Larisean eyes, this trifling misrepresentation does not necessitate the exclusion of the suggested dating,¹ and it may even arise from textual corruption.²

In September 404 Lycophron won a great victory over the Lariseans and his other Thessalian enemies.³ No details are extant, but there can be little doubt that Larisa was under the aristocratic leadership of Aristippus and the Aleuadae,⁴ whose object it was to crush the rising democratic power of Pherae. The victory of Lycophron may have been due to the superiority of his mercenaries over the ill-organized force at the disposal of his foes. This battle dealt a serious blow at the position of the Aleuadae as rulers of Larisa and caused, if not an actual revolution, certainly a movement towards a more popular form of government. A new party of moderate oligarchical principles and perhaps not unfavourable to Lycophron now held sway for a short period,⁵ and to this party belonged the author of the pamphlet *περί πολιτείας*. These 'moderates' were none too secure and found themselves forced

¹ Adcock, *Klio*, XIII (1913), p. 251, considers this error to be important.

² In the context the name of an Arcadian city would be more natural. 'Heracans', the suggestion of Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.*, XLIV (1924), p. 61 n. 25, is not very convincing.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, II, 3, 4—the passage may be an interpolation, but there is no reason to doubt the truth of its facts.

⁴ Plato, *Meno*, p. 70 a-b.

⁵ [Herodes] 30; Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 260-1.

to make concessions to extreme democratic feeling by wholesale grants of citizenship.¹ However, they succeeded in establishing a kind of *πάτριος πολιτεία*,² a phrase which towards the end of the Peloponnesian War had become a political catchword of convenient elasticity.³

In reply to this movement Aristippus promptly appealed to Cyrus, who was his personal friend, for two thousand mercenaries and three months' pay. Cyrus, anxious to maintain a large mercenary army in readiness for his Anabasis, granted him double with pay for six months.⁴ This resort to violence was naturally decried by the enemies of Aristippus, since it enabled him to gain a temporary advantage over them.⁵ Soon, however, his troops were ordered to join the army at Cyrus and they set out for Asia, accompanied by a small Thessalian contingent under Meno, a young aristocrat of Pharsalus.⁶ Aristippus did not accompany the expedition himself owing to the insecurity of his faction. According to Xenophon, he became

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.*, p. 1275 b (Gorgias' joke) and p. 1305 b.

² Highly praised by [Herodes], 30-1.

³ Drerup, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁴ Xen., *Anab.*, I, 1, 10.

⁵ [Herodes] 15.

⁶ Xen., *Anab.*, I, 2, 6; Diod., XIV, 19, 8. The thousand hoplites who were led by Meno are evidently distinct from the mercenaries supplied to Aristippus. Diodorus, *loc. cit.*, calls Meno a Larisean, but this is a mistake, cp. Plato, *Meno*, p. 70 b, who implies that he was not of the same city as Aristippus, and Diog., *Laert.*, II, 50.

'reconciled to those at home', and from this indefinite statement it can hardly be inferred that he crushed his opponents, but rather that the withdrawal of external aid forced him to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.¹ To collect another mercenary army at this time would be a difficult and expensive task. Moreover, the danger from Lycophron was more pressing than before, since he had by now become an ally of Sparta,² and there was every likelihood of Spartan intervention from Heraclea. Consequently Aristippus was compelled to address an appeal to Archelaus of Macedon, probably in the early spring of 401, when the army of Cyrus was being mobilized.

Archelaus was glad of any opportunity to interfere. He had already taken advantage of these political upheavals to win control of Perrhaebia,³ the special sphere of Larisa, and perhaps deliberately fomented them for his own ends.⁴ Macedonian troops were now admitted to the city, and the power of the aristocrats re-established by violent measures, which, however, can scarcely have amounted to the reign of terror described by the moderates.⁵ It is possible that Archelaus was granted the citizenship

¹ Xen., *Anab.*, I, 2, 1. Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 252 and 262, appears to misinterpret this passage.

² This is a certain inference from Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 24, and subsequent events in the struggle between Lycophron and Medius.

³ [Herodes] 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16-18.

of Larisa ¹ and more than likely that he left a garrison to ensure obedience to his wishes.² He also removed ten boys, chosen from the noble houses, to the Macedonian court as hostages.³ Thessaly was thus in danger of becoming a province of Macedonia, but Archelaus soon found that he could not further pursue his ambitions without involving himself in open war with Sparta.⁴

Spartan foreign policy during these years is not easily followed owing to the episodic character of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, but it certainly included definite schemes for the extension of her influence in northern Greece. In the spring of 400 her hands were free, for hostilities with Elis were drawing to a close, and the war with Persia had not yet begun. The rising power of Archelaus was regarded with such alarm that he had been refused admission to the confederation of Spartan allies ⁵ and was considered a dangerous enemy. Accordingly the Spartan government made an offer, either by an embassy or through agents, to interfere in party politics at Larisa and to expel the Macedonians. These proposals were eagerly welcomed

¹ Ibid., 17.

² Ibid., 29, where the best reading seems to be that of Beloch, III, 1, p. 24 n. 4.

³ [Herodes] 33.

⁴ An account of these events recorded from the Macedonian point of view is given by Geyer, pp. 94-7.

⁵ [Herodes] 24.

by the moderate party, and at this point the pamphlet *περὶ πολιτείας* was issued to urge their acceptance. The author is careful to avoid any mention of Lycophron, who, now an ally of Sparta, had inflicted the serious defeat upon Larisa four years earlier. He also tries to equate his own ideal of a *πάτριος πολιτεία* with the constitutions set up by Sparta after the eclipse of Lysander.¹ But it must have been obvious that Spartan interference would necessitate drastic concessions, including probably the substitution of a Spartan garrison for that of Archelaus. The argument also that as an arbitrator Sparta would be less dangerous than Macedonia is particularly unconvincing.²

Events had now reached a critical stage not only for Thessaly, but for the whole of Greece. War with Macedon seemed imminent, and as that country was not regarded as truly Hellenic, the Spartans could raise the old war-cry of 'Greek against Barbarian'. However, the crisis was never reached, nor is it known to which side the Lariseans eventually decided to attach themselves, for in the winter of 400-399 Archelaus was killed while hunting, probably the result of a domestic conspiracy.³ His successors were neither sufficiently secure nor suffi-

¹ [Herodes] 30-1 ; Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 274-5. ² *Ibid.*, 32.

³ Diod., XIV, 37, 6 ; Aristotle, *Pol.*, p. 1311 b—no certain conclusions are to be drawn from the fact that Hellanocrates of Larisa was one of the conspirators.

ently enlightened to continue his policy, so that the Thessalians were left to settle their disputes without Macedonian influence. Nor were the Spartans so ready to play an active part, since immediate danger was removed by the death of Archelaus, and the war in Asia had now become an absorbing distraction. Their sole action was to send in 399 an officer named Herippidas to quell a revolution at Heraclea.¹ In this way Spartan control of the Spercheius valley was maintained and the road to Thessaly kept open.² It must have been at this time also and probably with the aid of Lycophron that a Spartan garrison was established at Pharsalus, which is found there in 395.³

At Larisa the aristocratic party of the Aleuadae lost none of its strength despite the withdrawal of Macedonian support. Aristippus has disappeared from history, and his successor, who is now mentioned for the first time, was a certain Medius. Beloch⁴ and other scholars⁵ believe that Medius

¹ Diod., XIV, 38, 4-5 ; Polyæn., II, 21.

² Xen., *Hell.*, III, 5, 6 for the Oetaeans, Malians, and Aenianes supplying contingents at Haliartus.

³ Diod., XIV, 82, 6.

⁴ III, 1, p. 22 n. 1. Geyer, p. 95 and art. Medios (1) in *P.W.*, regards this as improbable, Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 254 n. 1, as impossible.

⁵ As Costanzi, pp. 100-1.

was the political opponent of Aristippus and was concerned in the Larisean defeat of 404, but there is no reason to believe that he became prominent so early. Beloch is unable to adduce convincing evidence in support of his theory,¹ and since he rightly regards Medius as an aristocrat, he has to presuppose a schism in the aristocratic party, which is incompatible with the situation described in the Herodes pamphlet. Medius was the enemy of Sparta and of Lycophron, and the words of Diodorus indicate that he was the leader of a narrow oligarchical party.² Hence it is almost certain that he was an Aleuad, who inherited the mantle of Aristippus.

Desultory warfare between Medius and Lycophron had already lasted for some years prior to the outbreak of the Corinthian War. Supported by Spartan goodwill and perhaps even by active assistance from the garrisons at Pharsalus and Heraclea, Lycophron was more than a match for his rival. Thus in 395, when Athens, Boeotia, Argos, and Corinth formed an alliance against

¹ It rests upon the arbitrary interpretation of a passage in Aristotle; see below, pp. 63-4.

² Diod., XIV, 82, 5, τοῦ τῆς Λαρίσσης . . . δυναστεύοντος. Medius was certainly not a tyrant. The word *δυναστεία* is often used of a narrow and irresponsible oligarchy; cp. Thuc., III, 62 (Thebes) and IV, 78 (Thessaly), and is a technical term in the *Politics* of Aristotle (Swoboda, p. 61; Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*, I, p. 358). Aristotle (*Pol.*, p. 1308 a) also describes the members of such a party as *δυνάσται*, and Aeschines (III, 220) uses *δυναστεύων* in a similar sense.

Sparta, Medius begged the allies to send troops to Thessaly. The Theban victory at Haliartus had resulted in the isolation of the Spartan outposts in the north, and these might well be captured, if an attack were made before Agesilaus returned from Asia. The allies thereupon dispatched an expeditionary force of two thousand Boeotians and Argives,¹ who reached Thessaly in the autumn. With this reinforcement Medius at once achieved striking success by gaining possession of Pharsalus.² The city fell not by storm but by the consent of a section of its inhabitants, to whom the Spartan garrison was distasteful. An Athenian inscription of a few years later honours a certain Iphitus of Pharsalus for past services, which may include the betrayal of his city to the allies.³ Sisyphus the Daochid also, who was a personage of some note at this time,⁴ may have deserted the Spartan cause and intrigued with the allies; the phrasing of the Daochus inscription is enigmatic and seems to conceal some discreditable action.⁵ At all events, Pharsalus was now in the hands of Medius, the

¹ Diod., XIV, 82, 5.

² Ibid., 6.

³ Ditt.³, 133. This and the preceding inscription do not amount to evidence of a formal alliance between Athens and Thessaly.

⁴ Theop. fr. 19, which helps approximately to fix his date.

⁵ Ditt.³, 274. Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 255, somewhat fancifully regards the reference to Pallas as evidence of intrigue with Athens.

Spartans were massacred, and this exploit was celebrated by the first and only issue of didrachms at Larisa.¹ After this the allied army, acting independently of Medius, took Heraclea, also by treachery. The town was restored to the Trachinians of Oeta, who had been expelled from their homes in 399, but a garrison of Argives was left to secure their loyalty to the allies.²

Spartan control of southern Thessaly and the Spercheus valley was thus completely destroyed, and in the following year (394) the march from Macedonia to Phocis presented a serious problem to Agesilaus. Had the allies sent an army to Thessaly, they might have prevented his return, but they were bent upon dealing Sparta a crushing blow during his absence. Larisa, Crannon, Scotussa, Pharsalus, and other cities were ready to oppose him,³ but their preparations were tardy and somewhat irresolute—the result no doubt of constant struggles with Lycophron. Agesilaus at first attempted conciliation and sent two envoys to Larisa, where a remnant of the pro-Spartan moderate party must have survived, but the envoys were imprisoned by the Lariseans and only with

¹ Stählin, art. Larisa (3) in *P.W.*, XII, col. 851.

² Diod., XIV, 82, 6–7. The Aenianes and Athamanians were also induced to desert Sparta.

³ For this episode, Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 3, 3–9, and *Ages.*, 2, 2–5; Plut., *Ages.*, 16, and *Mor.*, p. 211 E; Polyae., II, 1, 17. Paus., III, 9, 12–13.

difficulty recovered under a truce. Plutarch would have his readers believe that Agesilaus entertained the design of besieging Larisa, but this detail is clearly introduced only to give colour to a characteristic apophthegm. In truth Agesilaus was anxious only to pass through Thessaly with the maximum of speed and the minimum of loss. By some means he seems to have given his enemies the slip and reached southern Thessaly before he was seriously challenged.¹ Here a cavalry army, composed mainly of Pharsalians and under the command of Polycharmus of Pharsalus, harried his column to such an extent that in Achaea he left the main road and took to the mountains of the Othrys range. By a clever manœuvre he defeated the superior Thessalian cavalry in an engagement fought between Pras and Mount Narthacion,² in which Polycharmus was killed. This victory, which gave Agesilaus great satisfaction, enabled the Spartan army to reach Phocis without further opposition.

One more event remains to be mentioned in the conflict between Larisa and Lycophron, but it is one which presents peculiar difficulties. In his *Historia Animalium* ³ Aristotle states that 'about the

¹ It is possible that Lycophron may have caused a diversion, though he is not mentioned by the authorities.

² For the topography, Stählin, pp. 187-8.

³ IX, 31, p. 618 b—also Pliny, *N.H.*, X, 33.

time when the mercenaries of Medius were killed at Pharsalus' a dearth of carrion crows was noticed in other parts of Greece. Beloch has based his reconstruction of this period on the identification of this disaster with the victory of Lycophron over the Lariseans in 404. But, as pointed out above,¹ there is no reason to date the career of Medius so early, nor is there any evidence that the battle in 404 was fought at Pharsalus. It is sheer absurdity to contend that the disaster must have taken place at a time when there was universal peace in Greece and a consequent slump in carrion. Unfortunately Aristotle was more interested in the crows than in Medius or contemporary history. It does, however, seem far more satisfactory to date the catastrophe soon after the return of Agesilaus. The partisans of Sparta would be encouraged and her enemies discredited by the failure of the Thessalian aristocratic cavalry. Pharsalus had previously shown leanings towards the Spartan cause and nothing is more likely than a revolution, in which the troops stationed there by Medius were massacred to a man. This was the beginning of the party strife which culminated in the re-establishment of Spartan control and the appointment of Polydamas to his unusual office, as will be described in the following chapter.²

Neither Medius nor Lycophron is mentioned

¹ pp. 59-60.

² See below, pp. 77-8.

again by our authorities, and indeed for nearly twenty years Thessalian history is practically unknown. The continuance of inter-city and inter-party struggles made united action impossible and prevented Thessaly from taking any part¹ in the Corinthian War. Until the rise of Jason the Perioeci remained independent, always a reflection of weakness in the national state. The noble families still held a slight advantage, which was increased by the cessation of the unnatural alliance between Sparta and the tyrant-house of Pherae. When the King's Peace left the Spartans free to revive their northern policy, they seem to have conciliated 'the Thessalians', that is, the dominating aristocratic parties at Larisa and elsewhere. Shortly before the Olynthian War Amyntas of Macedon, an ally of Sparta, was restored to his kingdom by Thessalian support,² and during that war Spartan armies must have marched through Thessaly unchallenged. The preliminary force under Eudamidas may have been sent by sea, but the army of Phoebidas evidently intended to take the land route and that of Teleutias must actually have done so. Heraclea, liberated from Boeotian and

¹ Geyer, p. 116, erroneously states that a part of the Thessalian army fought at Coronea. Xen., *Hell.*, IV, 3, 15, only mentions the Aenianes.

² Diod., XIV, 92, 3 and XV, 19, 2. Beloch, III, 1, p. 102 n. 1, and 2, pp. 57-8, rightly points out that the two passages refer to a single restoration.

Argive domination under the terms of the King's Peace, once more became a Spartan fortress. The date of its recovery is unknown, but the Spartans, who interpreted the autonomy clause as suited to their own interests, probably reoccupied the town soon after 386.¹ Finally, in 381 Thessalian cavalry voluntarily assisted King Agesipolis at Olynthus.² This reversal of policy on the part of the Thessalians can be attributed to no more definite reason than a desire to be on good terms with the power which was temporarily supreme. And to the Spartans the allegiance of a conservative aristocracy was more satisfactory and creditable than their former association with an ambitious revolutionary.

¹ A Heracleot contingent fought at Leuctra, Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 9. The question of Pharsalus is treated in Chapter IV.

² Xen., *Hell.*, V, 3, 9—it was doubtless supplied by the nobles.

CHAPTER IV

JASON AND THE UNIFICATION OF THESSALY

Ἰάσων ἐφη πεινῆν δε μὴ τυράννοι

(ARISTOTLE)

THESSALIAN history during the first decade of the fourth century scarcely contains the promise of a brilliant future. Rival cities and rival factions are too evenly matched for any one of them to stage an effective revival of the *κοινόν*, which appears doomed to extinction. A succession of mediocre political leaders displays to a marked degree that lack of principle and of continuous policy which is a prominent feature of Greek history in the early fourth century. There follows a period of years on which the authorities have next to nothing to report. From this silence suddenly emerges a wellnigh united Thessaly ready to play a part among the leading powers of Greece. It is unfortunate that this astonishing development cannot be traced from its outset, but it was clearly the work of a single man of genius. Lycophron had conceived the project of extending his local

tyranny to embrace the whole of Thessaly, but he relied on the old fatal policy of alliance with self-seeking foreign powers. Jason, on the other hand, avoided such dangerous short cuts and stands out against a drab background of petty intrigue. To him alone is due the credit for creating for the first time since the sixth century and for the last time in history a powerful and united Thessaly.

The family relationship between the various tyrants of Pherae is a question of some difficulty, though of little historical importance. It is a natural inference from a passage of Xenophon that Lycophron and Jason were father and son.¹ Perhaps between the reigns of the violent Lycophron and the energetic Jason there may have been a period of comparative peace under Polyalces, brother or eldest son of the former, whose friendship Isocrates claims to have enjoyed.² No direct evidence can be adduced for the tyranny of Polyalces, but it well suits the inactivity of Pherae from 394 till after 380. Jason does not seem to have been the eldest surviving son of Lycophron at the time of his accession and may have resorted to intrigue or violence in order to gain the tyranny.³

¹ *Hell.*, VI, 4, 24.

² *Ep.*, VI, 1. Beloch, III, 2, pp. 80-4, adequately disproves the old reconstruction of the family tree by Pahle, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, XCIII (1896), pp. 532 sqq.

³ Alexander, son of Polydorus, was evidently many years older than his cousins, the children of Jason.

Of his youth nothing is recorded beyond a few more or less unhistorical anecdotes. Polyænus¹ narrates a number of rather infantile 'stratagems' employed by him to fleece his mother and brothers. These stories are at least useful in illustrating the wealth of the family and, at the same time, the serious difficulty of maintaining mercenary forces on the limited resources of Phærae. Jason was a keen admirer of the essentially practical philosophy of Gorgias² and received personal instruction during one of the philosopher's visits to Thessaly. To his early manhood probably belongs the story how he was cured of an ulcer by an attempted assassination.³

The year of his accession to the tyranny is not determinable. At the beginning of the war between Sparta and the Chalcidian League he had not yet become tyrant or was at any rate still a negligible power. But shortly after the fall of Olynthus he assisted a certain Neogenes to make himself tyrant of Oreus-Histiæa on the north coast of Eubœa. This tyranny was naturally frowned upon by Sparta, so that presently a Spartan officer named Theripidas⁴ expelled Neogenes and established a

¹ VI, 1.

² Paus., VI, 17, 9.

³ Cic., *N.D.*, III, 70 ; Val. Max., I, 8 ext. 6.

⁴ Parke, *C.Q.*, XXI (1927), pp. 157-65, may be right in identifying this 'Theripidas' with the Herippidas who was a harmost at Thebes at the time of Pelopidas' coup and was afterwards executed (Plut., *Pel.*, 13). The expulsion of

garrison. When therefore in the summer of 377 the rest of Euboea joined the Athenian Confederacy, Histiaea remained aloof, and its territory was ravaged by the fleet of Chabrias.¹ Eventually in the autumn the Spartan garrison was expelled by the crews of two Theban triremes, which had been sent to Pagasae to obtain corn from Jason.² This sequence of events shows Jason at the outset of his career as the enemy of Sparta and the friend of Thebes, a policy in direct contrast to that of his father, but evidently the result of exceptional foresight and sound judgement. Heraclea and Pharsalus were in Spartan hands, and Sparta was no doubt eager to continue her northern policy at the first opportunity. However, the growing power of Thebes on land and of Athens by sea was sufficient to distract Spartan arms from Thessaly, especially after the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy.³ Hence Jason could with some confidence hope for a few years of respite in which to extend his present local tyranny into a pan-Thessalian union. With

Neogenes would then have taken place before December 379. Parke's view that the army of Herippidas at Thebes was to be used against Jason is a very unconvincing conjecture.

¹ Diod., XV, 30.

² Xen., *Hell.*, V, 4, 56-7. Thebes had lost two successive harvests owing to Spartan invasions.

³ Jason was not necessarily committed to hostility with Sparta by supporting Neogenes, but certainly was by supplying Thebes with corn.

Thebes and Athens he could remain on terms of friendship without making himself liable to any obligations which might hinder the development of his plans.

At the moment when Jason suddenly appears as a clear figure in our historical authorities he was already master of nearly all the largest cities of Thessaly.¹ Lycophron never enjoyed this supremacy, and the advance of the Pheraeon tyranny must be due to superior ability and superior organization. It may be assumed that Jason relied on similar sources of income, but he employed his wealth to better effect by maintaining a standing army of 6,000 picked and highly trained mercenaries. His personality also, which seems to have been an attractive one, may have made him more popular with the Pheraeon demos than Lycophron had ever been. At all events, this authoritative position in Thessaly can only have been won at the expense of hard fighting extending over several years. Pharsalus, now perhaps the equal of Larisa, was often on the opposing side,¹ but the aristocratic cavalry and untrained hoplite militia, of which the city armies of the day were composed, were no match for a trained force of mercenaries. Jason himself was no mean general and was the inventor of a rhomboid cavalry formation much used in

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 5.

later times.¹ It would be interesting to know how he gained possession of Larisa, hitherto the headquarters of opposition to the Pheraeon tyranny ; but there survives no shred of information on the policy of the Aleuadae or of any party at Larisa during these critical years.

Outside the borders of Thessaly Jason could not in 374 lay claim to a very formidable array of conquests. The Dolopian mountaineers were his subjects and may have proved useful as peltasts.² Subject also were the Maracians, a mysterious tribe only once mentioned elsewhere,³ who must have lived somewhere in the Pindus range. A more valuable acquisition was Alcetas, king of Molossia, who had made himself lord over most of the semi-civilized peoples of Epirus and was apparently a personal friend of Jason. They probably joined the Athenian Confederacy at almost the same time and both journeyed to Athens as witnesses for the defence at the trial of Timotheus.⁴ From the reported words of Jason it is clear that Alcetas was in theory his vassal, but it would be a mistake to suppose that this dependence involved considerable obligations ; the army of Pherae cannot have contained an Epirote contingent. However, a defen-

¹ Arrian, *Tact.*, 16, 3.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 7, enumerates these allies.

³ By Pliny, *N.H.*, IV, 6, as one of the Aetolian tribes.

⁴ [Dem.] XLIX, 10, 22, 24.

sive alliance was manifestly to the advantage of both princes. As Epirus looked westward, their interests would not clash, while each in the pursuit of his ambitions was anxious to be secure from aggression by the other. Jason, as the more powerful party in this contract, received formal acknowledgement of his overlordship. Thus in the course of his interview with Polydamas, which will be described below, he could without serious exaggeration use his theoretical supremacy to impress this Pharsalian official and, indirectly, the Spartan government.¹

During the years of Jason's rise to power the most striking event in the Greek world was the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy. In the well-known inscription which contains a list of its members,² a name has been anciently erased, and this name many scholars believe to have been that of Jason. Since Fabricius first produced this theory,³ the question has been hotly disputed.⁴

¹ On the relations between Jason and Alcetas see Klotzsch, *Epirotische Geschichte bis zum Jahre 280 v. Chr.*, pp. 45-7, and Cross, *Epirus*, pp. 33-5. Criticizing the former, Nilsson, *Gött. gel. Anz.*, 1912, p. 379, points out that there is no evidence of any help given by Jason to establish Alcetas in a commanding position in Epirus. Jason was, in fact, far too much occupied at home.

² *I.G.*, II², 1, 43.

³ *Rh. Mus.*, XLVI (1891), pp. 589-95.

⁴ Ditt.³, 147 n. 41; Stähelin art. Jason (3) in *P.W.*; and elsewhere.

Beloch argues against the view of Fabricius,¹ but Wilcken has proved that a reported statement of Jason, wherein he expresses reluctance to form an alliance with Athens,² refers to his plans for the distant future and has no bearing, as Beloch believes, on his disputed membership of the Confederacy.³ It is generally agreed that this membership was short-lived, being merely a preliminary step in the progress of his far-reaching schemes. Contemporary events point to the following explanation. He joined the Confederacy in the autumn of 375, as Fabricius maintains, and was still a member in the spring of 374 when Polydamas went on his mission to Sparta. However, in the peace negotiations of that summer between Athens and Sparta his membership must have proved a serious obstacle, since the proposed Peace reaffirmed the terms of the King's Peace, including the clause stipulating that all Greek cities should be autonomous.⁴ A strict application of this clause to Thessalian affairs would be distasteful to the Spartans and to Jason alike. The former, smarting from their recent loss of Pharsalus,⁵ would be pledged to abandon their

¹ III, 1, p. 165 n. 2 and 2, p. 58. ² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 10.

³ *Hermes*, LIX (1924), pp. 123-4.

⁴ Isocr., XIV, 10; Diod., XV, 38, 2. The continuance of the Athenian League was not regarded as an infringement.

⁵ See below. Sparta always claimed to be the champion of autonomy and the enemy of despots. Cp. the Spartan attitude towards Archelaus.

northern policy, while Jason, signing as a member of the Confederacy, could scarcely retain the Thessalian cities which he had won. Accordingly it was arranged that he should resign from the Confederacy, though he remained on excellent terms with Athens.¹ It is no objection to this theory that, when in November 373 he journeyed with Alcetas to Athens to plead for Timotheus, both are described as 'allies' of Athens.² Forensic oratory did not demand a high standard of historical accuracy, and it would satisfy the hearers of the speech against Timotheus that Jason had been an ally of Athens until shortly before this visit and remained a friend until his death. On the other hand, if he had never been an ally, even an advocate, speaking in 362 could hardly have defined him as such. Alcetas retained his membership, for though he was hostile to Sparta, his ambitions were not so prejudicial to Spartan interests. In these peace negotiations difficulty would also arise in regard to the occupation of Boeotian towns by Thebes, who was also a member of the Athenian League. The Thebans merely chose to pursue a different policy from that of Jason, namely to sign the Peace in order to be rid of Spartan garrisons and later

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 2, 10. Ctesicles, who was sent post haste to Corcyra and helped by Alcetas, must have taken the land route and passed through a friendly Thessaly.

² [Dem.] XLIX, 10. Alcetas is always named first (cp. *ibid.*, 22, 24) and perhaps stood closer to Athens.

to repudiate their side of the contract. However, the Peace proved abortive, so that these motives never came to light.

It was some months before the conclusion of this Peace that Jason, still a member of the Confederacy, first came into serious collision with Sparta. The clash of interests occurred over Pharsalus,¹ and the authority for these events is the long but not always satisfactory account by Xenophon ² of Polydamas's mission to Sparta. Pharsalus was of course the key to southern Thessaly, occupying a commanding position on the road from Thermopylae to Larisa and the north. To keep this road open was of immense importance to Sparta, and Pharsalus would be even more valuable to her interests than Heraclea.³ No mention of the former is made by our authorities since its opposition to Agesilaus in 394 and the disaster which befell the mercenaries of Medius shortly afterwards.⁴ But there must have been considerable strife between local factions some years before Polydamas appeared at Sparta.⁵ Spartan armies passed Pharsalus on their way to

¹ Tropea, *Giasone*, pp. 37-47 (the best section of the book), is here largely followed with several differences and developments.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 2-19.

³ For a parallel occupation of Pharsalus and Heraclea see above, p. 59.

⁴ See above, p. 64.

⁵ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 2, *στασιάζοντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι*.

Chalcidice, and it seems certain that some commander, perhaps Agesipolis, for whom Thessalian cavalry fought at Olynthus, took advantage of this anarchy to win the city. The evidence for this lies mainly in the unusual and ill-defined position of Polydamas.

Xenophon represents him as a sort of enlightened *aesymnetes* appointed by consent of each party to restore peace. But Xenophon is notoriously a Spartan partisan and would suppress intrigues with treacherous party politicians, which probably led up to the capture of Pharsalus. Moreover, he is obviously an admirer, if not a personal friend of Polydamas,¹ and in fact the whole story reads like an uncritical eulogy. Aristotle mentions a *μεσίδιος ἄρχων* appointed in Larisa for a crisis of this kind,² and Polydamas may have held some such position. It is, however, extraordinary that, as *aesymnetes* or *μεσίδιος ἄρχων*, he should have made no attempt to legislate, but apparently merely marked time. His position and conduct are far more intelligible if we regard him as definitely appointed by Sparta and forced upon the Pharsalian populace.³ Possibly he was even supported by a

¹ For the sources of the Polydamas speech, see Banderet, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Hellenika*, Diss. Berlin, 1919, pp. 41-2.

² *Pol.*, p. 1306 a—there is no indication of date.

³ Tropea believes that he was a secret agent of Sparta, which credits him with singular inability to maintain secrecy—his speech at Sparta was a public one.

Spartan garrison, at any rate until the return of the armies from Chalcidice.¹ His own account of his relations with Sparta is proof of his very definite responsibilities, far beyond those of an ordinary proxenos.² The opposition of Pharsalus to the encroachments of Jason is consistent with a position as subject ally of Sparta. Polydamas had already held this peculiar office for a number of years³ and with considerable success. He was, as it were, a legalized tyrant, liable to an annual presentation of his accounts to some assembly or council, just as an Athenian magistrate presented his *εῦθυναί*. That he was not an irresponsible tyrant is proved by the necessity of 'persuading the city' to agree to his compact with Jason.⁴ Evidently he could not rely on the universal support of the Pharsalians and had lost much of his authority owing to the withdrawal of the garrison and the decline of Spartan prestige throughout Greece.

If possession of Pharsalus was valuable to Sparta, it was essential to Jason. Already he made no secret of his ambition to revive the Thessalian national state and secure his own election to the

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 3, *τὴν τε ἄεραν φυλάττων*.

² Ibid., 4—also the use of *ἀποστήναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους* in 13.

³ Ibid., 3, *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*, cp. the story how he made up any deficit in the year's accounts and paid himself back another year.

⁴ Ibid., 18.

office of tagus ; and it is evident from the words of Xenophon that without the support of Pharsalus and its dependent cities he could not legally claim to assume the tageia.¹ Unfortunately no information is extant on the methods employed in the election of a tagus, but as the office originated in the distant past before the growth of cities, the tetrarchies must have been responsible for the ultimate choice. If, as seems likely, the vote of each of these four cantons was required to secure a legitimate election, the anxiety of Jason to obtain the vote of the tetrarchy Phthiotis—‘ Pharsalus and the cities dependent upon you ’²—is very easily explained. This object could have been attained by force of arms, but an attempt to take a city of such strength by storm would be a most formidable undertaking and would involve the loss of precious time. Therefore Jason devised a Themistoclean scheme, which he hoped would gain Pharsalus for him without bloodshed and at the same time seriously alarm Sparta. He invited Polydamas to a conference and issued the following ultimatum, expounding his case with the utmost frankness.³ The allegiance of the Pharsalians was essential to him, and though prepared to resort to force as a

¹ Ibid., 8.

² Ibid. These were the lesser cities of the tetrad and not those of Achaea, which being outside Thessaly proper would have no vote.

³ Ibid., 5-12.

last expedient, he would much prefer that they should follow him as willing allies than as disaffected subjects. If they were persuaded to join him, he would make Polydamas a partner, second only to himself, in the furtherance of his pan-Thessalian ambitions. On the other hand, refusal of these terms would certainly lead to the extinction of Pharsalian independence, for Polydamas could not hope to check the advance of Jason without the active support of Sparta. Polydamas, as Jason foresaw, replied that he must first consult the Spartan government¹ and at once set out for this purpose. Jason knew that Sparta was at the time preoccupied by the naval war against Athens and the land war against Thebes, for the Peace of 374 was not concluded until after these events.² He could be fairly confident of Athenian and Theban support in the event of a Spartan attack. Moreover, a Spartan force, at present in Phocis under King Cleombrotus,³ was fully occupied in preventing the Boeotian army from overrunning Phocian territory and was not intended for operations in Thessaly.⁴ Polydamas considered this force insufficient to be effective against Jason; for he made no mention of it in his speech and insistently asked,

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 13. ² *Ibid.*, 2, 1. ³ *Ibid.*, 1, 1.

⁴ Stähelin, *op. cit.*, considers that this expedition was directed also against Jason. But Xenophon expressly states that its purpose was the defence of Phocis against Boeotian invasion and mentions no other motive.

as Jason had cunningly advised him, for a large army or none at all.¹

Though credit is due to Jason for a brilliant diplomatic stroke, his diplomacy must at the same time have been something of a gamble. If Sparta had been able to send an army, there is little doubt that, even with external support, Pherae would have shared the fate of Olynthus. As it happened, Jason gambled and won. Very reluctantly the Spartan government came to the conclusion that for the present they were unable to send an army, though they hoped to interfere at a future date.² This confession of weakness was very bitter to Sparta and of great value to Jason for purposes of propaganda.

Its immediate result was that Polydamas had no alternative but to submit to the demands of Jason. It was agreed that the acropolis of Pharsalus should not be surrendered, but to ensure his loyalty the children of Polydamas were handed over as hostages.³ A far more important consequence was that Jason with the additional votes of the Pharsalians was now elected tagus of all Thessaly.³ Although his position had, like Roman dictatorships of the late Republic, the semblance of legality, it was constitutional only in theory, since the support of most of Thessaly had been gained by conquest,

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 13-14.

² *Ibid.*, 17.

³ *Ibid.*, 18.

that of Pharsalus by intimidation. The tagi of old had always been leaders of the predominant noble family, appointed by common consent for a stipulated national enterprise. Jason, on the other hand, was an upstart democratic tyrant, who had imposed himself on the country by the efficiency of his mercenaries and the astuteness of his diplomacy, and clearly did not intend his power to be either temporary or exclusively military. A tyrant-tagus must have appeared somewhat anomalous, and as technically a tagus could only be elected for a foreign war or to deal with some crisis of vital importance, his rights might well have been challenged. However, the strict letter had not always been observed in the past, and at the moment of his appointment he was a member of the Athenian Confederacy, so that his country was in theory at war with Sparta. It would be a mistake to suppose that all the Thessalians were enthusiastic supporters of their new leader. At this early stage his enemies were many,¹ and the achievement of his first objective must have caused general misgiving. As tagus he was now entitled to raise a national army, but any attempt at mobilization on a large scale would at present have been highly dangerous. He had no wish to forge a weapon which he could not fully control, nor did any of his present enterprises justify a national levy. Hence he was content to

¹ *Xen., Hell.*, VI, 1, 14.

draw up a theoretical army-list ¹ and perhaps commenced to train those portions of the national army upon whose loyalty he could rely. The rest must be gradually conciliated by diplomacy or dazzled into acquiescence by the brilliance of his exploits. He was careful not to interfere with the personal rights of his subjects, and his rule was always regarded as mild.²

¹ See below, p. 105.

² Diod., XV, 60, 5.

CHAPTER V

JASON AND THE GREEK WORLD

ισχυρῶς ἔδεισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες αὐτὸν μὴ τύραννος γένοιτο

(XENOPHON)

FROM 374 to 371 the energies of Jason were devoted to the consolidation of his position in northern Greece. There was work to be done in plenty,¹ as his new Thessalian army needed organization and training, while the surrounding tribes must all be won over to his side. To this period certainly belongs the reduction of Perrhaebia, which Diodorus dates after the Leuctra campaign.² As Perioeci the Perrhaebians would be

¹ Beloch, III, 2, p. 237, arguing against the usual dating of the Pharsalus episode (he favours 371), refuses to believe that Jason 'sat quietly at home for three or four years'. But surely his time was fully occupied.

² XV, 57, 2. He crowds almost all his account of Jason into a single year (371/70). The fact that in ch. 57 he represents the Thessalians as suspicious of Jason and in ch. 60 as enthusiastic for his cause proves that the events cover a number of years. Costanzi, pp. 112-13, followed by Stähelin, dates the Perrhaebian expedition and the Macedonian alliance before Leuctra. Xenophon mentions neither, but the omission is typical of his methods.

liable to pay taxes to the new Thessalian tagus in accordance with the traditional system. They had, however, after the death of Archelaus taken advantage of Macedonian weakness and Thessalian anarchy to establish their independence and now probably refused to meet their obligations. They had formerly owed particular allegiance to Larisa, which can scarcely have recovered from its wars with Lycophron. Jason reduced Perrhaebia by a mixture of violence and diplomacy, a sure indication that his fighting machine was not yet in perfect condition.

These operations brought him into collision with Amyntas III of Macedon, who, as is attested by a recently discovered inscription, held some authority over part of Perrhaebia.¹ This inscription, however, only proves temporary control and only of the very mountainous district later known as Tripolis.² Elimeiotis, which lay between Perrhaebia and Macedon, was usually a separate princedom, and Derdas II, its present ruler, though on good terms with the Macedonian court, was in theory

¹ Wace and Thompson, *B.S.A.*, XVII (1910-11), pp. 195-204.

² Rosenberg, *Hermes*, LI (1916), pp. 499-509, is therefore wrong in using this inscription to defend Diodorus's late dating of the Perrhaebian expedition and in arguing that through the support of Amyntas the Perrhaebians were able to defy Jason until after Leuctra. Geographically Perrhaebia belongs to Thessaly and not to Macedon.

independent.¹ There was therefore no necessity to regard Amyntas as a dangerous neighbour—he was throughout his long reign never very formidable—but rather as a probable victim of Thessalian imperialism. Hence Jason was certainly not too sanguine when in his interview with Polydamas he expressed confident hopes that he would eventually acquire Macedonia,² which would be invaluable to him, especially as a source of ships' timber. He now approached the king with proposals, which must have seemed very like an ultimatum. Amyntas found himself in a difficult position; for he was no match for Jason and was also being threatened by the Chalcidian League, whose members had, through joining the Athenian Confederacy, recovered much of their former power.³ Accordingly he agreed to terms, which were more or less dictated by Jason. The only authority for these negotiations speaks of a formal alliance,⁴ but two rhetorical passages leave no room for doubt that Macedon fell largely under Thessalian influence and was even in danger of losing its autonomy.⁵ This settle-

¹ According to Geyer, pp. 125–26, it was only as an arbitrator appointed through the influence of Derdas that Amyntas interfered in Tripolis.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 11. Tropea, *op. cit.*, p. 48, and Wilcken, *op. cit.*, p. 125, are certainly right in regarding *ἐχόντες* as referring to the future.

³ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II², p. 9. ⁴ Diod., XV, 60, 2.

⁵ Isocr., V, 20, *Θετταλοὺς μὲν τοὺς πρότερον ἐπάρχοντας Μακεδονίας* and Arrian, *Anab.*, VII, 9, 4, *Θεσσαλῶν δὲ*

ment was probably reached early in 373. In the summer of the same year Timotheus was operating in the northern Aegean, and Amyntas, who supplied him with timber,¹ strengthened his own position somewhat by concluding an alliance with Athens.² This could be done without a breach with Jason, whose relations with Athens were still quite good and who was actually present at Athens in November of this year. To the end of his reign Amyntas continued this conciliatory policy towards the leading Greek powers and was represented at the Peace Conference of Sparta in 371.³

False interpretation of the Polydamas speech has led to the belief that for some years before his death Jason was the avowed enemy of Athens. Two passages from late authorities would seem to support this belief. Polyaeus narrates an anecdote how Iphicrates at a peace parley tricked Jason and forced him to terms.⁴ The story, however, is suspiciously theatrical for the fourth century and would be more suitably associated with the mythical than with the historical Jason. Meyer believes that Iphicrates made an expedition to Thessaly from Corcyra,⁵ but such an undertaking, involving a long march over difficult country, was far beyond

ἀρχοντας, οὓς πάλαι ἐτεθνήκειτε τῷ δέει, ἀπέφηνε. Both must refer to this time.

¹ [Dem.] XLIX, 26-9. ² *I.G.*, II², I, 102. ³ Aesch., II, 32.

⁴ III, 9, 40.

⁵ *G.d.A.*, V, pp. 405-6.

his very inadequate financial resources.¹ It is also barely conceivable that a diplomatic triumph over so formidable an enemy as Jason should have been ignored by the Attic orators. Still less convincing is the statement of Cornelius Nepos² that Timotheus, after personal friendship with Jason, later conducted a war against him. This is clearly the unhappy fabrication of some eulogist to illustrate how his hero valued patriotism above friendship. Niese, seeking to explain the quarrel, which he imagines to have taken place between Athens and Jason, suggests a clash of naval interests in Euboea or the islands.³ Certainly Jason possessed some ships at the time of Leuctra,⁴ but these cannot have been sufficiently numerous to cause the Athenians much alarm. Eventually a breach was unavoidable, especially when his naval scheme was brought to completion; Jason realized this⁵ and so refused to commit himself to a formal alliance. However, he was murdered before his plans had reached this advanced stage, and though his murderers were doubtless received with as much enthusiasm in Athens as elsewhere, this sentiment was due more to apprehension than to hostility.

With the Thebans Jason maintained still closer friendship. In 374 he was an ally of Thebes only

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 2, 37 for his sailors working as labourers.

² *Timoth.*, 4, 3. Timotheus held no Athenian command from 373 until after the death of Jason.

³ p. 111. ⁴ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 21. ⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 10-12.

in so far as both were rather half-hearted members of the Athenian Confederacy; for his indefinite reference to a Boeotian alliance, which is quoted by Polydamas,¹ belongs to his programme for the future.² But a formal alliance had been concluded before the battle of Leuctra.³ He was a friend of Pelopidas⁴ and made an unsuccessful attempt to bribe Epaminondas in the course of some unknown negotiations, before the latter's rise to fame.⁵ Moreover, since his wife was probably a Theban,⁶ and a daughter, born perhaps shortly before the King's Peace, was named Thebe,⁷ his friendship with that city appears to have been of long standing.

The foregoing outline of his policy shows that Jason was determined to play no part in the affairs of central and southern Greece until his hegemony

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 10.

² Wilcken, *op. cit.*, p. 126—the present *ὑπόσχεσις* affords no objection.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 20; Diod., XV, 54, 5.

⁴ Plut., *Pel.*, 28.

⁵ Plut., *Mor.*, p. 193 B and 583 F; Aelian, *V.H.*, XI, 9. The first and last of these passages imply that the occasion was just after Leuctra, but it is very hard to see what was to be gained by bribery at that time. Probably some writer linked the story to the only meeting between Jason and Epaminondas with which he was familiar.

⁶ She retired to Thebes after his death (Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 37—see below, p. 155) and was thus surely a native.

⁷ The name might have been a compliment to Phthiotic and not to Boeotian Thebes, but in view of Xen., *loc. cit.*, this is highly unlikely.

in the north was thoroughly consolidated. He must have viewed with intense satisfaction the barren and exhausting struggle between Sparta and the ill-balanced confederation of her enemies. In spite of his friendship with Athens and Thebes and his hostility to Sparta he refused to be drawn into the war, well content to bide his time. In 371 the chance for which he was waiting suddenly presented itself, earlier perhaps than he had expected ; but here was a golden opportunity to play a leading role, and he seized it with characteristic fervour.

In his attitude at the Peace Conference of 371 Epaminondas cannot be wholly acquitted of rashness. No one knew so well as he the strength of the newly organized Boeotian army, but the Boeotian League was not yet a reliable political unity, and still more important, he could hope for no external support. There may have been a party in Athens which opposed peace with Sparta, but when once the Peace was signed, it was hardly likely that a breach would take place before the inevitable Spartan invasion of Boeotia. Jason was the only ally from whom any help might be expected, and he was not the type of man to pull down Sparta at the expense of setting up Thebes. Beloch believes that Epaminondas relied on the active support of Jason,¹ but this seems impossible. He was not,

¹ III, 1, p. 116.

according to the better account, summoned before the battle of Leuctra, though there was plenty of time, and the smallness of his army, when he was eventually summoned, shows that he was not expecting such a call.

The two main authorities for the Leuctra campaign, Xenophon and Diodorus, present such irreconcilable contradictions that historians are compelled to follow one or the other almost exclusively. Most have inclined to Xenophon and with good reason; his account is at least a soldier's, though he can rarely be acquitted of partisanship and is never at his best when dealing with Spartan failures. Diodorus is largely dependent on Ephorus, whose accounts of military operations were notoriously unscientific; ¹ he may in addition have used more expert authorities, but they are so obscured by his usual confusion of thought as to be quite unrecognizable. One of the vital differences between the two accounts concerns the movements of Jason. According to Diodorus, Jason arrived and negotiated an armistice before the battle,² whereas Xenophon expressly states that the messengers to Athens and to Jason were not sent until after the battle and added to their announcement of the victory an urgent request for help.³ Xenophon must surely

¹ Polyb., XII, 25 f. 3, states that his description of Leuctra, together with that of Mantinea, was particularly ludicrous.

² XV, 54, 5.

³ *Hell.*, VI, 4, 19-20.

be right. Jason certainly took no part in the battle, and it is incredible that, if he had been present, he should have assumed the part of a distinguished spectator. It may seem strange¹ that, as an ally, he was not summoned before the battle, but only when victory had been already won. But Epaminondas must shrewdly have guessed that the Thessalian, while not anxious to fight for an apparently desperate cause, would be only too glad of a share in the fruits of victory. And subsequent events substantiated this belief.

If therefore the account of Xenophon be accepted as the truth, the movements of Jason present no difficulty. Invited to lend his support to the final attack on the Spartan camp, he lost no time in preparations. His fleet was ordered to sail at once southwards; it was not yet considerable, but as Athens, the only strong naval power, remained neutral, it might prove of some value. He himself set out in great haste with an army of only 2,000 in all²—1,500 infantry, being the 'household' section of his mercenary force, and 500 cavalry, apparently his personal following.³ The speed of his march was due partly to a desire to pass through hostile

¹ Stähelin, *op. cit.*, who is undecided which authority to follow, regards this as an insuperable difficulty in the account of Xenophon.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 21. The numbers of the army are given by Diod., XV, 54, 5.

³ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἱππέας.

Phocis without hindrance ; for though the Phocians had sent part of their army to Leuctra,¹ a small force might cause a serious check in such difficult mountain country. A far more important reason was to reach Leuctra in time to make his presence felt.

As may be inferred from the inactivity of the defeated army and the precipitancy of a relief force led by Archidamus, the Spartan camp was for some days previous to the arrival of Jason practically in a state of siege.² Naturally the Boeotians expected that his trained mercenaries would add welcome stiffening to their attack, but instead of aiding them he refused to take any action and persuaded them not to make the attempt. At the same time he urged the Spartans to ask for an armistice and himself negotiated a truce, whereby they evacuated Boeotia unmolested.³ It is perhaps surprising that the Spartans should have submitted to the mediation of an avowed enemy, but as their retreat was very seriously endangered, they were not in a position to object, and he craftily intimated that he would do his best for them. It is now generally agreed that his advice to both sides was sound. A Theban

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 9.

² So Cary convincingly argues in *J.H.S.*, XLII (1922), pp. 186-8. It might plausibly be conjectured that Jason was informed of the expedition of Archidamus before the news reached either Boeotians or Spartans.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 22-6.

attack would have been hazardous and might have lost the immense advantage in prestige gained by the battle, while an offensive by Sparta could scarcely have reversed the result. Nevertheless Xenophon is certainly right in holding that Jason was eager to foster the hostility between the two powers and so make himself indispensable.¹ A similar policy was later pursued by Philip and carried to its logical conclusion. If Jason could give good advice to allies and enemies alike and at the same time serve his own interests, there was everything to be gained by such an attitude. Nothing could have suited his purposes better than this gift of fortune, which made him practically the arbitrator of Greece. It must have appeared immediately after the Spartan retreat that Jason had reaped the fruits of a victory so laboriously won by Thebes.²

The return march of the Thessalian army was not so precipitate. Jason plundered parts of Phocis, hereditary enemy of Thessaly since the First Sacred War, and stormed the outer defences of Hyampolis.³ He also marched through the territory of the

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 25—he qualifies the statement with *ισως*. Costanzi, p. 111, is surely looking too far ahead in crediting Jason with a desire to avoid further bloodshed in view of his pan-Hellenic expedition against Persia. See below, p. 117.

² Meyer, *G.d.A.*, V, p. 416.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 27.

Locrians and perhaps secured their allegiance.¹ Heraclea, always dangerous as a Spartan outpost, which had supplied cavalry at Leuctra,² was attacked and taken by treachery.³ The city was deprived of its fortifications and handed over to the Oetaeans, while its territory was divided between the Oetaeans and the Malians.⁴ The unmistakable object of Jason in these operations, and especially in the disarmament of Heraclea, was to secure for himself an open road to central Greece. It is absurd to contend that he was only acting as an ally of the Thebans and upon their instructions,⁵ the Malians and Oetaeans being also Theban allies. His conduct at Leuctra proves that he was very far from being under the thumb of Epaminondas, and he would never have acted in a manner so damaging to his own interests as almost to invite Theban domination of Thessaly. Moreover, the Malians and Oetaeans, though doubtless allies of Thebes soon after the death of Jason,⁶ can at this point have scarcely been other than subject allies of the Thes-salians, in a position little above that of the Perioeci.

The value of this march to Leuctra lay not only in the shock which it caused throughout Greece, but

¹ Diod., XV, 57, 2. Most editors regard *Λοκρίδα* as a mistake for *Φωκίδα*, but Opuntian Locris does not seem at all unlikely. The words need not mean any more than a military parade.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 9. ³ Ibid., 27; Diod., XV, 57, 2.

⁴ Diod., loc. cit. ⁵ As Niese, p. 112. ⁶ See below, p. 128.

also—almost more important to Jason at this time—in the effect which it had on his own countrymen. In 374 Polydamas could draw a convincing picture of the apprehension felt among the Thessalian cities, many of which would readily revolt upon the arrival of Spartan troops.¹ Another authority vouches for the alarm with which the advance and ambition of Jason were regarded.² However, this latest exploit obviously impressed the Thessalians, as is reflected by the authorities.³ They began to feel a sense of their own importance : if they associated with Jason in his schemes, the resulting benefits might well more than compensate for the very mild curtailment which he set upon their autonomy.

It is almost certain that at this moment Jason, in order to encourage these feelings, issued a manifesto whose substance is preserved by Diodorus.⁴ Thessaly was to strike a blow for the hegemony of Greece, a prize which owing to the weakness of the four traditionally leading cities could well be carried off by an energetic power. Sparta was weakened by the disaster of Leuctra, Athens confined her ambitions to sea power, Thebes was not worthy of

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 14—*πᾶσαι γὰρ φοβοῦνται ὅποι ποτὲ προβήσεται ἡ τοῦ ἀνδρός δύναμις.*

² Diod., XV, 57, 2. This must belong to the period before Leuctra—see above, p. 84 n. 2.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 28 ; Diod., XV, 60, 1-2.

⁴ Diod., loc. cit. Stäbelin hints at the possibility of such a manifesto.

the premier position, Argos rendered impotent by civil strife. It must have been hard to disparage the increasing power of Thebes in view of recent events, and Jason was driven to generalization. But in the course of the next few years his opinion that Thebes was 'unworthy' was amply justified; it is to his credit that he was perhaps the first to realize the weakness of Epaminondas's purely military genius. At all events, the manifesto fired the Thessalians to loyalty and unity not witnessed for two centuries. Jason could now with safety devote his attentions to foreign policy, and few monarchs could boast of a power built upon such solid foundations.

When Jason reached Thessaly on his return from Leuctra, the campaigning season was already over. His manifesto was probably issued in the autumn, and the winter was spent in further consolidation of his now formidable resources. In the spring of 370 he announced his intention of attending the Pythian Games in August and September, ordering the Thessalian cities to provide magnificent sacrifices for the festival. More significant, he commanded them to mobilize the national army in readiness for a military expedition.¹ From Xenophon onwards historians have found it difficult to define precisely the object of these preparations.

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 29-30. Grote, *History of Greece*, VIII, p. 186, points out that the two previous celebrations of the festival had been adversely affected by the war. Hence there was excuse for special display.

Nor is this remarkable, since Jason himself evidently intended by the indefinite threat underlying his orders to evoke feelings of panic in Greece. In a land where communications were difficult and imaginations lively, the value of rumour could not be overestimated. The report quoted by Xenophon that he intended himself to preside over the festival and games was doubtless well founded,¹ and it is more than likely that he planned a revival of the Amphictyonic League, which had for many years lapsed into comparative obscurity. The value of this League as a medium for uniting northern Greece was later exemplified by the diplomacy of Philip. As the Thessalian representatives are named first in inscriptions² and could, together with the votes of the Perioeci, command a majority on the Council, an instrument for Thessalian hegemony lay ready to hand.

The most disturbing rumour current at the time is quite beyond belief and clearly the outcome of panic—that Jason intended to seize the Delphic treasures. It is notable that this rumour, which Xenophon mentions with caution amounting almost to incredulity,³ had come by the time of Aelian to

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 30—ὥς ἔφασαν.

² Pomtow, art. Delphoi in *P.W.*; cp. inscriptions in the section on the Hieromnemones.

³ *Hell.*, VI, 4, 30—περὶ μέντοι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων ὅπως μὲν διενοεῖτο ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἄδηλον. Both Dionysius I and Alcetas of Molossia were suspected of the same design.

be regarded as an established fact.¹ The reputed answer of the oracle that the god would take care of the matter himself is an ingenious fabrication to explain the mystery surrounding the murder of Jason. By such a coup Jason would rid himself at once of financial difficulties ;² he could have attracted in large numbers to his standard the wandering bands of unemployed mercenaries which are a feature of the fourth century. However, the price to be paid for these advantages was obviously too high. He would at a blow have estranged all the Greek powers, whose friendship he had so assiduously courted ; even his authority in Thessaly might have been endangered by such sacrilege. When the Phocians fourteen years later took the drastic step of seizing Delphi, they were in desperate straits with annihilation as the only alternative. Jason, on good terms with nearly all Greece and at the head of a vigorous, progressive power, was in a totally different and much happier position.

The least that Jason can have intended by his mobilization of the Thessalian army was an impressive military review, the most a Sacred War. Pretexts for such wars were easily found throughout Greek history. Jason would thereby be provided with an excuse for leading an army into Greece and would be joined by a number of powerful allies. This is admittedly pure conjecture without a shred

¹ Fr. 52.

² See below, pp. 114-15.

of direct evidence, but it does seem far more credible than the belief that Jason meant at the Pythian Games to announce a crusade against Persia.¹ Greece was at this time quite incapable of such an enterprise, as even Isocrates, who regarded such a war as the only remedy for Greek disunion, would have been forced to admit.

The exact aim of these preparations will never be known, since Jason was not destined to bring them to fulfilment. At a review of the Pheraean cavalry in the early summer he was receiving petitions, when seven young men approached him as though in hot dispute with one another. Suddenly they fell upon him, and before the guard could rush to protect their master, he was dead. Two of the conspirators were cut down, but the rest escaped and were welcomed as tyrant-slayers in most Greek cities. This, says Xenophon, proves how strongly the Greeks 'feared that Jason would make himself tyrant'.²

On this statement of Xenophon Tropea has based a theory that the conspiracy had its origin outside Thessaly, probably in Thebes, whose foreign policy was seriously hampered by the ambitions of Jason.³ But the fact that the Thebans were the principal beneficiaries from the murder does not necessarily

¹ This view is held by Costanzi, p. 114—see below, p. 117.

² On the murder, Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 31-2.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

indicate that they were responsible for it. Indeed, though the assassination of tyrants or would-be tyrants by their fellow-citizens was a common practice, it was contrary to Greek usage to procure the murder of external enemies. The alternative suggestion of Tropea is no more convincing—namely, that the Delphic priesthood had a hand in the plot.¹ Xenophon casts a broad hint that this was suspected in his day, but the story of Apollo's answer, which has been recorded above, is more than questionable. Two more theories are supplied by Diodorus—the first, quoted from Ephorus, that the young men conspired merely for the sake of their own glory and had no ulterior motive.² This is intrinsically unlikely, but is conceivable, if one considers how little provision for the future was made by the murderers of Julius Caesar. The circumstances have a superficial similarity, and the young Thessalians may have expected the automatic advent of a Golden Age, as soon as the tyrant was dead. The other alternative, which Diodorus found in several authorities, is that Polydorus, the brother of Jason, was responsible. Meyer is inclined to believe Polydorus guilty³ and finds a motive in the stories that Jason misappropriated the wealth of his family.⁴ In such cases the successor would naturally be suspected, and this theory is probably a mere

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 66–7.

² *G.d.A.*, V, p. 417.

³ XV, 60, 5.

⁴ *Polyaen.*, VI, 1.

inference from subsequent murders and from the usual procedure in tyrant houses. It might with more plausibility be conjectured that the Aleuadae, who are not mentioned in the lifetime of Jason but became prominent again after his death, were implicated in the conspiracy.

Yet another motive appears in a story told by Valerius Maximus.¹ The young men, subjected to a degrading punishment, murdered Jason from motives of personal revenge. The authority is late and inferior, the story commonplace, its details perhaps inaccurate ; but in the absence of adequate evidence that the murder was a political one, it seems more probable that it was the outcome of private grievances. The secret must have been known to very few even of the Pheraeans, and in the anarchy which followed no intensive investigations can have been made. Jason was dead, and with him died the hopes of a united Thessaly.

¹ IX, 10 ext. 2.

CHAPTER VI

JASON AND HIS ACHIEVEMENT

μέγιστος δ' ἦν τῶν καθ' αὐτόν

(XENOPHON)

TO all readers of fourth-century history Jason must appear a peculiarly unsatisfactory figure. A narrative account of his life and death does not fully solve the problem of his historical importance, which may so easily have been exaggerated or underestimated by inadequate and indefinite authorities. General historians of the period are usually content with an uncritical paraphrase of the passages in Xenophon and Diodorus, wherein are recorded the current rumours to which the schemes of Jason gave rise. Still less valuable is it to speculate what turn Greek history might have taken, if the conspiracy of the seven young men had been a failure. It is the object of this chapter to attempt an estimate of the man and his work, viewed in a true perspective. The first step on such a course is to examine in some detail the resources, military, naval, and economic, which lay at his disposal.

The strong military organization which rendered Thessaly so formidable in the sixth century had long ago fallen into decay. Now, however, it became once more of importance since Jason in his endeavour to raise a national army did not create an entirely new system, but merely adapted to his needs one which had long been legitimized by tradition. This was the system of Aleuas, of which some account is afforded by a mutilated fragment of Aristotle's *Constitution of the Thessalians*.¹ Whether Aleuas is regarded as an historical character or as an eponymous hero of the Aleuad family, there is no doubt that the system was of considerable antiquity, dating perhaps from the close of the seventh century. It was based on levies not from cities but from *κλήροι*, a rather vague division of land comparable to the Roman *latifundia*,² and each of these was required to furnish 40 cavalymen and 80 hoplites.³ This method of mobilization proves that the system originated before the formation of cities and at a time when Thessaly was still a congeries of feudal estates. When a tagus was in office, a national army might be mobilized, and according to Jason's own words, this traditional army amounted to 'about 6,000 cavalry and more than 10,000 hop-

¹ Fr. 498 (Rose) ; cp. also fr. 497. The best work on this subject is that of Wade-Gery, *J.H.S.*, XLIV (1924), pp. 55-64, and of Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 223-6. ² Kahrstedt, p. 144.

³ Retaining *ὁπλίτας*, the reading of the MSS., followed by a lacuna.

lites'.¹ Such estimates customarily included every fully franchised man between the ages of eighteen and sixty,² so that in practice the total force available for active service would fall somewhat short of these numbers. No levy in accordance with this system can have been made prior to the *tageia* of Jason for very many years, but his revival of its groundwork was a brilliant stroke, at once legalizing his claims for a national army and pointing back to the old days of Thessalian greatness. It is also possible that the Aleuadae, who must have frowned on his *tageia*, were partly conciliated by this resuscitation of their famous ancestor.

Yet the traditional organization of Aleuas could only serve as a foundation on which Jason might build a more modern structure. For many years the *polis* had been the only practicable unit for mobilization; ³ the *κλήροι* were now quite obsolete and must at any time have been divisions of varying dimensions and unmanageable number.⁴ Accordingly, when Jason became *tagus*, it was from the cities that he expected to raise his new army. An assessment was drawn up of the contingent which each city might reasonably be required to contribute, and the full army-list comprised 'more than 8,000 cavalry, including the allies' and 'not less

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 8. ² Beloch, III, 1, pp. 267-8.

³ Cp. the cavalry army of 431 (Thuc., II, 22).

⁴ Their number must have been at least 130.

than 20,000 hoplites'.¹ Thus the potential army of Jason was considerably larger than those of the sixth century. This difference may be due in part to an increase of population, but it is to be observed that, whereas the traditional system was only concerned with native militia, the army-list of Jason is that of his entire fighting force² and must include his own 6,000 mercenaries, who were not Thessalians.³ These mercenaries perhaps account for rather more than 1,000 cavalry and rather less than 5,000 hoplites. Among the native troops the altered ratio between cavalry and hoplites must be attributed to city development and the passing of baronial estate-armies.⁴

It has been argued that in the passage containing these estimates Xenophon has given mere paper figures, which have no relation to reality and, in view of the comparatively insignificant Thessalian armies of later times, must be grossly exaggerated.⁵ If the words of the historian be casually interpreted, Jason would appear actually to have mobilized an army of some 28,000, excluding peltasts, as soon as he was elected to the tageia in 374. At the battles of Nemea and Mantinea, in which an exceptionally large number of combatants were involved, neither side can have exceeded this figure, so that

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 19.

² ἐνένορτο αὐτῶν.

³ Ibid., 5.

⁴ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁵ Niese, pp. 112-13.

it is remarkable that Jason, backed by military resources of such magnitude, did not at once strike a blow for the hegemony of Greece. Any attempt to check the accuracy of this estimate by the area and supposed population of Thessaly effects little, for such reckonings of population are based upon inadequate and sometimes misleading data. However, if the account of Xenophon be carefully examined in conjunction with a proper understanding of the progressive stages in the career of Jason, it will be seen that there is no reason to discredit these figures.

The words of Xenophon are chosen with extreme caution ;¹ they do not presuppose actual mobilization but merely the drafting of an army-list. During the opening years of his *tageia* Jason did not order a national levy, and cogent reasons led him to this decision. As has been noted in the preceding chapters, he was not at first popular with the bulk of the Thessalians, and he had no wish to command a conglomerate army of which many city contingents were disaffected and might well emulate their ancestors by desertion on the battlefield. Consequently between 374 and 370 he avoided enterprises which would be on a sufficiently large scale to warrant the mobilization of this national

¹ Note the verbs (*Hell.*, VI, 1, 19) ἐγένοντο . . . ἐλογίσθησαν. The author, interested but not too well informed, seems anxious not to commit himself.

army, and the brunt of his expeditions fell upon his highly trained mercenaries, whose efficiency was especially feared.¹ Mercenaries alone accompanied him to Leuctra, but the brilliant success of this venture so transformed the attitude of the Thessalians towards his schemes that at last he could feel some confidence in their loyalty. Thus in the following winter he was able to 'bid the Thessalians make preparations for a military expedition at the time of the Pythian festival',² but he did not live to see the outcome of this command. Hence the question whether the estimated figures would have been reached is one that could not be answered categorically even by a contemporary, and his successors were never able to put his pan-Thessalian army-list to the test. Very naturally his mobilization-order created serious alarm in Greece, where the potential military strength of Thessaly had long been realized. Even if the army failed to reach three-quarters of its estimated size, it would be a match for the disunited and unmanageable coalition-armies assembled by Thebes.

In cavalry Thessaly had always been extraordinarily strong, and the very unusual proportion in the army of Jason—not far short of one cavalryman to two hoplites—need occasion no surprise; it rather serves to authenticate the army-list. Isocrates gives 'more than 3,000' as a rough estimate

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 28.

² *Ibid.*, 30.

of the Thessalian cavalry force,¹ and no higher figure occurs elsewhere apart from that of Xenophon. Yet 2,000 Thessalian horsemen took part in the campaigns of Alexander in Asia,² and since it would have been unwise to leave the country denuded of cavalry, this figure indicates a total army of considerably more than 3,000 even at a time when Thessaly had long ceased to be autonomous. The estimate of Xenophon, 'more than 8,000 including the allies', is not unreasonably high. If due allowance be made for the difference between theoretical and actual numbers, the available force would amount to rather more than 6,000, of which some 2,000 would be either trained mercenaries of Jason or allies. This leaves about 4,000 for Thessaly proper, which is a reasonable figure, if the cities supported him wholeheartedly and mustered every available man. Such a cavalry army would be superior to any that could be raised in central Greece or the Peloponnese, though skilful generalship would be required to choose a battlefield where it could be used to the best advantage.

The hoplite section presents a more difficult problem, for the accuracy of its numbers cannot be checked, as no reliable record is extant of any pan-Thessalian hoplite army. Both Aristotle and Xenophon credit Thessaly with a potentially large force of hoplites ; but the armies sent to Attica in earlier

¹ VIII, 118.

² See below, p. 221.

times were composed exclusively of cavalry,¹ those sent to support Epaminondas in the Peloponnese exclusively of cavalry and peltasts.² Reasons for this absence of hoplites from expeditionary forces are obvious, and it is unnecessary to suppose any systematic distinction between armies for home and for foreign service.³ The earlier cavalry armies consisted mainly of barons and their retinues, who welcomed the prospect of freebooting, whereas the peasant hoplite was loth to leave his fields in harvest-time. Moreover, cavalry was an arm in which Greek states were notoriously weak, so that a small body of Thessalian horsemen would be of more value than many a thousand hoplites, while peltasts were still an attractive novelty. Jason used only mercenaries for reasons already stated ; the comparatively short period between his appointment to the tageia and his death was not sufficient to enable him to build up a national hoplite army of city contingents, and he had no occasion to use separate sections before the whole organization was complete. This process he certainly began, and when he lays stress on the necessity for careful training in his new army,⁴ it is clearly the hoplite section that he has especially in mind. That material existed for the

¹ Hdt., V, 63 ; Thuc., I, 107, and II, 22.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 5, 23, and VII, 5, 16 ; Diod., XV, 85, 1-2.

³ So Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 224, adducing the parallel of medieval armies.

⁴ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 9.

formation of a powerful hoplite army is proved by accounts of the battle of Cynoscephalae.¹ If Pelopidas in the course of a few brief visits could so improve the efficiency of the Thessalian League infantry, Jason had every prospect of more complete and permanent success.

There remain the contingents of light-armed troops which the Perioeci were expected to supply. These, of course, had no place in the original Aleuas system, since the peltast was a comparatively recent development.² However, the Perioecis became subject directly to the national state upon the appointment of a tagus, and military support would naturally be implied.³ No precise estimate is attempted of the numbers of these mountaineers either in the reported speech of Jason or in the subsequent narrative of Xenophon, and evidently no assessment of the Perioeci was included in the army-list. Xenophon is content with vague generalities,⁴ while Jason declares that his army would be no less superior in peltasts than in its other branches.⁵ The area of the Perioecis was considerable, though the population of its mountain slopes was not comparable to that of the plains. In view of the importance of mobile, light-armed troops in fourth-century warfare, which had not yet been

¹ See below, p. 149-50.

² Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 19 ; cp. Isocr., VIII, 118.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

fully realized by the more conservative powers, even a few thousand peltasts would form an invaluable auxiliary corps. Thorough training was essential, but this Jason probably commenced after his conquest of Perrhaebia. Some years after his death a light-armed contingent from the Perioecis proved its effectiveness at Mantinea by routing the Athenian cavalry.¹ His claim is no idle boast, for before the rise of Macedon no other power could draw upon such an array of mountain tribes.

In regard to his fleet there are far better grounds for scepticism. He himself includes his naval schemes among his ambitions for a more distant future, when he intends to challenge Athens for the naval supremacy of Greece.² Three very real advantages were, as he points out, in his favour: firstly, if he controls Macedonia and its timber, he will be able to build more ships than Athens; secondly, in his possession of the Penestae he can claim superior man-power, both in quantity and in quality, from which to draw his crews; thirdly, as Thessaly is more than self-supporting he will be much better able to feed his sailors. These arguments show insight into the basis of naval power, but merely from them and from the fact that he manned some ships to cover his hasty march to

¹ Diod., XV, 85, 4-5.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 10-11. His fourth point (*ibid.*, 12) is treated below.

Leuctra ¹ it is far from safe to infer the existence of a large Thessalian fleet. He never gained complete control of Macedonia, and the alliance with Amyntas, which would give him use of its timber—though not to the exclusion of Athens—cannot have been formed more than four years before his murder. The Penestae, too, would be landsmen from the plain and would need years of training before they reached a high point of efficiency. Though the Bay of Pagasae had good harbours, it was the only outlet which Thessaly had to the sea and was not too easy of access from the centres of population. Moreover, had Jason built a large fleet, there would surely have remained trace of it after his death. Military organization might at once crumble away when deprived of its leader, but a navy is somewhat more durable. The ships used by Alexander in his piratical raids may have been built by Jason ; but they were neither numerous nor very efficiently manned, and their success over an ill-managed Athenian squadron seems to have occasioned some surprise. It is clear that, although Jason meant one day to own a dominating fleet and had made a start before Leuctra, he realized the serious obstacles which lay in his path, though naturally he did not divulge these to Polydamas. In consequence, this navy was still in its infancy at the time of his death.

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 21.

According to the traditional system, the Perioecis were liable to pay a war-tax, if a tagus were appointed.¹ When no tagus was in office, apparently no tribute was paid, as the harbour and market dues, which were levied throughout Thessaly, sufficed to defray the ordinary expenses of administration.² For the collection of this war-tax Jason adopted the system attributed to Scopas, who lived in the first half of the sixth century and seems to have drawn up a sort of Domesday Book.³ The details of this system are unknown, but as in the case of the military organization of Aleuas, Jason can only have used the name of Scopas in order that by an appeal to tradition he might justify his claim to levy taxes on the Perioeci. The tribute-lists of the sixth century, if indeed they were still preserved, had now become archaic documents, and it was clearly impracticable to revive them without very substantial adaptations to suit the conditions of the time. No estimate is extant of the income which Jason hoped would accrue from this taxation. In his interview with Polydamas he uses a rather sophistical argument—namely, that, to judge from the wealth of Persia, the mainland

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 12.

² Dem., I, 22. The appropriation of these by Philip proves that they were considerable.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 19. Busolt, *Griechische Staatskunde*, II, p. 1483 n. 1, aptly compares τὸν φόρον ὅσπερ ἐπὶ Σκόπῃα τεταγμένος ἦν with the expression ὁ ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου φόρος.

was a better source of revenue than the 'wretched little islands' on which Athens relied. Many cities of the Perioecis struck coins in this period and must have traded to some extent, but to compare their wealth to that of the chief commercial centres of the Aegean is a manifest absurdity. The income derived from this tribute, even if it were supplemented by a certain amount of direct taxation in Thessaly proper, would have been swallowed up by the maintenance of a large army. Jason did not, like Philip, own rich gold-mines and without extensive conquests could never have attained a sound financial position.

No coinage of Jason has yet come to light, and in view of the comparative abundance of Alexander coins, it is almost certain that none was issued. The Aleuas coin, which will be treated in the next chapter, has been assigned to him,¹ but this is highly improbable. Though he was eager to conciliate the Aleuadae, he would hardly go to such lengths to flatter the noble families, whose feuds had always been one of the most disruptive forces in Thessalian politics. He was perhaps wise in refusing to issue a personal coinage, which would have been a departure from the precedent of earlier tagi, and it might have been dangerous to inflict the coinage of Pherae upon jealously autonomous cities. But he might with advantage have initiated

¹ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-4. See below, p. 146.

a national coinage, which would have been recognized throughout the Greek world. A national coinage fostered national patriotism, and no better stimulus to trade could be devised, as Philip was quick to realize. As it was, the manifold city coinages can scarcely have penetrated beyond the borders of Thessaly.

The evidence for these resources of Jason is slight in volume, but the chapter in which Xenophon describes them is clear and concise, and no amount of depreciation can shake the truth of its facts.¹ Despite very definite limitations in certain particulars, Jason had in his hands resources such as no single Greek power of his day could command. Epaminondas, dependent upon the ill-assorted armies which he led into the Peloponnese and the self-seeking allies which he found there, was never in so happy a position. To use his weapon to the best advantage Jason had need of an enlightened and constructive policy, and in this he is not found wanting.

Far too much stress has been laid by historians on the intention of Jason to invade Persia. This ambition is stated by Jason himself in the course of his interview with Polydamas² and also by Isocrates in his pamphlet to Philip.³ Upon these

¹ As that of Niese, *op. cit.*

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 12.

³ V, 119 ; *cp.* Val. Max., IX, 10 ext. 2.

two passages a tissue of romance has been constructed—that the one real objective of Jason was this Persian expedition, to which all other schemes were subservient and of quite secondary importance in his eyes. Costanzi actually explains his arbitration after Leuctra as guided by his hopes of an Hellenic Confederation against Persia,¹ and believes that at the Pythian Festival of 370 he intended to announce his crusade.² It was, however, absolutely necessary, as the same scholar points out,³ to set out with a united Greece at his back—Agesilaus had failed through this very deficiency. Jason was a soldier and a statesman of too much experience to underestimate the fighting strength of the Persian Empire despite its present inefficient organization. He would not, as orators and political philosophers had done, allow his judgement to be warped by the specious ease with which Cyrus and Agesilaus had won their half-successes.⁴

On the other hand, this design must not be regarded merely as an idle boast or as incorrectly attributed to Jason by rumour.⁵ Since the triumph of the King's Peace Persian authority had been under a cloud. Artaxerxes himself was a nonentity, his satraps frequently dependent only in name,

¹ See above, p. 94 n.1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³ p. 114.

⁴ Though he uses this Isocratean argument to impress Polydamas (*Xen., Hell.*, VI, 1, 12).

⁵ Niese, p. 111.

his generals prone to disastrous feuds with their colleagues. Although Persian armies were strengthened by Greek mercenaries and sometimes by Greek commanders, their enterprises were consistently ruined by the patent weakness of the central government. In 370 Asia Minor was in the hands of those satraps who were very soon to take part in the Satraps' Revolt, and the insurrection was already being planned. It might be argued that Jason had everything to gain by launching an immediate attack on Persia with the forces at present at his disposal. In cavalry, which Agesilaus had found essential in the plains of Asia, he was magnificently equipped, and there would be booty in plenty to furnish pay for his mercenaries. The states of Greece Proper would be boundlessly impressed by a few sensational victories and might well submit to his leadership. But the risks were too great even for the gambling instincts of a Jason. His power, it seems, was still centred almost entirely in his own person—there is no record of any subordinates other than Polydamas—and the national state, which was a recent creation, might in his absence fall a prey to Thebes or to a coalition of Greek cities. Nor was he in possession of a strong fleet, without which his communications would have been always in danger. Therefore this Asiatic campaign must have been regarded by him as a sequel to his assumption of the hegemony of Greece and not as a

means to that end. He always followed the effective policy of publishing frankly his more distant ambitions, but concealing his movements in the immediate future. The idea of an anti-Persian crusade was by no means new in 380, when Isocrates first began to preach it, and was widely believed to be the panacea for Greek inter-state wars. And now the further decline of Persia made its prospects yet brighter. It is typical of the foresight of Jason that he adopted the idea as a valuable item of propaganda for the present and a real possibility for the distant future. Isocrates, and his words are almost a sneer, is witness to the reputation which he gained thereby during his lifetime.¹ But, like Philip, Jason realized that many years of fighting and diplomacy in Greece must pass before he could be in a position to cross into Asia with any hopes of permanent success.

His object during the next few years was nothing more nor less than to win for Thessaly a dominating position among the Greek powers. This aim he made no attempt to conceal, but his plans for attaining it he acutely kept a close secret. To infer from his treatment of lesser projects such as

¹ V, 119. Apart from a passage in one of the 'Socratic Letters', an almost worthless authority (XXVIII, 13, ed. Köhler, where the name of Jason must evidently be substituted for that of Alexander), there is no evidence that Isocrates at one time regarded Jason as the ideal leader for his crusade. Isocr., *Ep.* VI, 1, only indicates friendship, which may well be exaggerated.

the reduction of Perrhaebia, it may be conjectured that he intended to adopt the methods later employed by Philip. A sparing use of force and an abundance of diplomacy, seasoned perhaps with a spice of bribery, could cause almost unlimited havoc among Greek city-states. At Leuctra he had seized an unexpected chance and shown an ability for turning the efforts of others to his own advantage. Naturally his plans were not rigidly formulated, and he would extemporize as difficulties or opportunities presented themselves.

It has been urged that he had no chance of success against Thebes, clearly his most dangerous rival after Leuctra ; that Xenophon has grossly exaggerated his power in order to overshadow the hated Thebans.¹ This is surely a misconception. In spite of her fine hoplite army and her two brilliant generals, Thebes was always hampered by a lack of constructive policy. Her measures were disruptive, and not even the Boeotian League was wholehearted in its support. Had a strong power existed in Greece, the Theban hegemony would have ended long before the swift collapse which followed the battle of Mantinea. As he showed in his manifesto,² Jason realized these weaknesses and must have been confident of his ability to outwit and eventually to supplant the unenlightened Thebans.

The opinion has also been strongly expressed that

¹ Niese, p. 115.

² See above, p. 96.

the position of Jason in Thessaly was not sufficiently established to enable him to win the hegemony of Greece.¹ This argument is based on the false application of a passage in the Polydamas speech.² It might well be that in 374 the Thessalian cities lately won by Jason would readily revolt on the arrival of a large Spartan army, but in 370 the situation was completely different. By his exploits after Leuctra he had become a popular figure, and all Thessaly looked to him not as an oppressor, but as the creator of a new age of prosperity. Nor was Thessaly too small a basis for such an enterprise,³ as the foregoing examination of his resources has proved. The only serious flaw in the organization of Jason was his lack of financial stability, a failing common to nearly all fourth-century ambitions. He could not hope to pass, like Alexander the Great, from bankruptcy to fabulous wealth in a few years, and this obstacle must have remained almost insuperable.

The only section of his ambitions that Jason lived to accomplish in the wider field of Greek politics was that he provided a very unpleasant shock to established beliefs. Thessaly had come to be regarded as a land of turbulence and civil war, fit only for foreign exploitation, and no one imagined

¹ Niese, p. 113; Beloch, III, 1, p. 170.

² Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 14—the view of Beloch is, of course, influenced by his dating of the speech to 371.

³ Beloch, loc. cit.

it capable of directing its own destinies. The career of Jason should permanently have dispelled such ideas, but fear of his growing power at once gave way to relief at his murder,¹ and the lesson was never learnt. It should now have been evident how dangerous the forces of a large northern state could be, when united under the direction of a single man of genius. However, Greeks were slow to realize changing conditions, and the spread of cultural development to the north never appeared as a menace to them. To one man at least the life of Jason was not without its significance, laying bare, as it did, the weaknesses of conventional Greek politics. And Philip put to excellent use the leaves which he took from his predecessor's book.

No clear picture has come down to us of the personality of Jason, which has mainly to be inferred from the story of his actions. Very few of the usual gossipmongers' tales are collected round his name, since the characters of Dionysius and Philip, who held the stage for much longer periods, distracted the attention of such writers. Aristotle records two scarcely creditable apophthegms of Jason, but neither is particularly damaging and both might be regarded with a tinge of admiration. In the one Jason says that he is hungry when not a tyrant,² in the other that it is essential to do some unjust acts in order

¹ *Xen., Hell.*, VI, 4, 32.

² *Pol.*, p. 1277 a.

to do many just ones.¹ Unlimited ambition and a very mild form of Macchiavellianism are in Greek eyes rather qualities to be admired than vices to be condemned. Even Cicero inclines to this opinion when he classes Jason with Themistocles as an example of that typically Greek genius which by unscrupulous cleverness was so capable of outwitting opponents.²

By far the best picture is contained in the contemporary account of Xenophon. To Xenophon Jason is a figure of the highest interest, and he interrupts the course of his narrative to make his description of the Pheraean tyranny as complete as possible. Though he lacks knowledge of Thesalian conditions, he has derived the personal details from an excellent source—he may even have met Polydamas—with the result that Jason is the clearest figure in the last three books of the *Hellenica*.³ It is delightful after many a weary page of Spartan or Theban intrigue to learn that Jason when in a hurry would eat breakfast and lunch together as one meal.⁴ Naturally Polydamas was anxious to impress the Spartan government, but the picture which he draws in his speech of Jason's restless energy as he moves among his troops must be

¹ *Rhet.*, p. 1373 a—also Plut., *Mor.*, pp. 135 F and 817 F.

² *De Off.*, I, 30, 108—he also compares Jason to Hannibal and Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator in ability.

³ Bandaret, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 15.

substantially the truth. Jason could endure extremes of physical hardship himself and demanded the same of his soldiers.¹ Yet he was most generous in rewarding them for good service and even paid careful attention to their health.¹ He knew the value of relaxation after hard toil, but never allowed his pleasures to interfere with his astonishing efficiency.²

Jason grew up in a world of rapidly changing conditions and himself made some slight contribution to these changes. A restless feeling was abroad in Greek political life, and the fourth century bred a peculiar type of progressive individualist and innovator. Of this type Jason is one of the earlier examples and may perhaps be compared with those versatile Athenian admiral-generals, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias. But in one respect he held an immeasurable advantage. Demosthenes constantly emphasizes the superiority of the independent, irresponsible leader over the general or statesman who is trammelled by his responsibility to a fickle populace.³ Jason enjoyed a large measure of independence, and while other adventurers were often forced to enlist in the service of foreign powers, he was free to work steadfastly towards the accomplishment of his life's ambition. He showed in the course of a very brief career outstanding ability as general, organizer, and diplomat,

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 1, 15.

² Ibid., 15.

³ XVIII, 235, and often elsewhere.

but not perhaps notably in advance of less fortunate contemporaries. With Philip, who started from similar beginnings and yet attained his ends with greater rapidity, he will not bear comparison. One outstanding achievement must always claim the admiration of posterity, that he created order out of the chaos to which years of anarchy had reduced his country. But his organization required a strong guiding hand to ensure its permanence, and Jason, unlike Philip, was not very fortunate in his successor.

CHAPTER VII
ALEXANDER AND ANARCHY

χαλεπὸς Θετταλοῖς τὰ γὰρ ἐγένετο

(XENOPHON)

THE strength of Jason's personality and the weakness of his organization in its half-developed condition is illustrated by the events which followed his death. Never again was Thessaly a leading power in the Greek world. The immediate revival of civil war precluded a consistent foreign policy, so that the menace of a Thessalian hegemony disappeared as rapidly as it had arisen. The country became again no more than an attractive bait for the foreign intriguer, and very soon after the murder of Jason, Thebes, which could never have undertaken an invasion of the Peloponnese with a formidable power in the rear, might actually plot to make Thessaly a subject ally. The Thebans clumsily continued the policy, hitherto exploited by Sparta, of provoking stasis in order to make external aid indispensable. Their utter failure had an indirect effect on Greek inde-

pendence ; for, had Thessaly stood as a strong buffer-state against the threatening power of Macedonia, the day of Chaeronea might have been indefinitely postponed.

The Pheraean tyranny at once reverted to its original form. The successors of Jason were, as Lycophron had been, revolutionary tyrants rather than constitutional magistrates and must have been supported by a radical party. It might have been expected that some attempt would be made to overthrow the tyranny, but there were, it seems, no difficulties even arising from the succession. As the sons of Jason were not of an age to rule, his two surviving brothers Polydorus and Polyphron assumed joint control, styling themselves *tagi* as legitimate heirs of the late *tagus*.¹ It is highly improbable that they were constitutionally elected to that office by the *κοινόν*, and indeed unlikely that any part of the national organization was in operation until after its remodelling by Pelopidas. Perhaps the wealth of Polydorus smoothed away any constitutional obstacles.²

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 33. A rival tradition, represented by Diod., XV, 60, 5, makes Polydorus sole *tagus*, but this tradition has evidently become confused owing to the similarity of the names. Polyphron is omitted altogether, and later Polydorus is stated to have been murdered by Alexander. The account of Xenophon is clearly the more accurate.

² Polyæn., VI, 1, 7.

This joint tageia was short-lived, as within a few weeks Polydorus died suddenly on the way to Larisa, and there was little doubt that he had been poisoned by his brother, who now became sole tagus. After a tyrannical rule ¹ Polyphron also met a violent death, being murdered by Alexander, son of Polydorus. If we are to believe a rather theatrical story told by Plutarch,² Alexander slew his uncle ³ with his own hand, his motive being partly to avenge his father and partly to 'bring the tyranny to an end',⁴ a laudable aim which he did not pursue further. Polyphron is almost certainly the Pheraean whom Dionysius of Syracuse described ⁵ as *τραγικὸς τύραννος* and who reigned ten months. Xenophon reckons his reign as a year, an approximation, and the murder must have taken place in the early summer of 369.

These dynastic struggles naturally affected the foreign relations of Thessaly. Not only independent states such as Phocis and Locris, but also Heraclea and Malis, which had owed allegiance to Jason, now joined the Theban alliance. Contingents from

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 34—κατεσκευάσατο δὲ τὴν ταγείαν τυραννίδι ὁμοίαν.

² Plut., *Pel.*, 29.

³ In Diod., XV, 61, 2, ἀδελφίδου, the reading of an important MS. is adopted by Vogel in the Teubner Text and is supported by *Πολύφρων τὸν θεῖον* in Plut., loc. cit.

⁴ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 35.

⁵ Plut., *Galba*, 1—this remark would be made by Dionysius on hearing of the death of Polyphron.

all of these ¹ were included in the army of Epaminondas on his first invasion of the Peloponnese in the winter of 370-369. A force of Thessalian cavalry and peltasts is also mentioned, though clearly in a somewhat different category from the allied contingents. These Thessalians would be mercenaries in quest of adventure and plunder together with a few free-lance barons.

In the united Thessaly which Jason had created, there were already ominous signs of disruption. The journey of Polydorus to Larisa at the time of his sudden death may have been due to opposition there.² Certainly a party in Pharsalus intrigued with a view to throwing off the yoke of Pherae, since Polyphron with the violence of declining power executed Polydamas and eight of the leading citizens. In Larisa too he caused wholesale banishments, and it is probable that some months before he was murdered a deputation of Alcuaadae had already persuaded Alexander II of Macedon to interfere in Thessaly.³ Alexander of Pherae was thus faced by a very serious crisis, which must at once

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 5, 23; Diod., XV, 62, 4.

² Since the short distance from Pherae was apparently not covered in a single day, the brothers were probably accompanied by an army.

³ Diod., XV, 61, 3. The Alcuaadae were usually on good terms with the Macedonian royal house. In *C.A.H.*, VI, p. 85 (and in the Chronological Table), the date of this appeal is given as 368, but the correct date (369) is apparently assumed in the following paragraph.

have dispelled any ideas that he may have entertained of restoring a constitutional government. With the impetuosity for which he became famous, he decided to invade Macedonia and hastily collected an army. But Alexander of Macedon was too quick for him. The Aleuadae admitted Macedonian troops to Larisa, and the citadel, held by a Pheraean garrison, was stormed. Crannon, which up to this point may have been ruled by the tyrant Deinias,¹ also fell under Macedonian control, and Alexander of Pherae was forced to retreat, leaving most of the Pelasgiotid plain in enemy hands.²

If the Aleuads expected the restoration of Thessalian freedom, they were soon rudely disillusioned. Alexander of Macedon, after first posing as a disinterested deliverer, refused to withdraw his garrisons from Larisa and Crannon. Accordingly the Thes-salians, faced with a mere change of oppressors, sent an embassy to Thebes to beg for protection against both Alexanders.³ To the Thebans this opportunity of extending their influence northwards was, in spite of distractions in the Peloponnese,⁴

¹ Stählin, art. *Κράνων* in *P.W.* This would supply a motive for interference at Crannon, but before his *coup d'état* (Polyaen., II, 34) Deinias was *μεσθιος ἀρχων* for three years, a position which he could scarcely have gained during the *tageia* of Jason. Hence it is preferable with Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 239 n. 1, to date his tyranny after the death of Alexander.

² Diod., XV, 61, 4-5. ³ Ibid., 67, 3; Plut., *Pel.*, 26.

⁴ Epaminondas was absent with the main Boeotian army on his second expedition to the Peloponnese.

extremely alluring. During the lifetime of Jason Thessaly had to be regarded as a dangerous rival, but the anarchy which followed his murder offered hopes that the strong Thessalian cavalry together with the rich resources of the country might be gained to strengthen the Boeotian cause. The Theban alliances with small states in the Spercheus valley provide evidence of this design. Hence in answer to the request for 'a general and some troops' ¹ Pelopidas was sent with the significant instructions 'to conduct affairs in Thessaly to the advantage of the Boeotians'.²

During the next five years Pelopidas was a central figure in Thessalian politics. To the glamour of his personality we are indebted for our knowledge of the struggle between Alexander of Pherae and the Thessalian nationalists, which would otherwise have little interest for the general historian. Unfortunately in their account of his exploits Diodorus and Plutarch seem to have been wholly under the influence of the same very unsatisfactory authority. The Boeotian historians, Dionysodorus and Anaxis, who ended their histories at the battle of Mantinea,³ may originally have been responsible for this tradition, which was perhaps transmitted to Diodorus and Plutarch through the *Hellenica* of Callisthenes.⁴

¹ Plut., *Pel.*, 26.

² Diod., XV, 67, 3.

³ Ibid., XV, 95, 4.

⁴ Jacoby, art. Kallisthenes in *P.W.*, especially col. 1697.

At all events, the author whose work underlies our extant accounts was strongly biased in favour of Thebes and Pelopidas ; and he must have possessed a flair for melodrama, but evidently had no knowledge of geographical or political conditions in Thessaly. Nepos in his *Life of Pelopidas* contributes nothing new, while the notices of the tacticians, Frontinus and Polyænus, only serve to indicate the incompleteness of the main authorities.

When Pelopidas arrived in Thessaly, he found that a new turn of events had considerably lightened his difficult task. Alexander of Macedon was now wholly occupied by the rising of a pretender, and his garrison was promptly expelled from the citadel of Larisa by Boeotian troops. Against Alexander of Pheræ there was a certain amount of fighting,¹ in which Pelopidas was not by any means successful.² However, both parties were unwilling for war, and soon an attempt was made to settle their differences by negotiation.³ There had been no formal declaration of war, and probably Alexander was still in theory an ally of Thebes, as Jason had been. A conference took place, at which Pelopidas no doubt tried to exact a guarantee not to attack

¹ Frontin., *Strat.*, I, 5, 2 = Polyæn., II, 4, 2 ; Frontin., *Strat.*, III, 8, 2 = Polyæn., II, 4, 1. These incidents cannot belong to the second or third expedition of Pelopidas.

² Frontin., *Strat.*, IV, 7, 28. These operations would naturally not be stressed by a Boeotian historian.

³ Plut., *Pel.*, 26.

the Thessalian cities,¹ but it is highly unlikely that he was willing in return to recognize Alexander as tagus.² At any rate the negotiations broke down,³ and Boeotian forces must have been retained at Larisa and other towns to protect them against the Pheraean.

After this partial failure Pelopidas was summoned to Macedonia to act as an arbitrator between the two claimants to the throne, Alexander and his rival Ptolemy the Alorite.⁴ Owing to the scantiness of our information it is impossible to judge the motives of either party in agreeing to such an arbitration, though both must have angled for Theban support. Nor have any details survived of the settlement reached. It was obviously of importance to Thebes to foster disunion and so to prevent Macedonian intervention in Thessaly.⁵ Consequently, though Pelopidas favoured the cause of Alexander, with whom an alliance was made,⁶

¹ Niese, p. 116.

² As Niese believes.

³ Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.*, II (1877), p. 198 n. 2, regards Suidas, *παρ' οὐδέν θέμενος*, as evidence of a treaty concluded at this time. But the passage clearly refers to the truce made just before the imprisonment of Pelopidas.

⁴ Plut., *Pel.*, 26 ; Diod., XV, 67, 3-4.

⁵ Geyer, p. 128, believes that Pelopidas in the interest of his country was eager to restore order in Macedonia, but this is to neglect the fact that throughout this period the main Theban objective was not Macedonia but Thessaly.

⁶ Diod., loc. cit.—since Alexander gave hostages, he must have been a subject ally.

Ptolemy was by no means crushed ; but the danger of such half-hearted compromises was soon to become apparent. Pelopidas then returned to Thessaly and in the late autumn to Thebes. On his homeward journey he established Theban outposts at Echinus ¹ in Achaea and at Nicaea ² near Thermopylae with the intention of providing Theban armies with easy access to Thessaly.

To the first expedition of Pelopidas probably belongs an important political reorganization ³ for which two Attic inscriptions provide the only evidence.⁴ The conventional dating of this new constitution—in 363, the year after Cynoscephalae—is not impossible, but rests upon no ancient authority and does not seem suitable to the circumstances. It is very unlikely that the Thebans without the influence of Pelopidas and at a time when Alexander appeared to have been permanently crushed would have created an organization so likely to make itself independent. Further, the gradual stiffening of the Thessalian opposition to Alexander in the next few years and the existence

¹ Dem., IX, 34.

² Ibid., VI, 22 ; Aesch., III, 140. Both were in Theban hands in the time of Philip, but the date of their occupation is unknown. Beloch, III, 1, p. 171, inclines to 370, Meyer, *G.d.A.*, p. 461, to 363 B.C.

³ The best account is that of Busolt, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 1486–7. See also Swoboda, pp. 232–4 ; Meyer, *T.H.*, pp. 228–9.

⁴ *I.G.*, II², 1, 116 and 175.

of an efficient army in 364 must be due, as Beloch points out,¹ to an improved political and military system. Beloch's own date, however, is also very unconvincing—367, immediately after the rescue expedition of Epaminondas. The sole object of the latter and his sole achievement was the recovery of Pelopidas and Ismenias; he had no time to evolve political reforms,² and Pelopidas cannot have then stayed in the north, as he was an envoy to Susa in the same year. The present dating (369) is open to no such objections and is in fact supported by a hint in the narrative of Plutarch. In passing to his account of the arbitration embassy to Macedonia, which probably occupied only a few weeks, he remarks that Pelopidas left the Thessalians 'in concord towards one another'.³ This may well be a biographer's phrase for the foundation of a new system, whose details were worked out in the autumn after the return of Pelopidas from Macedon.

The new constitution, though naturally influenced by the Boeotian League, was yet essentially Thessalian. The *κοινὸν τῶν Θεσσαλῶν*, which had so long existed as a loose national union, was now conceived as a federal fourth-century League of

¹ III, 1, p. 184 n. 1.

² See below, p. 144.

³ Plut., *Pel.*, 26—*ἀπολιπὼν . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους δμόνοισιν*. Cp. Diod., XV, 67, 4, where Pelopidas is stated to have settled Thessaly 'as seemed to him to be to the advantage of the Boeotians', i.e. to have strengthened his allies sufficiently to keep Alexander under some control.

cities with a president and a general assembly.¹ This president bore the title of archon and probably held office for life.² He was not a mere figurehead as in Boeotia, but apparently possessed the wide powers, civil and military, of a permanent tagus, a name which owing to the abuse of the office by the successors of Jason was naturally avoided. The extraordinary authority of this archon is stressed in the treaty with the Athenians, who promised assistance, if any attempt is made to depose him,³ and regard him not as a servant of the *κοινόν* but rather as a partner with it in the administration of Thessaly.⁴ Subordinate to the archon were four polemarchs, essentially military officers, representing not the cities but the four original tetrads,⁵ whose contingents they commanded. Hence it is clear that the military organization of the new League was based on the tetrarchies, which cannot have become at this date so obsolete as is generally believed. A tetrarchy would now consist mainly of a collection of city-territories, but from the mention of *ἡπείζ* in this treaty ⁶ it appears that

¹ No doubt the assembly elected the archon and other magistrates. For its *ψηφίσματα* cp. Dem., II, 11, and Aesch. III, 161.

² Philip and Alexander were elected archon for life, but theirs may have been exceptional cases.

³ *I.G.*, II², 1, 116 l. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, l. 33-6; cp., Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 228.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II², 1, 175 l. 6-8. Their term of office is unknown.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II², 1, 116 l. 24.

there still existed a large number of independent baronial estates outside the towns.¹ This revival of the tetrarchies was probably a deliberate archaism, designed to promote national feeling and to obviate inter-city jealousy, and it may even have been hoped that some of the more wavering adherents of Alexander would be drawn by local patriotism into the service of Pelasgiotis. The pezarchs and hip-parchs were subordinate officers of no great importance, but the fact that they were required to sign treaties as League magistrates proves that the League maintained a standing army.² The inclusion among the Thessalian signatories of hieromnemones, who were representative officials at the Delphic Amphic-tyony and not League magistrates, may point to an attempt on the part of the *κοινόν* to revive the Amphictyony as a political weapon.

This system was created by a friend of the Aleuadae and for the benefit of the Aleuadae. Consequently it was aristocratic to a much greater degree than similar Leagues formed in other parts of Greece. Its primary object was to consolidate the resources at the disposal of the Aleuadae against the Pheraean tyranny. It was therefore fundamentally military, and the gradual development of the League army is an important feature of the following years. At first the League was compelled to hire mercenaries ; in the year of Cynoscephalae

¹ Kahrstedt, p. 141.

² Swoboda, p. 232 n. 11.

it possessed finely trained cavalry and an efficient hoplite army.¹ Politically its development was less successful, as the ambitions of rival cities and rival families² proved an ineradicable hindrance to Thessalian unity.

It was during the winter of 369–368³ that Epaminondas and Pelopidas were impeached and tried before the federal court of the Boeotian League. Although acquitted, both suffered a temporary loss of popularity, so that neither appears as Boeotarch in the following campaigning season. Whatever the precise nature of the charges brought against them, the reason for their impeachment is manifest, and this attack must be regarded as a direct challenge to their recent policy. To Theban eyes Epaminondas in the Peloponnese, Pelopidas

¹ See the account of the battle, below, p. 149.

² If a series of conjectures be accepted, the first archon was Hellanocrates an Aleuad, the second Agelaus of Pharsalus.

³ Plut., *Pel.*, 25 ; Diod., XV, 72, 1–2 ; Paus., IX, 14, 7 ; Nepos, *Epam.*, 7–8. Beloch, III, 2, pp. 247–50, though unjustified in accepting the account of Diodorus in its entirety, rightly adopts his dating of the trial. Cary, *C.Q.*, XVIII (1924), pp. 181–4, strongly supports the dating of Plutarch, i.e. after the first expedition to the Peloponnese ; but he neglects the importance of Plut., *Pel.*, 28, where the ‘anger’ which caused the Boeotians not to elect Epaminondas Boeotarch for 368 is no chance whim but rather the widespread dissatisfaction felt at the time of his trial. Further, it does not follow because Pelopidas also was accused that the charges against both arose from the same expedition—they had in fact been guilty of similar indiscretions in different fields.

in Thessaly had acted in a spirit rather of philanthropy than of patriotism. The only tangible advantage to Thebes gained by the latter was a purely negative one, that Macedonia was not in a position to encroach upon Thessaly. On the other hand, the new Thessalian League might soon be powerful enough to deal with its enemies without Boeotian assistance. The Theban government, always selfish and short-sighted, had perhaps some justification for its disappointment.

It was not long before fresh requests for help came from both Macedonia and Thessaly. Alexander of Macedon was murdered this winter by his rival Ptolemy,¹ who established himself as regent with all the powers of a king, and the friends of the dead king naturally appealed to his Theban allies. In Thessaly the new League proved incapable of defending itself against the attacks of Alexander of Pherae. The two appeals must have arrived almost simultaneously, but neither party was successful in convincing the Thebans of the advantages to be gained by a military expedition. Indeed, the hitherto ambitious northern policy of Thebes seems to have fallen into temporary disrepute. Nevertheless, an embassy was sent, consisting of Pelopidas and Ismenias, to attempt the arduous task of settling the disputes in both countries by diplomacy.

¹ *Marsyas* fr. 11 (Jacoby) ; *Diod.*, XV, 71 ; *Plut.*, *Pel.*, 27.

Meanwhile the situation in Macedon had been further complicated by the intervention of another power. Ptolemy, finding his authority threatened by a rival claimant Pausanias, appealed to the Athenian admiral Iphicrates,¹ who happened to be operating with a small squadron at Amphipolis. Acting on his own initiative, Iphicrates expelled Pausanias and established Athenian influence in Macedonia.² At this time Athens, already an ally of Sparta,³ was a declared enemy of Thebes, so that Pelopidas considered it his first duty to re-establish Theban control in Macedon. Leaving the Thessalians to check Alexander as best they might, he marched against Ptolemy at the head of a mercenary force, which had been stationed at Pharsalus⁴ and must have been in the pay of the new-born Thessalian League. The campaign, which at one time seemed likely to result in serious disaster, ended in the accomplishment of its object. First the mercenaries, for whose upkeep Pelopidas cannot have had adequate resources, were by bribery induced to desert their commander.

¹ Aesch., II, 27-8. The appeal was made through Eurydice, the widow of Amyntas.

² Ibid., 29.

³ Xen., *Hell.*, VII, 1, 14. The alliance had been made in the previous year.

⁴ Plut., *Pel.*, 27. Pharsalus must have regained its independence since the execution of Polydamas, perhaps in the course of Pelopidas's first expedition.

Ptolemy, however, found his Athenian friends too weak or too self-seeking and decided that submission to Thebes was the lesser evil. Somewhat surprisingly he gave fifty hostages and negotiated an alliance through Pelopidas.¹

On his return to Thessaly the first thought of Pelopidas was to take vengeance on his treacherous mercenaries. He proceeded at once to Pharsalus, the temporary home of their families, accompanied by some part of the Thessalian League army. Here he was unexpectedly confronted by Alexander at the head of a much superior force. Hoping to repeat the diplomatic successes which he had achieved in Macedonia, Pelopidas effected a truce for purposes of negotiation—there was, in fact, no alternative. But Alexander, less easily overawed than Ptolemy by the might of Thebes, broke his oath ² and imprisoned both Pelopidas and Ismenias.³ Pharsalus at once fell into his hands, apparently without bloodshed.

This act of violence is not to be attributed to the savagery of a tyrant's character. He knew that Pelopidas was in disfavour, that the Theban government would not relish the prospect of a considerable campaign, especially so late in the season. No doubt he hoped to exact as the price for releas-

¹ Aesch., II, 29 ; Plut., *Pel.*, 27.

² Suidas, *παρ' οὐδέν θέμενος*, quoting an unnamed author.

³ Plut., *Pel.*, 27 ; Diod., XV, 71, 2 ; Paus., IX, 15, 1-2.

ing his prisoners the recognition of his claim to the *tageia* and freedom to deal with the Thessalian League as he pleased. This confident attitude was also encouraged by his improved relations with Athens. There is clear evidence that in the spring of this year the Athenians were contemplating interference in Thessaly,¹ and an alliance was now formed.² News of the tyrant's latest exploit caused the Athenians to indulge in one of their bursts of misguided enthusiasm,³ especially in regard to the material benefits which they fondly hoped to gain from the alliance.⁴ They set up a bronze statue of Alexander⁵ and, as a more valuable proof of their sincerity, dispatched thirty ships and a thousand men under a general named Autocles to protect him against Boeotian reprisals.⁶ This association of Athens and Alexander was not likely to prosper since their interests were conflicting, and it was not long before each party was proved unwise in its reliance on the other.

Thebes acted with unexpected promptitude, and while Autocles was still on his way, an army of

¹ Xen., *Hell.*, VII, 1, 28—the Athenian proposal to send the second relief force from Dionysius to Thessaly.

² *I.G.*, II², 1, 116 l. 39–40, where instructions are given for destroying the stone on which this alliance was inscribed—also Diod., XV, 71, 3.

³ Dem., XXIII, 120.

⁴ Ephippus fr. 1, on bread from Thessaly; Plut., *Mor.*, p. 193 D, on cheap meat.

⁵ Plut., *Pel.*, 31.

⁶ Diod., XV, 71, 3.

8,000 under Cleomenes and Hypatus¹ invaded Thessaly in the hope of recovering their envoys by a short autumn campaign. However, Alexander, realizing the value of delay and wishing to use his superior cavalry to the best advantage, refused to fight a pitched battle. The Boeotians, who had encountered apathy and even treachery among their Thessalian allies, were soon in difficulties through lack of supplies. Eventually they were forced to beat a hasty and ignominious retreat and sustained considerable loss in the Thessalian plain at the hands of Alexander's cavalry.² If a picturesque story is to be credited, it was only by the appointment of Epaminondas, who was serving in the ranks, as commander-in-chief that the army escaped without serious disaster.³

For the following year (367) Epaminondas was reinstated as Boeotarch. His first duty was to secure the release of Pelopidas, and in the early spring he led an army into Thessaly. According to Plutarch, this expedition was highly creditable to Thebes, but his account is suspiciously brief and vague.⁴ Clearly Epaminondas aimed only at the release of the prisoners; he conducted his third invasion of the Peloponnese in the summer

¹ Paus., IX, 15, 2. ² Diod., XV, 71, 3-7; Plut., *Pel.*, 28-9.

³ This story appears in Diodorus, Nepos, and Pausanias, but not in Plutarch.

⁴ Plut., *Pel.*, 29. Pausanias (IX, 15, 2) confuses the events of the two campaigns.

of this year and was anxious to march southwards at the earliest opportunity. He now forced the passage of the Spercheius in the face of troops sent by Alexander to check him.¹ But it was only by a mixture of threats and concessions that he induced the tyrant to surrender his prisoners under a thirty-days' truce.² He may even have guaranteed to withdraw Theban support from the Thessalian League, which had proved a broken reed in the previous year. The Boeotians then retired, and Pelopidas must have accompanied them, for he attended the Peace Conference at Susa in the same year.

Encouraged by this Boeotian withdrawal, Alexander in the next three years attempted to strengthen his position by ensuring the loyalty of districts already under his control. It is not possible to define precisely the limits of his territory, but he must have held rather less than half of Pelasgiotis, the greater part of Magnesia, and nearly all Achaea.³ After the time of Jason the Penestae disappear from history,⁴ and it is conceivable that Alexander adopted the policy of liberating them, while to prevent wholesale desertion the League was com-

¹ Polyæn., II, 3, 13.

² Beloch, III, 1, p. 183 n., infers that Alexander gave up Pharsalus, but though this city was independent in 364, it was not necessarily freed by Epaminondas.

³ At least as far as Melitaea, cp. Ephorus fr. 95 (Jacoby).

⁴ Theopompus (fr. 119) only mentions them for comparison with Chian serfs.

pelled to grant similar concessions.¹ Little is recorded of Alexander in these years apart from a catalogue of his atrocities, no doubt the substance of Thessalian complaints received at Thebes. At Scotussa the male inhabitants were massacred, the women and children sold into slavery, and the same fate befell Meliboea, one of the larger villages of Magnesia.² Both were near the borders of Pheraean territory and may well have been suspected of intrigue with the head-quarters of the League, which was at Larisa. Financial stringency was also a potent factor in determining this inhuman policy.³ Alexander found it necessary to maintain garrisons in Achaea and Magnesia,⁴ and his resources were severely taxed by the upkeep of a standing army. This army was also employed in desultory warfare against the nationalists, but as the Thebans could not for a time be persuaded to intervene, information is wanting.

Interesting light is thrown upon the inner history of this civil war by the coinage of the period. In contrast to Jason⁵ Alexander issued coins bearing

¹ This is a conjecture of Kahrstedt (p. 145 n. 4), but the case of the Cyllyrians at Syracuse is analogous (Hüttl, *Verfassungsgeschichte von Syrakus*, p. 38).

² Diod., XV, 75, 1; Plut., *Pel.*, 29; Paus., VI, 5, 2. The coinage of Scotussa ceases abruptly at this point.

³ Paus., loc. cit.

⁴ Plut., *Pel.*, 31.

⁵ See above, p. 115. No tagus issued coins in his capacity as such.

his own name,¹ a virtual confession that he ruled as a tyrant rather than as a constitutional tagus. Many types bear the image of his favourite goddess Hecate Ennodias, others the horse or horseman which appears so often on the coins of Thessalian cities, a symbol perhaps that he regarded all Thessaly as his lawful domain. The Thessalian League replied with a coinage of its own,² bearing the legend *ΠΕΤΘΑΙΩΝ*, which seems to have been a collective name for the whole Thessalian people. To this period also belongs a very curious issue from Larisa, the much-disputed Aleuas coin. On the obverse is the head of Aleuas with the legend *ΑΛΕΥΑ* and a double axe, on the reverse an eagle and the word *ΕΛΛΑ*. This drachma is of a type totally different from the usual issues of Larisa and must have been struck to commemorate some outstanding success for which the Aleuadae considered themselves responsible. No event suits the evidence so well as the liberation of Larisa by Pelopidas in 369 and the foundation of organized opposition to both Alexanders.³ It was the Aleuadae who had

¹ Head, *Historia Numorum*³, p. 308.

² Head, *op. cit.*, p. 304, dates these coins *circa* 350 and assigns them to a Thessalian people known only from an inscription. Hiller von Gaetringen in *Z.N.*, XXXII (1921), pp. 44-5, attributes them to the Thessalian League and quotes three inscriptions to support this view. The coinage was of bronze only.

³ The coin is variously dated. Kahrstedt, p. 136, dates it soon after 400 B.C. ; Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-4, assigns

called in Macedonian aid and who also presumably made the subsequent appeal to Thebes. The coin points back to the old days of Thessalian greatness, when Larisa was supreme in Thessaly and the house of Aleuas in Larisa. The double axe, a symbol of the tageia,¹ now reappears for the first time since the opening years of the fifth century, and the fact that Alexander retaliated by introducing the double axe on his coins² links the Larisean issue with his tyranny.³ ΕΛΛΑ is an unsolved puzzle: it is more likely to stand for the name of a magistrate than for 'Hellas.' Hellanocrates is a Larisean and probably an Aleuad name, and it is a plausible conjecture that the first archon of the Thessalian League was so named.⁴

In 364 the Thessalian League, which was still no match for the trained mercenaries of Alexander, again succeeded in obtaining the active support of the Boeotians.⁵ An embassy—in all probability by

it to Jason (see above, p. 115); Hill, *Historical Greek Coins*, p. 96, connects it with the Simus coin, i.e. after 350 B.C.

¹ Herrmann, *Z.N.*, XXXV (1924), pp. 64-5.

² Hiller von Gaertringen, *Aus der Anomia*, p. 15, argues that Alexander and the Aleuads indulged in a campaign of ancestry propaganda. This attractive theory is largely spoiled by the mistaken idea, originated by A. von Sallet, *Z.N.*, V, p. 99, that ΕΛΛΑ appeared also on the coins.

³ Wade-Gery, *op. cit.*, disputes the connexion.

⁴ Stählin, *art. Larisa*, col. 853, favours this theory.

⁵ Diod., XV, 80, 1-2; Plut., *Pel.*, 31.

no means the first to be sent since the expedition of Epaminondas—was favourably received by the Council of the Boeotian League, which ordered Pelopidas at once to lead an army of 7,000 men into Thessaly. Boeotia had not yet been drawn again into the sterile war in the Peloponnese, and the Thebans at any rate had not abandoned their ambitions in the north. The progressive policy of Athens in Thrace may have been an additional stimulus, for though Timotheus had not yet won the cities of Chalcidice, Pagasae would be a valuable link in a projected chain of maritime allies, stretching from southern Euboea to the Strymon. Thus the two Theban enterprises of this year, the expedition of Pelopidas to Thessaly and the naval venture of Epaminondas, may have been not wholly unconnected in their objects.

The army of 7,000 never set out for Thessaly, as an eclipse of the sun, which occurred just before its departure was thought fatal to the prospects of the expedition.¹ Pelopidas himself was not to be deterred and, accompanied by a volunteer corps of three hundred cavalymen, he hastened to assume command of the Thessalian League army

¹ There seems no valid reason to doubt this story nor the sincerity of the Theban alarm. A number of parallels are to be found in antiquity, and an eclipse certainly took place on 13 July 364. But it is conceivable that the Boeotians in view of their expensive naval plans may have had misgivings about the cost of this army.

at Pharsalus.¹ Meanwhile Alexander crossed the low pass from Pherae at the head of a large army,² composed mainly of mercenary hoplites, and reached the Thetideion. As the hill country round Scotussa was in his hands, he would naturally keep to the north side of the narrow Enipeus plain, so that this temple of Thetis must have stood at the edge of the plain, perhaps a little to the north of the railway station at Orman Magula.³

In the ensuing battle of Cynoscephalae ⁴ Pelopidas held a marked advantage in his superior cavalry, Alexander in his no less superior hoplites,⁵ and this inequality largely determined the tactics of both. As soon as Alexander saw the enemy advancing, he led his infantry into the hills, where it would be better able to withstand cavalry attacks. The Thessalian League hoplites attempted to forestall him, but lost the race for the high ground and were

¹ For this campaign see Plut., *Pel.*, 32. Diod., XV, 80, is of little value.

² Diod., XV, 80, 4, gives 20,000—a slight but not outrageous exaggeration. Perhaps two-thirds would be mercenaries.

³ Stählin, p. 141 and art. *Κυνοσκεφαλαί* in *P.W.* If the Thetideion had been a strong position in the hills north of the railway, Alexander would not have found it necessary to improve his position just before the battle, as Plutarch describes.

⁴ Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder*, II, pp. 116–22, gives an excellent account, except that he misplaces the Thetideion. His explanation of Pelopidas's tactics is here adopted.

⁵ The statement of Plutarch that Alexander had 'more than twice as many hoplites' is not to be taken literally.

beaten off with heavy loss. In the meantime the cavalry of Pelopidas first routed the enemy cavalry on the plain, then checked its pursuit and turned on the exposed flank of Alexander's centre. This brilliant manoeuvre—the same won many a battle for Alexander the Great—was certain to crumple up the enemy army, but it was essential that the League infantry on the left wing should hold its ground. Here the personality of Pelopidas was no less effective than his generalship. He threw himself into the conflict with such energy that the faltering Thessalians actually advanced, thus enabling the cavalry to complete the flanking movement. However, at the turning-point of the battle Pelopidas, now standing on higher ground, saw Alexander among his bodyguard and rushed forward unsupported to slay the tyrant. He was at once mortally wounded and died, as Epaminondas was to die, at the moment of victory. His army must then have relaxed the pursuit, and the greater part of Alexander's mercenaries escaped to Pherae or over the hills to Scotussa.

Pelopidas died a hero's death, but his impetuosity cost his country another campaign.¹ The Thebans were determined to crush Alexander and, acting with great promptitude, they dispatched under

¹ Plutarch makes the victory a complete one for dramatic reasons, but if it had been complete, there would have been no need for a second expedition. Alexander's losses, reckoned by Plutarch at 3,000, cannot have been nearly so heavy.

Malcidas and Diogeiton a large Boeotian army of 7,000 hoplites, which reached Thessaly in the early autumn.¹ Epaminondas, who would naturally be chosen as the avenger of Pelopidas, was prevented from taking command owing to the demands of his naval operations. No detailed account of this expedition survives,² but apparently the mercenaries of Alexander, weakened by desertion, were no match for Boeotian hoplites and Thessalian cavalry. They were defeated, and the tyrant was forced to agree to ignominious terms, amounting almost to an unconditional surrender. He became a member of the Boeotian League, liable to supply contingents to the League army,³ while his territory was confined to Pherae, Pagasae, and some part of southern Magnesia. Achaea Phthiotis and the rest of Magnesia⁴ were not restored to the Thessalian League,

¹ Beloch, III, 2, p. 244, assigns this second expedition to the spring of 363. This dating is the inference of Köhler, *Hermes*, XXIV (1889), p. 637 from *I.G.*, VII, 2408, an inscription of the period, in which these two generals appear as Boeotarchs, while Pelopidas and Epaminondas do not. However, as Cary points out, *J.H.S.*, XLII (1922), pp. 190-1, the date of this inscription is not fixed, since Malcidas and Diogeiton may well have been colleagues on more than one occasion. Plut., *Pel.*, 35, insists that the second army was sent immediately, and there is no reason to doubt his words.

² Diod., XV, 80, 6; Plut., *Pel.*, 35.

³ Contingents both from Alexander and from his enemies fought at Mantinea two years later (Xen., *Hell.*, VII, 5, 4).

⁴ Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Magnesia as a whole was liberated from Alexander, but at the time of his

but were made separate Boeotian allies.¹ Such was the Theban settlement, and at last the Theban aim to control Thessaly was accomplished. But this control was not, as Isocrates describes it to Philip,² an enslavement; it was rather a general weakening, disastrous to the Thessalians themselves and, as the future was to show, by no means profitable to Thebes.

The death of Epaminondas at Mantinea transformed the political situation throughout the Greek world, and in Thessaly no less than elsewhere. As Thebes had now lost both her imperialist leaders, Alexander could with safety forget his obligations to Boeotia, and the Thessalian League could no longer hope for Boeotian support. When the representative contingents of both parties had returned from the Mantinea campaign, the struggle must have begun anew, although no account of it is extant. The army of the League could now hold its own without external support and during the next four years suffered no further losses. In fact, Alexander, unable to make his military operations pay for themselves, found it hard to maintain naval raids he certainly held at least its southern coastline. Kip, *Thessalische Studien*, pp. 78-9, believes that Magnesia was now taken by Thebes, but later restored perhaps in return for the contingent sent to Mantinea. Theban munificence, especially at a time of such difficulty, is barely credible.

¹ Diod., XV, 80, 6. Their light-armed troops rendered valuable service at Mantinea (*Ibid.*, 85, 4).

² V, 53.

his mercenaries and was compelled to resort to piracy. This brought him into collision with Athens, lately his ally, but now owing to his submission to Thebes virtually an enemy.

Athenian sea power was during this period at a very low ebb,¹ and Alexander could attack her island allies in the Aegean without much danger. His first raid, which took place in August 362 soon after the battle of Mantinea, was directed against Tenos,² and the sale of his prisoners must have realized a welcome sum. Next year he landed a force of mercenaries on Peparethus, and the Athenians were forced to intervene. A general named Leosthenes succeeded in besieging the attackers, but a surprise attack by the fleet of Alexander brought disaster upon the Athenians. Six ships, five Athenian and one Peparethian, and six hundred prisoners fell into enemy hands, and Leosthenes on his return home was condemned to death.³ Immediately after the battle the ships of the tyrant daringly raided the Peiraeus and, being at first mistaken for Athenian vessels, escaped with their plunder before opposition could be organized.⁴ Alexander intended to continue these naval operations and tried to enlist the freebooter Charidemus in his

¹ Dem., XXIII and [Dem.] L *passim*.

² [Dem.] L, 4. This raid was made quite independently and not as an ally of Thebes.

³ Diod., XV, 95, 1-3; Polyacn., VI, 2, 1.

⁴ Polyacn., VI, 2, 2.

service.¹ He was, however, met with a very curt refusal, which seems to have damped his enthusiasm for such ventures.

From an Athenian point of view this buccaneering was humiliating, but not particularly dangerous ; and Chares, the successor of Leosthenes, did not think fit to take any action against Alexander.² When, however, an embassy³ arrived from the Thessalian League⁴ proposing an alliance against Alexander, the suggestion was gladly accepted. The Thessalians, finding that no more assistance would be forthcoming from Thebes, naturally hoped to profit from the effects of Alexander's depredations. This alliance with an optimism quite exceptional in Greek agreements of this kind was to last 'for ever',⁵ but a clause, which stipulated that neither side should make peace with Alexander without the agreement of the other,⁶ suggests the duration of the war as a more likely time-limit. An unusual feature is that 'all the allies of the Athenians'⁷ are to be allies of the Thessalians, and this may point to expected co-operation between the League and the island allies of Athens in the northern

¹ Dem., XXIII, 162.

² Diod., XV, 95, 3.

³ For this alliance, which is not mentioned by the literary authorities, see *I.G.*, II², 1, 116, and its treatment by Köhler, *Ath. Mitt.*, II (1887), pp. 197 sqq. Also *I.G.*, II², 1, 175.

⁴ Lines 8-9 of the former inscription seem to show that the negotiations were initiated from the Thessalian side.

⁵ ll. 4 and 12.

⁶ ll. 31-4.

⁷ ll. 12-13.

Aegean. Agelaus, who was the present archon of the League, is thought to have been a Daochid, because an earlier Agelaus is honoured in the Daochus inscription ;¹ it is perhaps safe to infer that he was a Pharsalian and that Pharsalus had at this time become the equal of Larisa.

No record is extant of any action resulting from this alliance, and it is highly improbable that any took place. Athens had been consistently unsuccessful in the northern Aegean and was even experiencing difficulty in keeping open the corn-route through the Hellespont.² Thebes was an enemy of Athens, and the only outcome of the alliance may have been to improve the relations between Alexander and the Thebans.³ Rather flimsy support for this friendship is provided by a curious story which appears in Xenophon.⁴ Alexander proposed to divorce his wife Thebe, as she was childless, and to marry Jason's widow, who was living at Thebes. Even if Jason contracted a second marriage late in life,⁵ it is surprising that Alexander, anxious for an heir, should plan to divorce his cousin and marry his aunt. However, the scheme must have involved a certain amount of negotiation with Thebes.

¹ Ditt.³, 274.

² [Dem.] L, 6.

³ Costanzi, p. 125.

⁴ *Hell.*, VI, 4, 37.

⁵ Beloch, III, 2, pp. 82-3, makes this suggestion, but prefers to believe that there is some mistake in Xenophon and that Alexander really wished to marry a younger sister of Thebe.

Whatever the details of Alexander's matrimonial entanglements they certainly brought about his murder, which occurred in 358.¹ The story is attractively melodramatic and excited the interest of many writers, the account of Plutarch being particularly brilliant.² Thebe in her exasperation persuaded her three brothers, Tisiphonus, Lycophron, and Peitholaus, to murder the tyrant in his bed. The plot was carefully laid, but the courage of the young men failed, and it was only by threats of exposure that Thebe induced them to enter the bedchamber. 'Then one of them tooke him by the feete, and bounde them hard : an other caught him by the heare of his head, and pulled him backwards : and the third thrust him through with his sword'.³

The character of Alexander is one which will bear no whitewashing. He was unscrupulous and cruel, a man of violent passions, to be mistrusted even by his closest allies. He had neither the ability for organization nor the gift of attaining popularity which had made Jason almost a national hero. Yet in view of his achievements it is impossible to

¹ Diod., XVI, 14, 1, tells the story under 357-6, but in XV, 61, 2 he calculates the reign of Alexander as eleven years, i.e. 369-358 B.C.

² *Pel.*, 35—see also Xen., *Hell.*, VI, 4, 35-7 ; Diod., XVI, 14, 1 ; Cic., *De Off.*, II, 7, 25 ; Val. Max., IX, 13, ext. 3.

³ Plut., loc. cit. (North's translation).

accept without reserve, as many modern historians have done,¹ the prejudiced verdict of antiquity. Xenophon,² interested in Thessaly but ignorant of its peculiar conditions, calls him *ἄδικος ληστής*, a phrase which freedom-loving Greeks might apply to almost any tyrant. Later tradition is still more severe, influenced perhaps by Aristotle's *Constitution of the Thessalians*, which must have been tinged with Macedonian prejudice against the tyrants of Pherae. Hence Alexander joined the ranks of that unhistorical, overdrawn 'tyrant-type', created by the schools of rhetoric and philosophy.³ The portrait in Plutarch contains many 'tyrant-type' crudities, since Alexander must be blackened not only to provide an ethical contrast to the heroic Pelopidas, but also as an enemy of the biographer's beloved Thebes.

The historical Alexander seems to have been a man of much the same type as Dionysius I of Syracuse, though without the resources or opportunities of the latter. No threat of barbarian invasion assisted him in his attempt to reunite Thessaly, and he was continually hampered by the development of the opposition. To keep his cause alive he had of necessity to resort to drastic measures,

¹ Cary in *C.A.H.*, VI, p. 85, is surely mistaken in considering Alexander almost insane.

² *Hell.*, VI, 4, 35.

³ A rhetorical papyrus classes him with the notorious Phalaris (Kunst, *Rhetorische Papyri*, p. 21, l. 119).

and this threw his country once more into its usual condition of spasmodic turbulence. But the policy of his opponents in relying on external aid was no less culpable and still more fatal to Thessalian unity. Alexander too had allies, but he did not incur dangerous obligations by expecting them to fight his battles for him. Perhaps his most serious handicap was his enforced reliance on mercenaries. There is no reason to suppose that his own subjects were disaffected : ¹ they had numerous opportunities for revolution, which were never taken, because they must have benefited handsomely from his policy. However, the population of Pherae, Pagasae, and the district which he controlled was quite incapable of supplying an army to combat the rest of Thessaly, still less the rest of Thessaly supported by a Boeotian expeditionary force. He was thus forced to put his faith in one of those large mercenary armies, which were in the fourth century so easily collected, but not so easily maintained. In contrast to Jason he seems to have concentrated less on efficiency than on numbers,² a policy especially unwise in view of his limited income.³

¹ Plut., *Pel.*, 32, says that his body was 'cast out and trampled under foot by the Pheraeans ; but this is probably an appropriate fabrication to complete the 'tyrant' picture, cp. Diod. XV, 61, 2.

² To judge by the battle of Cynoscephalae.

³ Harbour dues at Pagasae would be his most fruitful source. Achaea and Magnesia doubtless paid taxes, when under his control, but these would not be considerable.

Food was cheap enough, but a hired soldier demands more than a bare livelihood. In consequence the necessity of raising pay for his troops or of providing them with opportunities to enrich themselves led him sometimes into ill-advised acts of violence.

Incapable of surmounting the obstacles by which he was hampered, Alexander left very little mark on Greek history. Even in a period when men of first-rate ability were few, he played and, had he lived, always would have played a minor part, sensational rather than important. More than energy and obstinacy was required to make Thessaly a dominating power, and Alexander's failure is perhaps the best commentary on Jason's success.

NOTE ON THE MURDER OF ALEXANDER

Accounts of the murder present some divergences in regard to the immediate cause of the plot and the details of its execution. Theopompus, who is known to have dealt at some length with the story of Alexander (Polyb., XXXVIII, 6, 2, where the writer criticized appears to be Theopompus) and of Thebe (fr. 306), is probably responsible for the account of Plutarch, while Xenophon gives a shorter but almost identical version. Later authorities are less trustworthy, for a fourth-century tragedian named Moschion here found the subject for his 'Pheraeans' (Ribbeck, *Rh. Mus.*, XXX, 1875, pp. 155-9) and may well have modified the story to suit his dramatic purpose. It is perhaps under his influence that Conon (*Diag.*, 50), writing in the first century B.C. further glorifies Thebe and represents her as virtual ruler of Pherae in succession to her husband. After the murder the body of Alexander was cast into the sea, whence it was recovered by a fisherman and restored to the loyal members of his household, who had taken refuge at Crannon (Theop., fr. 319).

CHAPTER VIII

PHILIP AND THE END OF THESSALIAN FREEDOM

στρατηγήμασι Φίλιππος ἐκράτησε Θεσσαλίας, οὐ τοῖς ὅπλοις
(POLYAENUS)

THE murder of Alexander was enthusiastically acclaimed by most of the Thessalians, but although it marks the opening of a new phase in their development, it contributed nothing towards the solution of their most pressing problems. Their share in Greek history during the next quarter of a century contains hardly a single achievement on which they could with reason congratulate themselves. Some excuse for this political sterility may be found in the destructive policy of Thebes during her recent hegemony, but little defence can be made against the strictures of Theopompus upon Thessalian character.¹ In this period, at any rate, history confirms his conventional picture of the Thessalian as a hard-drinking fellow who got the maximum of pleasure out of to-day and cared

¹ Fr. 51 and 153.

nothing for to-morrow. With the removal of Alexander the Pheraeon tyranny lost much of its vital force, and there was less necessity for the rest of the country to unite against a common enemy. The Thessalian League, which had at one time shown promise of a brilliant future, was far too short-sighted to appreciate the menace of a growing power in the north and actually invited Macedonian domination by encouraging Philip to settle its domestic difficulties. It is true that the country ultimately profited by subjection to an organizer who substituted order for chaos,¹ but this was not the result of enlightened statesmanship on the part of its leaders.

Philip, on the other hand, was fully aware of the advantages which control of Thessaly would bring. It was an established tradition that, when the kingship was strong, an attempt should be made to extend Macedonian influence southwards ;² and Philip, whose designs were from the first on a wider scale than those of his predecessors, had additional reasons for interference in Thessaly. Not only was it the first stepping-stone to Greece, but its military strength, particularly in cavalry,³ was comparable to that of his own country. Further, since Macedonia was very deficient in good harbours

¹ Isocr., *Ep.*, II, 20.

² Kaerst, pp. 217-18, who instances Archelaus and Alexander II.

³ Justin, VII, 6, 8-9.

and could furnish no adequate base for naval operations in Athenian waters, he was anxious to gain possession of Pagasae. He realized that the task of winning Thessaly was not, if skilfully handled, by any means a difficult one. Throughout his relations with the League and with individual cities he relied very largely on diplomacy,¹ supporting all appeals, but at the same time serving his own interests, so that eventually the prize fell to him at the trifling price of one pitched battle and a few sieges.

But the story of this process is not easily reconstructed. The interest of historians in the personality of Alexander of Pherae is largely responsible for the survival of evidence which throws light on the events of the preceding decade, but subsequently Thessalian history is a barren field for the sensationalist. The Macedonian period contains not a single historical character²—even Daochus in spite of his efforts to perpetuate his memory is little more than a name. More than ever before is it difficult to gauge the Thessalian point of view in foreign politics or to decide what party or section of the population is indicated when an authority refers vaguely to ‘the Thes-

¹ Polyæn., IV, 2, 19, which refers not to a single situation, but, as the imperfects indicate, to a continuous policy.

² Medius of Larisa, the friend of Alexander the Great, is a tolerably clear figure, but he took no part in Thessalian political life.

salians'. At home the inner history of the national state and the relationships between the leading cities are for long periods absolutely unknown. The loss of Theopompus's *Philippica*, which has adversely affected the whole tradition of Greek history at this period, is particularly to be regretted, as he dealt on a generous scale with the northern Greeks. Justin supplies few points of importance, while Diodorus, after giving some account of the Thessalian part in the Sacred War, later confines himself to very brief and often confused notices mainly derived from his chronographical source. Contemporary evidence is furnished by a series of inscriptions from Delphi which throw light on Thessalian activities in the Amphictyonic Council, and also by the speeches of the Attic orators. Aeschines mentions Thessalian affairs several times, Demosthenes frequently; but, when collected and compared, the total of these references, though considerable in volume, is very disappointing in historical value. Thessaly has little intrinsic interest for either, and in most cases events in Thessalian history are cited merely to illustrate a particular argument, while in narrative portions both are guilty of prejudice often amounting to actual distortion. Demosthenes is highly inconsistent: sometimes he expresses hopes of aid from the Thessalians against Philip, sometimes pity for their intolerable servitude under a Macedonian yoke, sometimes

disgust at their desertion of his beloved Hellenic cause. A single instance will show that these are not progressive stages of opinion from confidence to disillusionment. In 341 he twice lays stress on the 'slavery' which Philip had recently inflicted on the Thessalians,¹ yet he regards it as necessary for Philip to induce them by deception to follow him in the Amphissean War two years later.² Seldom are the shortcomings of rhetorical evidence better exemplified.

Of the new rulers of Pherae very little is recorded, although an unfinished letter of Isocrates is addressed to them.³ Hailed at first as tyrant-slayers the three sons of Jason displayed some inclination to abolish the tyranny or at least to modify its unconstitutional nature.⁴ It, is, however most unlikely that they ever seriously contemplated such a move. Isocrates represents them as hesitating between the restoration of constitutional government, which he him-

¹ VIII, 62 and IX, 26.

² XVIII, 147, the speech being delivered in 330, when Demosthenes could look back on the events of the past and interpret them as suited his purpose.

³ *Ep.*, VI, written in answer to a request that he should live at their court. Münscher, art. Isokrates in *P.W.*, col. 2202-3, believes this letter to be spurious, but without good reason. Others, including Jebb, *Attic Orators*, II², pp. 242-4, Meyer, *G.d.A.*, V, p. 480, and Beloch, III, 1, p. 228 n. 1, regard it as genuine.

⁴ Diod., XVI, 14, 1.

self urges, and continuance of the tyranny advocated by most of their friends.¹ Athens also, now rid of a most troublesome enemy, endeavoured to influence their choice by the conclusion of an alliance.² But this attitude of doubt on the part of the brothers must have been a mere pose adopted to gain time and to avoid immediate attack by the Thessalian League, which might have taken advantage of their insecurity. A liberated Pherae, even though admitted to the League, could scarcely have avoided all reprisals; nor, deprived of financial support from the Jasonids and of the standing army of mercenaries which they maintained, could it ever have enforced its claims to leadership. Therefore, when the brothers bribed the mercenaries of Alexander and ruled tyrannically continuing his violent methods,³ perhaps few of the Pheraeans were disappointed. Tisiphonus, the eldest, held the supreme position, as is attested by coins which bear his name,⁴ but Lycophron and Peitholaus doubtless held official status under him. Under these altered circumstances Athens naturally cancelled her alliance, and in 357 Tisiphonus allowed his ships—the same with which Alexander had made his piratical raids—to be used in Theban operations against an Athenian fleet.⁵ The scene

¹ *Ep.*, VI, 11–14.

² *Ibid.*, 3.

³ *Diod.*, XVI, 14, 1.

⁴ *Head*, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–9.

⁵ *Schol.*, *Aristeides*, ed. *Dindorf*, III, p. 298.

of these hostilities was Euboea, where Tisiphonus, who was not a mere servant of Thebes, may have hoped to take advantage of Athenian and Theban weakness. In this case, however, the Athenians acted with unusual determination and succeeded in regaining control of the island.¹

When it became evident that the new rulers of Pherae would continue the policy of Alexander, the Aleuads, conscious of their own weakness, lost no time before casting about for external assistance. Athens had proved a broken reed and Thebes was now on good terms with the tyrant-house, so that their appeal was sent to Macedonia, where Philip was already giving evidence of outstanding abilities. The Thessalian spokesman in this appeal was Cineas,² no doubt a leader in Larisean politics, and the probable date is 358, the same year in which Alexander was murdered.³ This first interference of Philip presents some difficulties, and a number of historians have refused to credit it. Admittedly the passage in Diodorus ⁴ in which it is recorded is a résumé of relations between Thessaly and Macedonia extending over a considerable period ; ⁵ but it cannot be proved that Macedonian intervention did not start at this early date. On

¹ Schaefer, op. cit., I, pp. 162-3.

² Theop. fr. 35 (from Book I of the *Philippica*) ; Dem., XVIII, 295 ; Harp. s.v. *Κινέας*.

³ Beloch, III, 1, p. 228 n.

⁴ XVI, 14, 1-2.

⁵ Swoboda, *J.*, p. 203.

the other hand, there is no reason to believe that in 358 Philip either expelled the sons of Jason from Pherae¹ or, as the misleading evidence of Justin implies,² gained any authoritative position. Exaggeration of his achievements in Thessaly has led to difficulty in 'finding a place' for a Thessalian campaign among his manifold activities at the beginning of his career. This difficulty does not arise if the following explanation is adopted. As soon as he received the invitation of the Aleuadae, Philip initiated his policy of half-hearted interference³ and in the course of the years 358-356 sent more than one expeditionary force into Thessaly.⁴ These could not be large owing to distractions elsewhere, and it is not necessary to conclude that Philip came in person⁵ or won outstanding

¹ Kahrstedt, art. Lykophron (4) in *P.W.*, wrongly infers this from Diod., loc. cit.

² VII, 6, 8-9. The transposition by Ruehl in the Teubner Text of 'urbem nobilissimam Larissam capit' from the preceding sentence is better textual than historical criticism; for Larisa is the last city which Philip would wish to take at this time. Clearly the word 'Larissam' is corrupt.

³ Polyæn., IV, 19, 2.

⁴ Swoboda, *J.*, p. 205.

⁵ Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*, p. 69 n. 1, attempting to disprove early intervention by Macedon, cites Dem., IX, 25 where it is stated that in 341 Philip had been in personal contact with Greek affairs for less than thirteen years. This is to assume that Philip never employed troops except under his own leadership and also to credit the orator with an accuracy in historical detail which is scarcely so apparent elsewhere.

successes. He did, however, accomplish his primary aim, namely to maintain the balance of power between the tyrants and the League until he could spare sufficient time to appear personally and turn the situation to his advantage. Several fragments of Theopompus lend support to this belief, although great caution must be observed in drawing inferences from the arrangement of the *Philippica*.¹ Thessalian events were mentioned in the first, third, and fourth books,² and this is an indication, but not by any means definite proof, of several expeditions during these years. It was also in the earliest years of his reign that Philip married a Larisean woman named Philinna, for their son, Arrhidacus, was himself of marriageable age before 336.³ This move had the express object of gaining Thessalian favour,⁴ but Philinna, who was very far from being an aristocrat,⁵ is usually regarded as little higher than a concubine and was soon overshadowed by the masterful Olympias.

The progress of Macedonian intrigue was now checked by events which caused a temporary

¹ Beloch, III, 2, p. 19, points out that certain reconstruction of this work is impossible.

² Fr. 34, 35, 47, and 51.

³ Plut., *Alex.*, 10.

⁴ Satyrus fr. 5 (Müller).

⁵ Plut., *Alex.*, 77 : Ptolemy of Megalopolis fr. 4 (Jacoby) ; Justin, IX, 8, 2 and XIII, 2, 11. Beloch, III, 2, p. 69, believes her to have been an Aleuad despite this weight of evidence.

revival of Thessalian unity. In the spring of 356¹ the Council of the Amphictyonic League sent its ultimatum to the Phocians and in the following autumn almost the whole of northern Greece was involved in the Sacred War. Pausanias suggests that among the causes of this war may be included the hereditary enmity between Thessaly and Phocis.² Certainly the decree which in 363 banished the pro-Phocian party from Delphi and so ultimately brought about the war was proposed by a Thessalian, Andronicus,³ but practically all responsibility lies with Thebes. The Thessalian League can scarcely have been so foolish as deliberately to foment a second war, thus exposing itself to attack from the rear by the still formidable Pheraean tyranny. However, the Thessalians, ever jealous of their privileges at the Amphictyony, resented any alleged attempt by Phocis to interfere with these,⁴ and a Boeotian embassy⁵ had no difficulty in persuading them that they had everything to gain by participating in a war which seemed likely to effect the prompt and final extinction of their most bitter enemies. It was an easy matter to sway the votes of the Perioeci and other neighbours,

¹ For the Sacred War period the chronological system of Beloch is generally adopted here, though without much confidence in its accuracy. The order of events which concern Thessaly is fairly clear, but not their precise dates.

² X, 2, 1.

³ Ditt.³, 175, l. 6.

⁴ *Second Hypoth.* ad Dem. XIX, 1. ⁵ Diod., XVI, 28, 4.

and soon nearly all Greece north of Thermopylae had joined the cause.¹ That the tyrants of Pherae welcomed the outbreak of hostilities is self-evident, since the League was thereby diverted from its attempts to crush them ; but there is no evidence that they formally sanctioned the declaration of war. They cannot have been represented on the Amphictyonic Council, and the vote of Magnesia, which Beloch believes to be evidence of their sanction,² must have been that of free Magnesia and not of such portions as were probably still under their control. Their friendship with Thebes appears to have waned and before long changed to actual hostility.

During the first campaigning season of the Sacred War the League displayed commendable activity, for which Larisa was undoubtedly responsible. It actually took the offensive with an army of 6,000 men, including the contingents of neighbouring tribes, which marched into eastern Locris with a view to joining forces with the main Boeotian army.³ This was indeed a notable achievement and is the first recorded instance of League hoplites operating independently outside Thessaly—in fact, since the march of Jason to Leuctra no troops had left the country other than enforced contingents to Theban armies. However, even if the neigh-

¹ Diod., XVI, 29, 1.

² III, 1, p. 253.

³ Diod., XVI, 30, 4.

bouring tribes supplied only a thousand men in all, this army does not represent the full fighting strength of Thessaly, and large reserves must have been left to watch any movement by the tyrants. Philomelus, already victorious in a cavalry engagement, now commanded an army of over 10,000, and he made every effort to encounter his foes separately before they could unite. Near an unknown Mount Argolas the Thessalians, whose generals were perhaps incompetent, were outnumbered and defeated,¹ but the survivors were not prevented from reaching the approaching Boeotian League army.² It was now the Phocians who were outnumbered and they were compelled to retire in the direction of Delphi, abandoning all hopes of holding Thermopylae. A decisive battle was fought at Neon on the northern side of Parnassus, in which the Phocians were overwhelmed and Philomelus lost his life.³ No valuable details of the victory are extant, and the Thessalians are not even mentioned.

Despite the share which they may have had in

¹ Diod., XVI, 30, 4. Some of the dedications whose inscriptions are recorded by Ditt.³, 202-3, were probably made in honour of this victory.

² Beloch, III, 1, p. 250 n. 1 and in *Klio*, VI (1906), pp. 40-41, rightly includes the Thessalian forces in Diodorus's 'Boeotian' army of 13,000, but the former had been reduced in numbers by their defeat.

³ Diod., XVI, 31, 1-5; Paus., X, 2, 4.

the final victory the part played by the Thessalian League troops during this summer was not altogether a creditable one. On their return serious dissensions broke out, and these were unchecked by any need for union, since the Sacred War now appeared to be at an end. The tyrants had probably not been idle in the absence of the League army and they now received substantial assistance from an unexpected quarter. During the winter of 355-354 Onomarchus, who always used the Delphic treasures to very shrewd effect, began to subsidize Lycophron—Tisiphonus was already dead—in his conflict with the League.¹ This prevented the concerted action by Boeotia and Thessaly which had proved so disastrous to Philomelus in the preceding summer; in fact, the Thessalians took no further part in the Sacred War until its closing stages were reached. Another cause of civil war in Thessaly may be found in the establishment of a tyranny at Crannon under the Pheraean Deinias.² The adherents of Alexander fled to Crannon after the murder;³ and Deinias, who was perhaps one of them, first held a constitutional office for three years, but later,

¹ So Schaefer, *op. cit.*, I, p. 504 n. 4, rightly interprets Diod., XVI, 33, 3, this explanation being confirmed by the subsequent aid sent from Onomarchus to Pherae (*ibid.*, 35, 1). Costanzi, p. 129, is surely wrong in believing that Onomarchus bought off all the Thessalians, a very costly undertaking even for one who controlled the Delphic treasures.

² Polyæn., II, 34.

³ Theop. fr. 319.

becoming reconciled to Lycophron, made himself tyrant with assistance from Pherae. That Deinias was supported by Lycophron is admittedly a conjecture, as the date of his coup is quite unknown,¹ but even without this exacerbation there was no lack of a *casus belli* between the League and the tyrants. Open war soon broke out, which virtually resolved itself into a struggle for supremacy between Larisa and Pherae.² The stratagem of Onomarchus had achieved its object, and in consequence several vital points near Thermopylae fell into his hands—Thronion at this time,³ Alponus and Nicaea perhaps somewhat later.⁴

These disturbances were much to the liking of Onomarchus, but they were no less welcome to Philip. As was usually the case, Larisa and the League were no match for Pherae, and a request for help was sent to Philip,⁵ who had just captured Methone (early summer 354) and was now in a position to deal with the Thessalian situation in person and with greater firmness than hitherto. Lycophron evidently could not muster an army sufficiently large to give him any hope of opposing Philip with success. At this time of universal conflict he may have experienced difficulty in hiring mercenaries, even if his windfall from the Delphic

¹ See above, p. 130.

² Polyæn., IV, 2, 19.

³ Diod., XVI, 33, 4.

⁴ Aesch., II, 132.

⁵ Perhaps by Eudicus and Simus—see below, p. 182.

treasury provided ample resources for their pay. He therefore appealed to Onomarchus, at present operating with the main Phocian army in Boeotia, to show his gratitude. Phayllus promptly led an advance guard of 7,000 men into Thessaly, but he was unable to check Philip and was driven out of the country. The Phocians now appeared in full force considerably outnumbering and perhaps outmanœuvring the troops of Philip,¹ and Onomarchus, whose aim it was to gain the whole of Thessaly, won two notable victories.² If Diodorus is to be believed, the Macedonians got out of hand ; at all events, Philip was compelled to return to Macedon with his main purpose unaccomplished. But he refused to call this retreat a flight ; he was, he said, retiring like a ram in order to butt the harder a second time.

Onomarchus appears to have underestimated the resources and determination of Philip and to have believed Thessaly secured in his interests for the present. Hence the next campaigning season (353) opened with another Phocian invasion of Boeotia. However, Philip soon appeared in Thessaly and was appointed temporary commander-in-chief of the League army,³ a position equivalent to the archonship, though his formal election to that magistracy

¹ Polyæn., II, 38, 2.

² Diod., XVI, 35, 2-3.

³ Justin, VIII, 2, 1—the inclusion of 'Thebani' in this passage is evidently an error due to the fact that in 346 (*ibid.*, 4, 4) 'Thessali Boeotique' invited Philip to end the Sacred War, in which he was at this date not yet a combatant.

belongs to a much later date. The Thessalians are said to have trusted him, whereas they would not trust a fellow-countryman,¹ but it is more likely that they wished the whole of the forces in the field to be concentrated under a single command. Philip struck straight at the point of most value to him which was Pagasae,² but Pagasae had strong fortifications³ and its reduction must have occupied several weeks. A regular siege was required,⁴ and according to Demosthenes it was due only to Athenian tardiness that a squadron dispatched from Athens to relieve the town arrived too late to accomplish its purpose.⁵ Onomarchus also had time to march from Boeotia with 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry before Philip could turn his attention to Pherae itself. By this time Philip, whose own army perhaps did not exceed that of the previous year, had persuaded the League to support him wholeheartedly and to mobilize every available man.⁶ He now led an army of over 20,000 hoplites with the very valuable addition of 3,000 cavalry. Of the battle which ensued very little is recorded⁷ save that the horsemen of Thessaly turned the scale against the Phocians. The site of the engage-

¹ Isocr., V, 20.

² This order of events is suggested by Beloch, III, 2, p. 268 with note.

³ Stählin, p. 67.

⁴ Dem., I, 9; Diod., XVI, 31, 6.

⁵ Dem., IV, 35.

⁶ Diod., XVI, 35, 4.

⁷ Ibid., 4-6. Paus., X, 2, 5, gives no further details.

ment is unknown, but since there must have been space for cavalry to manœuvre and some Phocian survivors were picked up by the Athenian fleet under Chares which had been sent to relieve Pagasae, Beloch has concluded that it was fought in the Crocion plain near Halmyros.¹ The victory was a decisive one, the Phocian losses being heavier than in most Greek battles. Philip had Onomarchus hanged and all the prisoners drowned as temple-robbers.

It now appeared that Pherae would suffer the violent extinction for which the Thessalian League had so long looked in vain. But Philip thought otherwise. Pherae on its two hills must have at this time possessed considerable defences, and this was not the occasion to waste valuable time before its walls when diplomacy could effect an equally satisfactory result. On the Pheraeon side Lycophron and Peitholaus must have realized that, isolated as they now were, they had no hope of retaining their tyranny with any degree of permanence. Hence they agreed to evacuate Pherae under an armistice and marched away with their 2,000 mercenaries² to Thermopylae to join the Phocian army newly reorganized under Phayllus.³ Thus far had Philip been successful, but time was

¹ III, 1, p. 477 n. 1.

² These would be their personal following only, which ill compares with the 6,000 of Jason.

³ Diod., XVI, 37, 3 and 38, 1.

lost in these negotiations and in a temporary settlement of Thessalian affairs. He recognized, as Jason had done, that any northern power, in order to make its presence felt in the Hellenic world, must be assured of free passage through Thermopylae and he now marched southwards to take possession of the pass. For once, however, his enemies, seeing their peril, acted with a rapidity and co-operation which Demosthenes never forgot.¹ While the Macedonians were still occupied in Thessaly, the pass was strongly manned by an allied army composed largely of Athenians and Phocians, but also including Spartans, Achaeans, and the mercenaries of Lycophron.² Unwilling to jeopardize the reputation gained by his victory over Onomarchus, Philip refused to risk a check at this point and instead of attempting to force a passage led his army back towards Macedonia.

Thwarted in his major schemes, he now gave his attention to the pacification of Thessaly. Especially in the western plain, which now for the first time enters Thessalian history, he was forced to use his troops, for he intervened in a war which, contemporaneously with that between Larisa and Pherae, was being fought between the small Hestiaetid towns of Pelinna and Pharcadon.³ Phar-

¹ IV, 17; XIX, 84 and 319; XVIII, 32.

² Diod., XVI, 37, 2-4 and 38, 1-2.

³ Polyæn., IV, 2, 19, where the emendation of Melber, *Φαρ [κηδον] τοις* for *Φαρ [σαλ] τοις*, seems certain. Phar-

cadon was stormed and destroyed,¹ while Tricca must have met a similar fate, since in the edict issued many years later by Polyperchon in the name of Philip Arrhidaeus sanctioning the return of all Greek exiles the Triccaean as well as the Pharcadonians were debarred from this privilege.² Pelinna at once became the first city of western Thessaly and long remained a loyal adherent of the Macedonian monarchy.³ Gomphi also, which commanded an important road leading from Hestiaeotis over the Pindus range to the Ambracian Gulf,⁴ was secured in Macedonian interests. In fact the town, hitherto barely a village, appears to have become a Macedonian colony under the name of Philippi or Philippopolis,⁵ and the colonists for a time issued a local coinage in a semi-independent capacity parallel to that of the Thracian Philippopolitans.⁶ The hill on which the town lay was now protected by strong walls, and a small body of troops was left as much to ensure the loyalty of

salus would be much too strong for Pelinna, and both were from this time strongholds of the Macedonian cause. The date is roughly fixed by Theop. fr. 83 from Book IX.

¹ Polyæn., IV, 2, 18—cp. Stählin, p. 120.

² Diod., XVIII, 56, 5.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, I, 7, 5; Diod., XVIII, 11, 1.

⁴ Stählin, pp. 124–7, describes Gomphi and its environs.

⁵ Steph. Byz., s.v. *Φίλιπποι*. Soon after the death of Alexander the Great the name of Gomphi had been revived (*I.G.*, IV, 617, l. 10).

⁶ Head, op. cit., p. 295; West, *Num. Chron.*, 1923, p. 176.

the western Thessalian plain as to protect it from the raids of Athamanian mountaineers.

To detach the Perioecis from Thessaly proper and to make it directly dependent upon Macedonia would clearly be of advantage to Philip. This process he now began in Magnesia and Perrhaebia,¹ but Achaëa, in virtue of its geographical position, did not feel his influence for a number of years. In Magnesia he seized several strategic points—some of these may until recently have been held by the tyrants of Pherae—and garrisoned them with his soldiers,² who, though acting ostensibly in Thessalian interests, would also serve to spread Macedonian propaganda and to keep a close watch on the plains.³ It was not long before the Thessalians were clamouring for the restoration of these strongholds. Perrhaebia was yet more valuable to Philip, for unhampered access to Thessaly was indispensable to him. The northern passes at least with their surrounding mountains he seems actually to have annexed,⁴ this being effected partly by force, but also through the intrigues of Agathocles, a liberated Penestes who had become his boon-companion.⁵ The southern sec-

¹ Isocr., V, 21.

² Dem., I, 13 and 22 ; II, 11.

³ Dem., II, 7 ; Schol., Dem., II, 22.

⁴ Strabo, IX, p. 440 ; A. Rosenberg, *Hermes*, LI (1916), p. 503.

⁵ Theop. fr. 84. Possibly this may be the Agathocles of Crannon who was the father of Lysimachus, but the name is a common one.

tion of the country, including Phalanna, retained its independence and continued to be represented on the Amphictyonic Council after the Peace of Philocrates, although its votes were reduced in number.

Even if events in Illyria and Epirus had not demanded his attention, it was as yet impracticable for Philip to attempt any permanent organization of Thessaly as a Macedonian province. The Thessalians, it is true, owed to him a very real debt of gratitude for removing the Pheraean tyranny,¹ which had been a constant menace for half a century, and thereby providing them with an opportunity of lasting peace. But he could not run the risk of alienating their sympathies by treating them as subjects. Accordingly he was forced to assume a conciliatory attitude and to exert his genius for virtual or actual annexation without military conquest. Progress was necessarily slow and his methods—the Thessalians being notoriously difficult to manage²—were not so conspicuously successful as in other districts. He had been appointed commander-in-chief of the League army solely for operations against the tyrants, but he could with some justification claim to retain this official status so long as the Sacred War lasted. At all events, he had no authority to employ Thessalian troops

¹ *Isocr.*, V, 20 and *Ep.*, II, 20; *Dem.*, II, 14; *Diod.*, XVI, 14, 2 and 38, 1.

² *Isocr.*, *Ep.*, II, 20.

for his own purposes, and it is not until 341, when his final organization of the country was complete, that the Thessalians are found operating in Thrace,¹ though perhaps not even then as an integral part of the Macedonian army. Indeed, Thessaly enjoyed until after the conclusion of the Sacred War a measure of independence which historians with later developments before their eyes have tended to underestimate.²

Even the Pheraeans were apparently not treated with severity if, as is stated by an historian,³ it was for diplomatic reasons that Philip married Nicesipolis, a relative of Jason.⁴ Pagasae, being of paramount importance both as a naval base and as a commercial harbour, passed finally out of Pheraean control and continued to be held by Macedonian soldiery.⁵ Further, as the price of his services against Onomarchus, Philip appropriated the Thessalian market and harbour dues, which seem to have amounted to a considerable sum.⁶ The rest

¹ Dem., VIII, 14. As Swoboda, *J.*, p. 211, states, the epigram in *Anth. Pal.*, IX, 743, cannot be dated with certainty—there were several victories over the Illyrians.

² Cp. Dem., V, 19–23 (346 B.C.) with XIX, 260 (343 B.C.).

³ Satyrus fr. 5 (Müller)—οἰκειώσασθαι θέλων καὶ τὸ Θεσσαλῶν ἔθνος.

⁴ Steph. Byz., s.v. Θεσσαλονίκη. Beloch, III, 2, p. 69, believes that Thessalonice, the daughter of this marriage, was so named in celebration of the victory over Onomarchus.

⁵ Dem., I, 22 and II, 11. Pagasae is independent of Pherae in *I.G.*, IV, 617.

⁶ Dem., I, 22 with Schol.

of Thessaly was at present left to the League to govern as best it might, although agents in Macedonian pay provided a safeguard that the wishes of their paymaster should be obeyed. Simus, an Aleuad of Larisa,¹ and Eudicus, perhaps an Aleuad also,² were still faithful to Philip³ and kept the Macedonian cause alive, while lesser representatives doubtless performed a similar function in most Thessalian cities. That the League was unable to unite or even to pacify the country is proved by its complete inactivity against the Phocians, who were pressing Boeotia hard, and still more by the return of Peitholaus to Pherae.

Since their expulsion the sons of Jason had been fighting in the service of Phocis and had sent a cavalry squadron to the Peloponnese to aid the Spartans.⁴ They also paid a visit to Athens, where they would be regarded as martyrs by the war party.⁵ Peitholaus appears to have delivered some orations in order to enlist support⁶ and was granted Athenian citizenship, a favour which at the time

¹ About 356 Simus was at Athens for the Panathenaic Festival, but his visit was voluptuous rather than political. ([Dem.] LIX, 24, cp. 108).

² This name is not common and another Eudicus was tagus at Larisa in 219 B.C. (*I.G.*, IX, 2, 517 l. 1).

³ Dem., XVIII, 48; Harp., s.v. Σίμος and Εὐδίκος.

⁴ Diod., XVI, 39, 2.

⁵ Arist., *Rhet.*, III, p. 1410 a.

⁶ Ibid., p. 1411 a. Aristotle could hardly refer to two persons called Peitholaus—the name is unusual—on successive pages without distinguishing them.

met with severe criticism from some quarters ¹ and later in consequence of his ill-success was actually revoked.² Lycophron was now dead, but his brother with perhaps Athenian as well as Phocian aid effected a brief revival of the Pheraean tyranny.³ This cannot have been altogether distasteful to the local populace, since Pherae remained for years afterwards a centre of opposition to the Macedonian hegemony. Philip made a swift descent into Thessaly in the summer of 350,⁴ and for the last time the house of Jason was expelled, although apparently no garrison was established in the acropolis. This expedition must have been a brief one: Philip could spare neither time nor troops to bring about a satisfactory pacification of Thessaly, for his intrigues in Chalcidice were about to lead to the outbreak of the Olynthian War.

While Philip was drawing his net round Olynthus, Thessaly was on the verge of another civil war. Although the hints of Demosthenes are exaggerated,

¹ Ibid., p. 1410 a.

² [Dem.] LIX, 91.

³ Many have suspected that Diod., XVI, 52, 9 is merely a repetition of 37, 2; but this can scarcely be so, because in 52, 9 Peitholaus alone is mentioned as tyrant, thus implying the death of Lycophron meanwhile (Kaerst, p. 220 n. 2). Theopompus dealt with Thessalian affairs in Book XXII, i.e. just before the Olynthian War (fr. 137 and 138).

⁴ Kahrstedt, *Forschungen* (1910), p. 53, inclines to this dating, since Philip could scarcely have marched south after the Olynthian War had commenced. Demosthenes, speaking in 349 (II, 14) refers to this expulsion as a recent event (*νῦν*).

the Thessalians were evidently dissatisfied with the continued occupation of Pagasae and Magnesia, by which they were cut off from the sea, and with the loss of their market and harbour dues. In the First and Second Olynthiacs Demosthenes advocates, among other measures of vigorous opposition to Philip, the dispatch of an embassy to stir the Thessalians to action.¹ He even implies military support from Athens, though in view of the difficulties experienced in sending expeditions to Olynthus this was certainly impracticable. It is evident that these negotiations were to be conducted with an anti-Macedonian faction which had sprung up in the Thessalian League and that the Athenians had shifted their ground somewhat since the final expulsion of the tyrant-house. Schaefer would connect the plans of Demosthenes with the return of Peitholaus ;² but the words of the orator leave no room for doubt that he intended to deal with a constitutional authority, the Thessalian League.³ However, before the end of 349 Philip had already prevented the movement against him from assuming alarming proportions, and in the Third Olynthiac Thessaly is not even mentioned. This renewed loyalty was gained partly by the reiteration of a former promise to restore Magnesia to them,⁴ Pagasae being too

¹ Dem., I, 22, and II, 11.

² Op. cit., II, p. 139. Pickard-Cambridge in *C.A.H.*, VI, p. 230, makes the same mistake.

³ I, 22.

⁴ Dem., II, 7.

valuable for its restoration to be considered. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly plain that the Sacred War could be ended by Philip alone, and probably he now indicated that he would act in Thessalian interests. The League, convinced of his sincerity,¹ decided that the restitution of Thessalian leadership in the Amphictyonic Council—naturally no Thessalian held office at Delphi during the Sacred War—was a goal whose attainment was of sufficient value to warrant considerable sacrifices.² It was perhaps believed that he did not intend to encroach further on Thessalian independence. And he himself made every effort to encourage this belief, as he required all the available troops of northern Greece against the Phocians.

It was for these reasons that, when finally even the Thebans had been induced by their hardships to call upon Philip to end the Sacred War and when his intentions were not yet known, the Thessalians exerted the utmost pressure upon him in order that he should fulfil his promises. Their only fear was that he might be persuaded by the protests of Athens, with whom he was already negotiating the Peace of Philocrates, to abandon the expedition against Phocis,³ which they believed to be under-

¹ Dem., XVIII, 43.

² Justin, VIII, 4, 5. A contrary view is expressed by an Aetolian speaker in Polyb., IX, 28, who states that Philip by making an example of Olynthus 'intimidated the Thessalians into submission'.

³ Aesch., II, 141.

taken in their interests.¹ In fact, had the Thebans and Thessalians not insisted, he might have agreed to a compromise with Athens and inflicted on the Phocians a punishment less violent than was actually imposed.² At one moment, if the somewhat unconvincing version of Demosthenes be accepted, there was actually risk of a breach between Philip and his allies.³ But the obedience of Thessaly, the gratitude of Thebes, control of Thermopylae, and a hand in guiding the decisions of the Amphictyonic Council were advantages which Philip could not afford to forgo even at the price of continued estrangement with Athens. Hence the Phocians were finally, in fact if not in theory, excluded from the terms of the Peace.

The only other state which was not permitted to sign the Peace was Halus,⁴ a small town on the edge of the Achaean coast-plain. Recently Halus and Pharsalus had become involved in a dispute, and at the time when Philip was negotiating with Athens the former was being besieged by a Macedonian and Pharsalian army led by Parmenio.⁵ After lasting for some months the siege ended with the destruction of Halus,⁶ and its territory was handed over to the Pharsalians, who by supporting the

¹ Aesch., II, 136.

² Ibid., 140; Dem., VI, 14; XIX, 318 and 321.

³ XIX, 320.

⁴ Aesch., II, 159.

⁵ Dem., XIX, 36 with Schol. and 163.

⁶ Ibid., 39 and 334; cp. Mnesimachus fr. 8.

Macedonian régime were beginning to challenge Larisa for the leadership of Thessaly. It was probably in honour of this success that Pharsalus dedicated at Delphi an equestrian figure of Achilles.¹ The dedicatory inscription furnishes further evidence of Pharsalian progress, for from it the city is known to have supplied three out of the four polemarchs of the Thessalian League.²

Early in the summer of 346 Philip began his southward march, accompanied by his army and by a host of envoys who had gathered at Pella. He had already given his consent to the terms of the Peace, but delayed its ratification for some time. One of his reasons for this delay was that he was not entirely confident that the whole of Thessaly would support him against Phocis, for Pherae and other towns were inclined to be recalcitrant.³ He therefore marched straight to Pherae, where the oath was finally administered to him at an inn—an ignominious choice which Demosthenes deploras—opposite to the Dioscureion.⁴ The Thessalians

¹ *S.E.G.*, I, 210 ; Pomtow in *P.W. Suppl. Bd. IV*, col. 1322.

² There would not be any point in naming these polemarchs if they were not all Pharsalians, and their inclusion is a boast. It is nowhere stated that either polemarchs or tetrarchs must be natives of the district which they represented ; cp. Momigliano, *Athenaeum*, X (1932), p. 50. In fact, Daochus and Thrasydaeus, who were later tetrarchs simultaneously, were both Pharsalians.

³ *Dem.*, XIX, 320.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

then joined wholeheartedly in an expedition which promised large benefits at the cost of little exertion.¹ And when Phalaecus capitulated and Delphi was once more in the hands of the Amphictyons, they appeared to have profited handsomely.

A meeting of the victorious allies was next held—the wishes of Philip, of Boeotia, and of Thessaly alone carried any weight—to reconstitute the Amphictyonic League, to settle the fate of Phocis, and to restore order in northern and central Greece.² It was mainly by Thessalian influence that representatives of Philip were admitted to the Amphictyonic Council³ and in return for this and other services he exerted himself on their behalf. Nicaea was assigned to them,⁴ although at Thermopylae itself Philip built some fortifications and occupied the pass with his own troops.⁵ The Thebans submitted a counter-claim for possession of Nicaea,⁶ which was originally a Theban settlement⁷ founded probably in the days of Epaminondas, but Philip wished this

¹ Dem., V, 20 ; Aesch., II, 138 ; Diod., XVI, 59, 2.

² Dem., XIX, 50 ; Diod., XVI, 59, 4. The destruction of Colaceia by the Thessalians (Theop. fr. 164) probably belongs to this time. Its site is unknown, but apparently it lay south of the Spercheius (Stählin, p. 210).

³ Dem., XIX, 111.

⁴ Dem., VI, 22. Philip also restored Magnesia to them, as he had promised, but only for a very few years.

⁵ Ditt.³, 220.

⁶ Aesch., III, 140, with inaccurate dating.

⁷ Schol. [Dem.], XI, 4.

valuable fort to be held by allies whom he could more easily control. Outward aggrandisement of the Thessalians was also the keynote of his policy in his reorganization of the Amphictyony.¹ They regained all their former privileges and their two hieromnemes, or representatives on the Council, are always named first in its decrees²—those of the Macedonian monarchy now held second place—so that the first of the Thessalian representatives enjoyed a permanent presidency.³ From 346 to 339 Thessaly was represented by Cottyphus of Pharsalus and Colosimmus, the former being president.⁴ As might be expected, Cottyphus was a partisan of Philip,⁵ but he was not so servile as his successors⁶ and his office gave him great power so long as Thessaly retained any semblance of autonomy. In subsequent years the larger Thessalian cities, especially Pharsalus and Larisa, were very well represented in the college of naopoei, who were officials of lesser importance at Delphi.⁷ Hence the aims which the Thessalians had had in view when they decided to support Philip—‘to control the council at Thermopylae and affairs at Delphi’⁸—were now successfully accomplished, though their command over the Perrhaebian and Magnesians was not so

¹ P. Cloché, *B.C.H.*, XL (1916), pp. 87–8.

² Ditt.², 230 and 242–4.

³ Schol., Aesch., III, 128.

⁴ Aesch., III, 124 and 128.

⁵ Schol., Dem., XVIII, 151.

⁶ See below, pp. 208–9.

⁷ Ditt.², 237–8, with table.

⁸ Dem., V, 23.

complete as hitherto.¹ It was by these acts of generosity that Philip laid the foundation of his popularity with the Thessalian κοινόν.²

When he had bound the country to him by this debt of gratitude, Philip could relax his policy of *divide et impera*. He was, in all probability, now sincerely anxious for the maintenance of law and order, an object which owing to the incapacity of the League and the treachery of his partisans remained unachieved. Revolution was brewing, especially at Larisa, but no movement can have taken place until about a year after the universal settlement of 346. Perhaps some of the Aleuadae, more far-seeing than their fellow-countrymen, realized that they had been outwitted³ and, not relishing inevitable servitude under Macedon, considered that an attempt ought to be made to regain complete independence before it was too late. The evidence for these disturbances is very slender, but is substantiated by the subsequent eclipse of Larisa by Pharsalus.⁴ To deal with some unknown crisis in Larisean politics Simus secured the position of μεσίδικος ἀρχων, and then, with the aid of his Aleuad party, which perhaps included Eudicus, and of the

¹ The Perrhaebians henceforward had to share their two votes with the Dolopians, but they alone of the Perioeci were represented in the college of the naopoci—perhaps a consolatory measure.

² Dem., VIII, 65.

³ Ibid., 62.

⁴ Stählin, *Pharsalos*, p. 18.

troops entrusted to him, he became tyrant.¹ It was in this illegal capacity and not as governor acting as deputy for Philip that Simus issued the coins which bear his name.² Constitutional magistrates at Larisa did not customarily inscribe their names on the city coinage, and an underling of Philip certainly would not have been allowed such a privilege. This act of disobedience, misguided enough at any time, can only have been rendered possible by the preoccupation of Philip with colonization in Thrace,³ and his vengeance was delayed by wars in Illyria against Pleuratus.⁴

It is not until late in the summer of 344 that he is found once more in Thessaly. Diodorus in a brief notice states that he 'cast the tyrants out of the cities',⁵ and from this it is usually understood that Peitholaus made yet one more attempt to re-establish his tyranny. But, although Pherae was certainly disaffected, the Aleuadae, who in the earlier stages of Thessalian relationship with Philip were

¹ Arist., *Pol.*, V, p. 1306 a. Simus was a common name in Thessaly (*I.G.*, IX, 2, index), but no other distinguished Aleuad Simus is known save a very shadowy person who lived at least a century earlier (Schol., *Theocr.*, XVI, 34; Meyer, *T.H.*, p. 239 n. 1). Aristotle, writing soon after the events described above, must surely amplify his reference if a lesser Simus were meant.

² G. F. Hill, *Historical Greek Coins* (1906), pp. 93-6, correcting P. Gardner, *Catalogue of Greek Coins, Thessaly to Aetolia* (1883), pp. XXIV-VI.

³ Kaerst, p. 239.

⁴ Meyer, *Kleine Schriften*, II (1924), p. 107, on the chronology.

⁵ XVI, 69, 8—he implies that tyrannies were established in a number of cities; cp. Trogus, *Prol.*, VIII.

on most cordial terms with him, are known to have been at another period his enemies.¹ In undertaking this expedition he declared that he was acting as the champion of Thessalian freedom² and, in so far as the new tyrants had violated the Peace of Philocrates, his contention was justified despite the protests of Demosthenes³ and Hegesippus.⁴ Except that Pharsalus remained loyal it is not known in what other cities tyrants established themselves or in what way the Pheraeans incurred the wrath of Philip. But, since generosity had failed, Larisa and Pherae could expect no mercy. The recalcitrant Aleuads were unceremoniously expelled,⁵ while Pherae was reduced by force after an unsuccessful attempt to intimidate the rebels, and a permanent garrison of Macedonian soldiers was stationed in the acropolis.⁶ Other cities were treated with similar severity.⁷ Philip could on this occasion afford to be strict, especially as the southern neighbours of Thessaly, Achaea and the tribes of the Spercheius valley were now inclined to obey him rather than their former masters.⁸ He bound the Achaeans to

¹ Polyæn., IV, 2, 11. The Scholia on Dem., I, 22, and II, 14, though the former is textually corrupt and both contain an abundance of muddleheadedness and false dating, insist on a tyranny of the Aleuads and their expulsion by Philip.

² Dem., IX, 12.

³ XIX, 260.

⁴ [Dem.] VII, 32.

⁵ Dem., XVIII, 48.

⁶ [Dem.] VII, 32; Dem., VIII, 59, and IX, 12.

⁷ Dem., XIX, 260.

⁸ Diod., XVI, 69, 8.

himself in the same way as he had formerly bound the Perrhaebians, and in 339 they were independently represented on an important embassy by their own envoys, who are distinguished from those of Thessaly.¹ Encircled and betrayed, the Thessalians were now forced to surrender to a foreign master a domination over northern Greece far more complete and securely founded than the proud position which they themselves had once enjoyed.

What verdict ought posterity to pass upon this chapter of Thessalian history? To Demosthenes at least, as he looked back on the whole of his lifelong struggle against a Macedonian hegemony, there was but one answer. Thessaly was a traitor to the cause of Hellenic freedom. 'Those despicable Thessalians'² were among those who were 'responsible for the misfortunes and disgraces which had befallen the Greeks'.³ The populace perhaps was not wholly blameworthy, but its leaders were time-servers, utterly beneath contempt. 'These men,' he says in his famous list of traitors, which includes three Thessalians, 'these men sacrificed national interests for the sake of their own selfish gain, cheating and corrupting the citizens with whom they had to deal until they had reduced them to slavery.'⁴ And again, 'if Thessaly had possessed one single man holding the same sentiments that I held, none

¹ See below, p. 211.

² Ibid., 64.

³ XVIII, 43.

⁴ Ibid., 295.

of the Hellenic peoples beyond Thermopylae would have been exposed to their present distresses'.¹ Against this shattering condemnation the narrative contained in the present chapter offers little defence ; but defence there is, although Thessaly has no advocate among ancient authorities. It is but a lame excuse to argue that the Thessalians 'philip-pized' more through the shortsightedness of their politicians than through deliberate treachery ; but, even if they had planned from the first to submit to Macedon, a very strong case could be made out on their behalf. The monomania of Demosthenes was such that even his own fellow-citizens, constantly under the spur of his rhetoric, were not always ready to follow him. The Thessalian, remote from the main current of Greek thought, could hardly be expected to recognize that 'the democracy of Solon and Pericles represents a higher type of state than the Macedonian monarchy'.² He had no more reason to be loyal to the old-fashioned powers who had successively attempted to exploit Thessaly for selfish ends than to a new monarch who, though not a true Hellene, offered him at least some share in the profits of far-reaching ambitions. Philip too was bringing to fulfilment an ideal of Jason—hegemony by a tribal state of the undeveloped North over the effete city-states of southern Greece.

¹ XVIII, 304, with omissions.

² Wilamowitz-Moellendorff quoted in *C.A.H.*, VI, p. 510.

Under the new régime the Thessalian would be treated at least as the equal of other Greeks and no longer as a semi-barbarian. Outside Thessaly careers were open to him which former generations had never enjoyed. If the peasant-farmer craved adventure, Thessalian contingents were frequently recruited for the Macedonian army and, in the wider Hellenistic world which the conquests of Alexander created, fresh opportunities were offered of enlistment in remunerative mercenary service or of participation in distant trading ventures. Thessalians of higher rank were in favour at the Macedonian court and might even be admitted to the body of 'Companions': Agathocles of Crannon became a citizen of Pella and his son Lysimachus a ruler of empires, while Medius of Larisa was an intimate friend of Alexander and later an admiral under Antigonus. And since it was a characteristic of Thessalians that they were happier in subordinate than in supreme commands, they achieved conspicuous success, both individually and collectively, when acting under Macedonian orders. If, on the other hand, they chose to remain at home, improved security for life and property enabled them to cultivate their farms without fear of civil war, although in fact the attainment of a stable economic prosperity was frequently prevented by the embroilment of their country in wars which were not of their own making.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARCHONSHIP OF PHILIP

*τετραρχίας κατέστησεν, ἵνα μὴ μόνον κατὰ πόλεις ἀλλὰ κατ'
ἔθνη δουλεύωσιν*

(DEMOSTHENES)

IN the eyes of Philip the Thessalians had proved themselves unworthy, they had failed to respond to the liberality with which he had at first treated them, and for this failure they were already amply chastened. The next step was to prevent the recurrence of such acts of disobedience as they had lately committed. It was with this aim that, in addition to the establishment of garrisons at Pherae and elsewhere, he initiated a system of decadarchies, or boards of ten, similar to those whereby Lysander had oppressed the former allies of Athens. The parallel with the Spartan system is a true one, and it must not be understood that a single board of ten was appointed to rule over the whole of Thessaly ¹—the *κοινόν* was consistently faithful to Philip at this period—but rather that of

¹ As Schaefer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 346, believes.

the less trustworthy cities each was to be checked from further disobedience by a separate board of ten Macedonian partisans.¹ The members of these boards, which cannot have been universal or even very general throughout the country,² were probably nominated by Philip himself or by his representatives. But of their powers and their activities nothing is known.

This adoption of a decadarchy system by Philip must be sharply distinguished from his later revival of the tetrarchy organization. Decadarchies and tetrarchies, though the former were to some extent the result of stop-gap legislation, are not mutually exclusive terms and do not represent successive methods of administration; they could and did coexist. The former operated in cities and were essentially military, the latter were tribal units for the purpose of civil government.³ But unfortunately, while the tetrarchies are mentioned by several authorities,⁴ evidence for the decadarchies rests on a single passage in Demosthenes which

¹ Szanto, art. *δεκαδρχίαι* (2) in *P.W.* In Dem., VI, 22 the singular *δεκαδρχίαν* is not objectionable and can mean 'a system of decadarchies'. The emendation *τετραρχίαν* is not more natural, since Dem. has the plural *τετραρχίας* in IX, 26.

² Demosthenes naturally exaggerates.

³ Dem., IX, 26 emphasizes this—*πόλεις* refers to the decadarchies, *ἔθνη* to the tetrarchies, the latter being regarded as a crowning indignity.

⁴ Dem., IX, 26; Theop. fr. 201; Harp., s.v. *τετραρχία*.

has evoked much controversy.¹ Many believe that Philip made but one expedition to Thessaly at this period, in the course of which he revived the tetrarchy system,² that Demosthenes in the above passage is guilty of a mistake³—an unlikely supposition—or that his text has become corrupted.⁴ On the other hand, those who accept the existence of decadarchies consider that Philip twice appeared in Thessaly, in 344,⁵ when he instituted the decadarchies, and again in 342, when he revived the tetrarchies.⁶ The former expedition is well attested by Diodorus⁷ and by Trogus,⁸ but the latter can only be inferred from a comparison between two passages in Demosthenes—the one spoken some three years earlier than the other—in which each system

¹ VI, 22.

² Costanzi, p. 133 n. 2 ; Beloch, III, 1, p. 529 n. 3 ; Meyer, *Kl. Schr.*, II (1924), p. 107.

³ So Harp., loc. cit.

⁴ Reiske was originally responsible for emending *δεκαδαρχίαν* to *τετραρχίαν*, which he imagined was written as *ΔΑΡΧΙΑΝ* in the text. The corruption must have been extremely early, as Harpocration read *δεκαδαρχίαν*.

⁵ The disputed passage is quoted by Demosthenes from a speech which he delivered at Messene in the late summer of 344. Philip could scarcely have completed his tetrarchy system so early, for his expedition also belongs to the late summer (Diod., XVI, 69, 8, under 344/43).

⁶ Schaefer, op. cit., II, pp. 346 and 430 n. 3 ; Szanto, op. cit. ; Foucart, *Rev. Phil.*, XXIII (1899), pp. 108–9 ; Swoboda, *J.*, pp. 208–9 ; Glotz, *B.C.H.*, XXXIII (1909), p. 542.

⁷ XVI, 69, 8.

⁸ *Prol.*, VIII.

of government is mentioned.¹ However, the plain statement of a contemporary, who had no special motive for falsification, cannot lightly be rejected, and the establishment of decadarchies is a measure which Philip might well adopt to meet the circumstances. He wished to show both Thessaly and the outside world that he was in earnest, and with this object in view he employed a notorious method of control which smacked of oppression.

The establishment of these decadarchies did not endear Philip to the Thessalians, and in the winter of 343-342 Demosthenes attempted to turn this unpopularity to the advantage of his city. War between Athens and Macedonia was now regarded as inevitable, and Demosthenes was untiring in his quest of allies. By his influence an embassy headed by Aristodemus was sent to Thessaly and Magnesia with the object of stirring up open revolt against Philip.² Aeschines condemned this action as a breach of the Peace of Philocrates, which forbade either party to tamper with the allies of the other ;³ but Demosthenes would doubtless have replied that

¹ VI, 22 and IX, 26. Schaefer, op. cit., II, p. 430 n. 3, finds somewhat flimsy evidence for a second expedition in the arrangement of Theopompus's *Philippica*. The campaign of Philip in Epirus (342) was described in Book XLIII and the Thessalian tetrarchies in Book XLIV. It is true that according to Diodorus (XVI, 71, 3) Books XLI-XLIII dealt exclusively with Sicilian history, but this is a palpable error (Laqueur, art. Theopompus in *P.W.*).

² Schol., Aesch., III, 83.

³ Aesch., III, 83.

Philip had deprived the Thessalians and Magnesians of their independence, so that they could no longer be regarded as his allies but rather as his slaves. The embassy perhaps met with a measure of success, since it was formally recognized by the Athenians, who voted the customary crowns of honour to Aristodemus and his colleagues.¹ Philip, therefore, on his return from Epirus decided that his presence was needed in Thessaly to effect a complete reconstruction of the existing political system.

Hitherto he had exerted a purely external influence upon the Thessalians, formerly as a benefactor, latterly as a conqueror, but now he secured for himself a position of constitutional authority in order that he might be enabled to carry out his reforms both directly and legitimately. The Thessalians were induced to elect him to the archonship of their League, an office formerly held only by natives. This election cannot be dated with certainty, for it is only known from a retrospective statement that Alexander succeeded his father as archon.² But it must have taken place at a date posterior to the Olynthian War³ and anterior to 341 when Philip employed Thessalian troops in his Thracian campaign.⁴ The system of government adopted by

¹ Aesch., III, 83.

² Justin, XI, 3, 2.

³ Dem., I, 22, from which it is clear that Philip had no legal claim on Thessalian finances at that time (Beloch, III, 1, p. 529 n. 1).

⁴ Dem., VIII, 14.

him was largely a reversion to the ancient traditional constitution of Thessaly which had been modified by the Boeotian remodelling of Pelopidas,¹ but the more general title of archon was retained in preference to the old local title of tagus. The latter still had evil associations, and the powers of a tagus were traditionally limited in that theoretically he could only be elected in the event of a national crisis. Moreover, the appointment of a tagus who was not Thessalian-born must have appeared highly incongruous. As archon Philip had the right to mobilize the army of the League and to control taxation and all finance as he pleased.² Nevertheless Thessaly still enjoyed a modicum of independence. Philip was not 'king of Thessaly'—not even later rulers of Macedon claimed this title³—nor was the archonship an hereditary office. At his death the Thessalians were free to elect whomsoever they wished.⁴

An absentee archon could not govern directly, and it was necessary to consolidate the decaying structure of the League by increasing the efficiency of local administration. In this Philip gave proof of his statecraft. It was the cities which had been recalcitrant,⁵ so that he no longer regarded Thessaly

¹ See above, pp. 134–8.

² Justin, XI, 3, 2.

³ Pace Euseb. ap. Müller, *F.H.G.*, III, pp. 703–4, who gives a list of 'kings of Thessaly'.

⁴ See below, p. 219.

⁵ Cities also bred tyrants and Philip posed as the champion of autonomy.

as a number of city-territories, but rather as a union of four tetrarchies, a unit of local government always better suited to a country which, like his own Macedonia, never became completely urbanized. The tetrarchies had never been wholly obsolete, and Pelopidas had made full use of them, but recent anarchy must have caused the polemarchs who controlled them to neglect their civil duties. Philip now discarded the Boeotian name of polemarch and, appealing like Jason to tradition, revived that of tetrarch. The duties of these new tetrarchs were probably much wider than those of the polemarchs whom they superseded.¹ Not only were they in command of the military strength of their tetrarchy, but they were answerable to the archon for the entire administration of their district in somewhat the same way as in the native states of India the greater princes are directly answerable to the Crown. They were, so far as is known, all Thessalian-born and not Macedonian governors. The *κοινόν* was responsible for their election, but naturally Philip was careful that none should be nominated save his own partisans. The two tetrarchs whose names are recorded were, in all probability, Pharsalians²—Daochus, who dedicated

¹ Theop. fr. 202 describes a tetrarch as *τῶν ὁμοθετῶν τῦραννον*.

² Daochus certainly, Thrasydacus probably from Ditt.³, 240 n. 7. An earlier Thrasydacus was a Pharsalian (*I.G.*, IX, 2, 242).

the famous monument at Delphi,¹ and Thrasydaeus. Both were servile creatures of Philip and were included by Demosthenes in his list of traitors to the Hellenic cause,² while Polybius, who regards Demosthenes' sweeping condemnation of Greek statesmen as unjust,³ makes no special plea for either of the Thessalian representatives. Thrasydaeus was also the victim of one of those brief but damnatory character-sketches which were a feature of Theopompus's historical writing.⁴ Each remained tetrarch for three years, and this may have been a recognized term of office; for, appointed in 342, they had already become hieromnemes at Delphi in the spring of 338, and it is unlikely that the two offices could be held simultaneously.

The new organization appears to have met with immediate success and despite minor modifications it proved remarkably durable. Thessaly, now virtually a Macedonian province, retained the semblance of freedom without its substance. Demosthenes at the time indignantly exclaimed, 'Does he not dictate to the Thessalians their form of government?'⁵ and many years later Polybius declared that the Thessalians, then ruled by another Philip of Macedon, 'were supposed to enjoy their own constitution and to have quite a different status

¹ Ditt.³, 274 (τέτραρχος Θεσσαλῶν). He was also proxenos of Anaphe (*I.G.*, XII, 3, 251, 4).

² XVIII, 295; cp. Harp., s.v. Δόχος.

³ XVIII, 14.

⁴ Fr. 202.

⁵ IX, 33.

from the Macedonians, but in fact they had exactly the same and obeyed every order of the royal ministers'.¹ Another indication of more stringent Macedonian control lies in the cessation of city-coinage, which was not revived until the end of the century. Nor did Philip introduce a tetrarchy-coinage, but in pursuance of a general change in his monetary policy, he forced the Thessalians to use Macedonian coins. This humiliating measure may have caused some resentment, coinage being regarded as a symbol of autonomy, but it was endured with resignation. Philip perhaps promised that in course of time when he had consolidated the tetrarchy system, his measures of military oppression would be considerably relaxed. At all events, Thessalian fidelity to the Macedonian monarchy henceforward became far more constant than ever before.²

Meanwhile relations between Philip and Athens were becoming increasingly strained, and each party showed scant respect for the subjects or possessions of the other. One of the most flagrant acts of hostility was committed by Callias of Chalcis, formerly a supporter but now an enemy of Philip,

¹ IV, 76.

² P. Cloché, *B.C.H.*, XLIV (1920), pp. 314-16, regards as evidence of general fidelity the fact that at this period the same Thessalian names occur again and again in the lists of *naopoei* at Delphi.

who conducted a freebooting expedition in the Bay of Pagasae. He used ships which the Athenians had lent to him and is said to have captured all the towns of the coast, though these can hardly include Pagasae itself. The Athenians honoured him by public decree, and this recognition of his action evoked an emphatic protest from Philip, who was at the time preoccupied in Thrace.¹ It was also during the months which preceded the siege of Perinthus that Demosthenes, who had not yet abandoned hope of detaching Thessaly from the Macedonian cause, led an embassy thither in person.² He boasted that he was not defeated by the agents of Philip, but it is hard to believe that he effected more than the encouragement of a rapidly disintegrating anti-Macedonian party. Against this and other attempts to tamper with Thessalian loyalty Philip may have made formal complaint, but as he well knew, the vast majority of the Thessalians recognized that it was to their advantage to remain faithful.³ Soon afterwards he laid siege first to Perinthus, then to Byzantium, and this precipitated a formal declaration of war by the Athenians. In the course of these sieges the skill of a Thessalian engineer named Polyeidus was

¹ His letter, [Dem.] XII, 5.

² Dem., XVIII, 244, which probably refers to this time (Schaefer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 492 n. 4).

³ Spurious letter of Philip ap. Dem. XVIII, 166.

of great value to him,¹ while on the other side Aristomedes, suitably enough a Pheraean, commanded the mercenary troops which the Great King had bidden his Asiatic satraps send to the relief of the besieged cities.²

During these years Philip was paving the way for a Macedonian invasion of Greece which could not now be long postponed. Nicaea, which after the Peace of Philocrates had been held by the Thessalians in the interests of Philip, had later been occupied by Macedonian troops.³ The date of this change is not recorded, but perhaps it took place in 342 at the time of the institution of the tetrarchies.⁴ It may be that the Thessalians were somewhat distrusted in consequence of the intrigues of Demosthenes,⁵ but this action on the part of Philip is more probably due to a natural desire that the route through Thermopylae into central Greece should be safeguarded by his own men. In the summer of 339 the Thebans, taking advantage of Philip's absence in Scythia, expelled the Macedonian garrison at Nicaea and manned the fort with their own troops.⁶ They had good reason for hostility towards him, for he had rejected their claim to Nicaea in 346 and more recently garrisoned

¹ Athen. Poliorc. (ed. R. Schneider) 10, 9; Vitruv., X, 13, 3.

² Theop. fr. 215.

³ [Dem.] XI, 4.

⁴ Glotz, *op. cit.*, p. 529.

⁵ So Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, p. 324, believes.

⁶ Philoch. ap. Didym. ad Dem., col. 11, 37 sqq.

their outpost at Echinus on the borders of Achaea and Malis.¹ Moreover, they were eager that his armies should not have easy access to the mountain passes leading through Phocis into the Boeotian plain and they believed that, if Nicaea were in their hands, he would be prevented from advancing beyond Thermopylae.

In the war of the Amphictyons against Amphissa which led up to the final catastrophe of Chaeronea Thessaly played a small but vital role. At the autumn meeting of the Amphictyonic Council in 340 a Locrian of Amphissa proposed that Athens should be heavily fined for supporting Phocis in the Sacred War. The diplomatic skill of Aeschines diverted the wrath of the Council upon the Amphisseans, who had committed various technical offences, and eventually this led to another Sacred War, commonly known as the Amphissean War. Demosthenes in his explanation of this incident is guilty of misrepresentation in regard to the Thessalians, who, as leaders of the Amphictyony, were intimately concerned in the measures taken against Amphissa.² Endeavouring to prove that the fracas was the result of deliberate machinations on the part of Philip, who was seeking a pretext for invading Greece, the orator states that it was necessary to persuade the Thessalians to support Macedonia partly by the inveiglement of a Sacred War and

¹ Dem., IX, 34.

² XVIII, 145-7.

partly by arguments that such a policy would be to their advantage. If Philip merely invited them to take part in a private quarrel of his own against Athens, they would refuse to follow him, and it was for this reason that he hurled an apple of discord into the Amphictyonic meeting.¹

This theory of Demosthenes contains patent inaccuracies. Philip was, it is true, almost certainly responsible for the Amphissa incident, but he had many excellent reasons for adopting indirect methods, and a desire to beguile the Thessalians was not one of them. The Thessalian *κοινόν* was now bound to support whatever enterprise he chose to undertake; even its representatives on the Amphictyonic Council were not really free agents, and in fact the punishment of the Amphisaeans was largely in the hands of his Thessalian partisans. Cottyphus of Pharsalus was still president of the Council, and it was he who summoned the general meeting of protest at Delphi on the day after the Amphictyons had made a descent on the plain of Cirrha and been repulsed by the Amphisaeans.² He also was appointed commander-in-chief when the Council held an extraordinary meeting early in 339 and resolved to raise an army to enforce its decrees.³

¹ Demosthenes classes Thebans and Thessalians together in this passage, and in the case of the former his argument holds good, as they were (in spite of recent points of dispute) free allies of Philip and not in any way his subjects.

² Aesch., III, 124.

³ Ibid., 128.

Although Aeschines credits this army with various minor accomplishments,¹ Demosthenes dismisses it with a word—‘some contingents did not come and those who came accomplished nothing’.² A general levy of the Thessalian League could have obliterated the little town of Amphissa within a few weeks, and it is not difficult to see the hand of Philip directing the inglorious inactivity of this campaigning season.

The case against Cottyphus cannot be proved, but it is not likely, as has been suggested,³ that the absence of his name and of that of his colleague Colosimmus from the lists of hieromnemones after the sessions of 339 is due to their disinclination to obey Philip’s every command. Certainly neither is included by Demosthenes in his list of traitors, in which their successors, Daochus and Thrasydaeus, both figure; but they had pursued a strongly Macedonian policy for seven years⁴ and had no reason for a change of attitude at this juncture. However, Daochus and Thrasydaeus, who had now relinquished their office of tetrarch, proved far more abject. They did not become hieromnemones until the spring of 338, but in the preceding autumn they probably proposed a decree whereby a new office was created at Delphi for the better financial management of the war.⁵ This proposal was doubt-

¹ Aesch., III, 129.

² Dem., XVIII, 151.

³ Glotz., *op. cit.*, p. 543.

⁴ See above, p. 189.

⁵ Ditt.³, 249—their names are with justification supplied by Bourguet.

less dictated by Philip, and they must be among the 'inveterate blackguards from Thessaly' who in the same autumn¹ decided on very inadequate grounds to entrust the conduct of the war to him.²

Philip answered the summons with great rapidity and in November hurried through Thessaly at the head of a small army without, perhaps, calling for any support from his Thessalian allies. By taking the inland route through Lamia and Heraclea into Doris he turned the Theban position at Nicaea and seized first Cytinion and then Elatea. His occupation of the latter, which lay on the route not to Amphissa but to Boeotia and Attica, caused consternation throughout Greece and especially at Athens. Much now depended upon the attitude of Thebes without whose armies the Athenians and their allies could not hope to check the advance of Philip. Demosthenes at once conducted an embassy to Thebes, where he found a number of emissaries from Philip already assembled—two Macedonians, Daochus and Thrasydaeus from Thessaly, and representatives of lesser allies such as the

¹ The chronology of Beloch, III, 2, pp. 295-9, is here followed.

² Dem., XVIII, 151. The spurious decree quoted *ibid.*, 155, incorrectly describes Cottyphus as an Arcadian, so that not much faith is to be placed in its statement that he was sent to convey the invitation of the Amphictyons to Philip. The latter appeared in Thessaly so soon that it is improbable that any formal embassy was sent.

Dolopians and Achaeans.¹ These envoys of Philip, while protesting against the occupation of Nicaea in the previous summer and demanding its surrender to the Locrians, attempted to convince the Thebans of the advantages to be gained either by granting the Macedonians a free passage through their country or by joining them in an invasion of Attica. Demosthenes, however, with stirring eloquence and lavish promises persuaded them to throw themselves wholeheartedly into the struggle for Hellenic freedom.²

It is remarkable that extant accounts of the battle of Chaeronea and of its preliminaries, brief or inadequate as they are, contain no reference to any Thessalian contingent in the Macedonian army and only one to Macedonian allies in general. According to Diodorus,³ Philip before entering Boeotia 'waited for those of the allies who were late in arriving', and it must be from this evidence and from general probability that Kromayer⁴ infers the presence of contingents from Thessaly, Aetolia, and the smaller Amphictyonic states among the 'more than 30,000 infantry and not less than 2,000 cavalry'⁵ who fought at Chaeronea. A few years later the Macedonian infantry, half of which Alexander took with him to Asia, amounted to 24,000,

¹ Dem., XVIII, 211; Philoch. ap. Didym. ad Dem., col. 11; Marsyas fr. 20 (Jacoby). ² Theop. fr. 300.

³ XVI, 85, 5.

⁴ *Antike Schlachtfelder*, I, p. 189.

and this did not include mercenaries or light-armed mountaineers from the northern borders.¹ It may be assumed that Philip pressed into service every available man of his reliable Macedonians for this vital battle, so that the contingents of the allies cannot have been very considerable. Hence the number of Thessalian hoplites may be estimated at about 2,000—this must remain a mere guess—who perhaps only arrived shortly before the battle. In cavalry the army of Philip is strangely weak, but it must be remembered that most of the fighting took place in mountainous country where horses would be of little value. Of the 2,000 cavalrymen a few hundreds were probably Thessalian, but had Philip conducted his campaign in broad plainlands, he would certainly have anticipated Alexander in relying upon the excellent cavalry of Thessaly. He may have been actuated in this sparing use of his allies by a desire that they should have no claim to a substantial share in the fruits of victory ; but he had no reason to believe his Thessalians untrustworthy. Evidence of alleged disaffection on their part has been found in the assignment of Nicaea to the Locrians, which he might have been expected to restore to its former owners.² But the motive of Philip in this action was merely to reward new allies through whose territory passed important roads which he must command.

¹ Diod., XVII, 17, 3-5.

² Glotz, *op. cit.*, p. 541.

During the winter and spring the allied army under the leadership of Thebes and Athens more than held its own against Philip. When, however, Antipater arrived with reinforcements, the Greek forces began to betray signs of weakness. The conglomerate army with its several leaders was no match for the coherent mass under the single-purposed generalship of Philip. He broke through the pass at Gravia, thus rendering the allied lines at Parapotamii untenable. And August or September saw him victorious on the field of Chaeronea, a battle whose consequences were perhaps more momentous than those of any other in Greek history.

It now remained for Philip to organize his conquests, a task still more exacting than the winning of his final victory. He could not, even if he wished, annex Greece as part of the Macedonian Empire, while even to govern it as a semi-independent protectorate, as he governed Thessaly and some districts of Thrace, was rendered impracticable both by geographical and by political considerations. His solution of the problem, perhaps suggested in the first instance by Isocrates, was to create a pan-Hellenic League, a federation based on the conventional lines of earlier Greek federations, but with himself as its Hegemon or virtual dictator. The organization of this League of Corinth, as it is known to historians, lies outside the scope of this

work, but is noteworthy in that Thessaly was a member of it. This appears at first sight somewhat remarkable in view of the extraordinary connexion between the Thessalians and the Macedonian monarchy, which Philip initiated and his successors continued. However, Thessalian membership of the League, though unmentioned by literary authorities, is conclusively proved by epigraphical evidence,¹ and in fact Philip had cogent reasons for including the Thessalians and even closer dependents such as the Greeks of Thrace. The League was to be open not to certain specified Greeks, but to all ; and it was imperative that some proportion of the votes in the League Council should be held by states whose obedience to the Macedonian monarchy was assured.² Moreover, the statesmanship of Philip was such that he constantly respected the theoretical autonomy of these protectorates wherever this was at all possible. Therefore, when the League was formed in the autumn of 338, ten votes were assigned to Thessaly,³ an extremely liberal allowance, if, as the latest reconstruction of the League constitution would indicate,⁴ Athens and Boeotia received but five

¹ *I.G.*, II², 1, 236.

² Schwahn, p. 54, estimates that over one quarter of the votes were held by close dependents or by cities occupied by Macedonian garrisons.

³ *I.G.*, II², 1, 236.

⁴ Schwahn, p. 25—his figures for those states not named in the fragmentary inscription are of course highly conjectural.

votes apiece. The three districts of the Perioecis and other states north of Thermopylae were also generously treated in this allocation of votes,¹ which was an innovation introduced by Philip to replace the unsatisfactory practice in Greek confederations of assigning the same number of votes to each member.²

This generosity towards his immediate dependents was in accord with the policy of Philip to promote the less-developed states of Greece at the expense of the older, over-developed powers. But possession of votes on the Council involved obligations as well as privileges. In the event of war a League army was liable to be mobilized under the command of the Hegemon, and every state was required to supply a contingent of 500 hoplites or 200 cavalrymen in return for each vote which it held on the Council.³ This was not an exorbitant demand; Philip had no wish to muster every available fighting man in Greece, for such an army would have been embarrassingly large, whatever enterprise he might contemplate. But under this system the Thessalians,

¹ The names of Perrhaebia, Malis, and Dolopia appear in the extant fragment, those of the rest only in the reconstruction of Schwahn, p. 2.

² Kaerst, p. 283.

³ So Tarn, *C.R.*, XLV (1931), p. 88, correcting Schwahn. The figures of Tarn certainly suit the Thessalian contingent better than those of Schwahn, which involve a mistake in regard to Achaea—see below, p. 221 n. 3.

in virtue of their ten votes, might one day be expected to supply 2,000 horsemen to the national army, and that day would not be long postponed. Philip was soon to embark upon an invasion of Asia and he had no difficulty in obtaining the sanction of the League Council for this campaign, which would provide an excellent test of the efficiency of this new organization. Most states would, in all probability, not be required to contribute their full quota of troops, but against Persia strong cavalry was indispensable, and especially as Philip was Archon of the Thessalians as well as their Hegemon, he would certainly demand of them their stipulated 2,000 to reinforce his own cavalry army. However, before any mobilization of Greek troops had even been commenced, he fell victim to a conspiracy, and his project was temporarily postponed.

•

CHAPTER X

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND AFTER

οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ἱππεῖς λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενοι οὐχ ὑπελείποντο
'Αλεξάνδρῳ

(ARRIAN)

THE news that Philip had been assassinated was welcomed throughout Greece with hysterical joy, and despite the appeal for loyalty which Alexander made to the envoys assembled at Aegae, overt acts of hostility were committed in many states against the Macedonian régime. From Asia also Attalus had begun to intrigue with Demosthenes, while many of the barbarian neighbours of Macedon were ready to revolt. Of these dangers Alexander decided that the situation in Greece had first claim to his attention and in the autumn of 336 he set out at the head of an army to enforce his rights.

The attitude of Thessaly towards the new king is not easily determined. In an anecdote whose purpose it is to illustrate the resourcefulness of Alexander, Polyænus describes how, when the

Thessalians defended Tempe against him, he had steps cut in the precipitous slopes of Ossa—these steps being henceforward known as Alexander's ladder—and so turned the pass.¹ This story, which can only refer to the first descent by Alexander into Greece, is usually accepted as evidence of a general anti-Macedonian movement throughout Thessaly at this time. But, while there is no reason to dismiss the story as apocryphal, it is impossible to believe that the pass was held by a large Thessalian army. There were other ways of access to the Pelasgiotid plain, and Alexander, to whose reputation a check at this point would be highly injurious, would have avoided the shortest but most defensible route if he had anticipated serious opposition. A party hostile to Macedon was doubtless still alive and active, but it can scarcely have ousted the strongly Macedonian government under the tetrarchs in the short interval between the murder of Philip and the march of Alexander. Probably these enemies of Macedon hastily collected a band of desperadoes in the hope that they would sway Thessalian feeling against Alexander by facing him in an impregnable position and preventing him from entering the Pelasgiotid plain. But they had not taken into account the military genius of their opponent.

Philip had bound the Thessalians to himself by

¹ IV, 3, 23. A tower of Alexander at the northern entrance of Tempe is mentioned by Polyb., XVIII, 10.

a twofold tie of allegiance, in the first place as archon of their own League and later as Hegemon of the League of Corinth. But in each case their oath was only valid during his lifetime, and legally they had every right after his death to discontinue both connexions with the Macedonian monarchy. Nevertheless, all but the most hot-headed champions of autonomy must have recognized the folly of any opposition to the election of Alexander. The same considerations which had prompted Philip to treat the Thessalians with unusual generosity in the past might be expected to prompt Alexander in the future ; and, even if his claim to the positions of authority held by his father had not been backed by the presence of a substantial army, their decision could scarcely have been different. He reminded them of his close relationship to Thessaly through his Heraclid and Aeacid ancestors and made lavish promises.¹ Thereupon the *κοινόν* elected him archon, agreed to pay to him the taxes which Philip had exacted,² declared itself ready to march with him to the walls of Athens,³ and finally recognized him as Hegemon of the Greeks.⁴ The neighbours of the Thessalians naturally followed their lead, and shortly after-

¹ Diod., XVII, 4, 1 ; Justin, XI, 3, 1.

² Justin, XI, 3, 2.

³ Aesch., III, 161.

⁴ Diod., loc. cit.—the explanation of this passage advanced by U. Wilcken, *Berl. S.B.*, 1922, p. 99, is here adopted.

wards a decree of the Amphictyonic Council left him master of the whole of northern Greece.¹

The Greek states south of Thermopylae renewed the covenant of the League of Corinth with Alexander in this autumn, but they required a further lesson that he was not, as Demosthenes had described him, a second Margites. When in the following summer a rumour spread that he had been killed while campaigning in Illyria, immediately Thebes, Athens, and several Peloponnesian states rose against Macedon. Alexander, however, was not dead and, marching with astonishing speed over the mountains into western Thessaly, he reached Pelinna within seven days.² From here he hastened to Boeotia, besieged and stormed Thebes, and intimidated the League Council into sanctioning the utter destruction of the city. Although Athens and other rebellious cities were pardoned, Macedonian control of Greece became far more stringent than before. The northern Greeks appear to have remained faithful during this rising, and wisely, too, for the whips of Philip were indeed less painful instruments of chastisement than the scorpions of Alexander.

The next winter was spent in preparation for the postponed invasion of Asia, an enterprise which was in theory planned no less as a Greek war of revenge than as a Macedonian war of conquest.

¹ Diod., XVIII, 4, 2.

² Arr. Anab., I, 7, 5.

Alexander followed the lead of Philip in making the constitution of the League of Corinth the basis on which he assessed the contingents to be raised from the several states of Greece. But, while some Peloponnesian states sent no troops to Asia and others very few, those of the north were for the most part required to contribute their full quota.¹ This was partly due to the more intimate relations which existed between the latter and the Macedonian monarchy,² and partly to the fact that the cavalry of the Thessalians and their neighbours was of far greater value to Alexander than Peloponnesian hoplites. While Achaea, Malis, and other northern tribes contributed to the army of 600 'allied' cavalry,³ the Thessalian contingent amounted to 1,800 horsemen,⁴ another 200 being sent out in the following year to make up the full quota of 2,000. The size of this Thessalian army, which equals the cavalry force of Macedonia, has not been accepted

¹ Schwahn, Table on p. 25.

² Well illustrated by Arr., *Anab.*, VII, 12, 4—in 324 Craterus was sent home *Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θράκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας*.

³ Diod., XVII, 57, 3. Schwahn, pp. 34–5, believing that the Achaeans formed part of the Thessalian contingent, explains their inclusion among the allied cavalry at Gaugamela (Diod., loc. cit.) as a military measure to strengthen the latter. It appears that he has confused Gaugamela with Issus where the allies were at first isolated on the left and might well need support.

⁴ Diod., XVII, 17, 4.

by all historians, and some have attempted to reduce it by emending the text of Diodorus.¹ However, this figure occurs in all the manuscripts and belongs to a chapter in which most of the numerals are reliable. There was no potent reason why the Macedonian horse, which in subsequent years was many times reinforced by reserves from home, should at the outset have exceeded that of Thessaly ; nor, if former armies of the Thessalians are considered, can any one question their ability to put 2,000 cavalymen into the field. In the spring of 334 preparations were complete and the whole armament of nearly 40,000 men began to assemble at Amphipolis.

So this army of Thessalian horsemen rode away to make its mark in the conquest of the East, and for the first time since Achilles and his Myrmidons sailed for Troy Thessaly was independently represented in an overseas campaign. A small contingent it was but an honoured one, ranking second only to Alexander's own Macedonian cavalry. ' One gets the impression ', writes Wilcken,² ' that, apart from the Thessalians, Alexander took the Greek contingents rather as hostages, who would

¹ As Beloch, III, 2, p. 324, who arbitrarily reduces it to 1,200. Others, as Wilcken, *Alexander the Great* (Eng. trans.), p. 76, adopt 1,500, a figure derived from a marginal note in one MS.

² Loc. cit.

help to keep Hellas quiet.' It might be added that, with the possible exception of the allied cavalry which included Perioeci and other northerners, the Thessalians alone of the Greeks had any real zest for the expedition.¹ They could regard themselves as privileged participators in a high adventure, led by their own archon, whereas the others could only lament the degradation of enforced service under a foreign dictator. It is for this reason that, while Alexander made full use of his Thessalian cavalry in his three great battles, the Greek infantry is never found in the fighting line and was employed mainly in occupying conquered territory.²

Seldom do the narratives of the campaign contain any mention of the fortunes of the Thessalians, but their part during the opening years is an important one and valuable for the better understanding of Thessalian history, if only to illustrate what a magnificent weapon Thessalian troops could be when efficiently organized and brilliantly generalled. They acted under the orders of a hipparch appointed by Alexander, who wisely did not give this command to a Thessalian, and, like the rest of the

¹ Schwahn, p. 34, disbelieves this on the ground that so few Thessalians volunteered for further service (see below, p. 227 ; but Alexander could never have relied upon them as he did if their heart had not been in their work.

² Kaerst, pp. 328-9. The Thessalians are customarily distinguished from the other Greeks (Arr., *Anab.*, III, 19, 6 ; Plut., *Alex.*, 33).

cavalry, they were divided into *ἡται*. Of these *ἡται* the Pharsalian contingent, which was the most numerous, was regarded as superior to the rest in fighting qualities.¹ In battle the Thessalian position was on the left wing, which was under the general command of Parmenio, and this was their station at the Granicus, where their success was exceeded only by that of the Macedonian cavalry.² Calas, son of Harpalus, was at first their leader,³ but when he was appointed satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, the command fell for a time to Alexander the Lyncestian. After leading them with Parmenio through Sardis to Phrygia in the winter of 334-333,⁴ this Alexander was suspected of high treason and, as it was thought that he might undermine the loyalty of his valuable troops, he was removed from his command.⁵ His successor was Philip, son of Menelaus, who must have handled the Thessalians skilfully, since he retained his command until their final disbandment. At Gordium a reinforcement of 200 horsemen arrived from home,⁶ and from Tarsus the Thessalians were included in the advance-guard sent forward under Parmenio to secure the passes from Cilicia into Syria.⁷

But it was at Issus that they were subjected to

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, III, 11, 10.

² Diod., XVII, 19, 6 and 21, 4.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, I, 14, 3.

⁴ Ibid., I, 24, 3.

⁵ Ibid., 25, 1 and 5.

⁶ Ibid., 29, 4.

⁷ Ibid., II, 5, 1.

their most severe test. Stationed at first on the right wing with the Macedonian cavalry, they were secretly moved just before the battle commenced to the left, where the rest of the Greek cavalry could not be expected to hold the Persian horse massed against it.¹ Here some of the hardest fighting in the whole battle took place, and had not the Thessalians stood their ground against superior numbers, the issue might well have been reversed. Thanks to their heroism the Persian right was held in check until the news came that Dareius and the mercenaries were in headlong flight. Thereupon the Persian cavalry turned and fled in confusion with the Thessalians in hot pursuit.² Alexander, ever generous where real merit was evident and seeing in the Thessalians the true victors of Issus, rewarded them with a lion's share of the spoil. Under Parmenio they rode straight to Damascus, where the Persian head-quarters furnished them with booty which must have amazed even the richest of Thessalian noblemen.³ In contrast to the glorious exploits of this body, the Pheraean Aristomedes was among the Greek commanders in the Persian army who fled from the battlefield ;⁴ and probably in the Persian ranks was many another

¹ Ibid., 8, 9 and 9, 1 ; Diod., XVII, 33, 2 ; Curtius, III, 9, 8 and 11, 3.

² Arr., *Anab.*, II, 11, 2-3 ; Curtius, III, 11, 14-15.

³ Plut., *Alex.*, 24.

⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, II, 13, 2 ; Curtius, III, 9, 3.

Thessalian who chose rather to enlist in mercenary service under an oriental monarch than to suffer the humiliation of a Macedonian régime.

No more is heard of the Thessalian cavalry until the day of Gaugamela nearly two years later, when it was again stationed in its familiar position on the left wing.¹ Philip, son of Menelaus, was still in command, but the Pharsalians were given the signal honour of acting as bodyguard to Parmenio. Shortly before the battle Alexander rode down the ranks and made a special appeal to the Thessalians and other Greeks who responded loyally.² As at Issus, the left wing was engaged in a desperate defensive struggle, and Parmenio was compelled to send to Alexander an urgent appeal for assistance. The Thessalians in particular were in great straits against the overwhelming numbers of Mazaeus, but they remained unbroken and it was through their courage and pertinacity that, when the report of Darius's flight began to spread through the Persian host, Parmenio was enabled to turn defeat into victory before Alexander arrived to the rescue.³

The Greek allies continued to share in the triumphant progress of Alexander during the following winter (331-330), but their term of service was now

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, III, 11, 10 ; Diod., XVII, 57, 4 ; Curtius, IV, 13, 29.

² Plut., *Alex.*, 33.

³ Arr., *Anab.*, III, 15, 3 ; Diod., XVII, 60, 5-8 ; Curtius, IV, 16, 5-6.

drawing to a close. Antipater had already crushed the rebellious movement of Agis, so that there was no longer any pressing necessity to retain Greek troops as a security for the good behaviour of their fellows at home. Furthermore, the declared goal of the Asiatic campaign—the extinction of the Achaemenid dynasty in revenge for past wrongs committed against the Greeks—had already been reached in the occupation of Susa and Persepolis, even though Darius himself still lived. Henceforward Alexander was fighting for his own hand and could demand no further support from the League of Corinth. Accordingly, when the army arrived at Ecbatana in the early summer of 330 he disbanded his Thessalian cavalry and all his other Greek allies, sending them seawards laden with honour and with spoils.¹ It is not stated that the Thessalians received any distinctive remuneration, but the reward of each cavalryman is disproportionately large compared with that of each hoplite,² and probably Alexander was more generous to the Thessalian than to the allied horse. Most of the Greeks had already had a surfeit of campaigning, but a small proportion accepted the offer of further service, no longer as allies but as mercenaries, and among these were some 130 Thessalians.³ But even

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, III, 19, 5-6; Plut., *Alex.*, 42; Diod., XVII, 74, 3-5; Curtius, VI, 2, 17.

² Diod., loc. cit.

³ Curtius, VI, 6, 35.

this little squadron soon wearied of endless hardship in the pursuit of Bessus, and after less than a year of mercenary service under the former hipparch Philippus,¹ it was finally disbanded before the Oxus was crossed.²

Meanwhile domestic events in Greece proper were dwarfed into insignificance by the exploits of Alexander in the East. Except that the activities of rival parties at Athens are recorded by the orators, history is a blank from the end of 335 until the spring of 331 when Agis of Sparta declared war upon Macedon. The Thessalians had small reason to support a Spartan king fighting for Peloponnesian interests, especially when so large a proportion of their cavalry was absent overseas. And if it is true that Demosthenes claimed to have incited Thessaly and Perrhaebia to revolt at this time, this boast deserves all the scorn which Aeschines pours upon it.³ This passage only serves to show that a disaffected party continued to exist in Thessaly, and this is evident from the story of the Lamian War. All too little is known of the campaign in which Antipater crushed Sparta and her allies, but the army of Macedonians and Greek allies which was victorious at Megalopolis was a very large one, amounting to 40,000 in all.⁴ Not more than half

¹ Arr., *Anab.*, III, 25, 4.

² Ibid., 29, 5—cp. V, 27, 5.

³ III, 167.

⁴ Diod., XVII, 63, 1.

of these can have been Macedonians, and it may be assumed that Thessaly contributed a substantial contingent both of cavalry and hoplites. Apart from this disturbance the Thessalians appear to have enjoyed peaceful government under their four tetrarchs in the absence of their archon. Daochus and Thrasydaeus no longer figure in the lists of hieromnemones after the spring session of 335—it is not necessary to assume their death, for they may well have accompanied Alexander to Asia—and their places are taken by Politas, another Pharsalian, and Nicasippus from Pelinna, a city which constantly adhered to Macedon.¹ These held office until 328 when one of the Thessalian representatives was Cyrsilus, perhaps the Pharsalian who wrote a history of Alexander's campaigns,² the other an unknown Pheraeus.³

For many years the Thessalian countryside had enjoyed security undisturbed by the depredations of local or of foreign armies; but this durable peace, so rare in Thessalian history, was shattered by the events which followed the death of Alexander. The uncompromising severity of Antipater had made Macedonian rule hated throughout Greece, and when Leosthenes had persuaded the Athenians to

¹ Table II in Ditt.³, I, p. 444. ² See above, p. 44 n. 1.

³ Ditt.³, 253 s. The name can hardly be 'Cyrsilus the Pheraean', since there is no reason why only one of the two Thessalian hieromnemones should be mentioned.

commit themselves to a struggle for freedom, it seemed likely that the whole Greek world would follow their lead. For the present, however, Thessaly remained faithful despite Athenian intrigue, as did all the states in the vicinity with the exception of Phocis, Locris, and Oetaea. The Aetolians, who had been favoured by Philip and were now beginning to play the role filled by Thessaly earlier in the century—that of an unknown semi-civilized power rivalling the older states—had already agreed to an alliance with Leosthenes. At first the rebels won success after success, thus causing an influx of new allies, and Thermopylae fell into their hands. When Antipater marched southward with the limited army at his disposal, he found his troops heavily outnumbered, and his difficulties were increased at Heraclea by the defection of the Thessalians, who barred his retreat to the north. The latter had at first sent their cavalry to join the Macedonians, but soon they were induced by the Athenians to ride over to Leosthenes.¹

This desertion is somewhat surprising in view of the exploits of the Thessalians in the East, but perhaps it was those very exploits which had given them confidence that they were man for man superior to the Macedonians. Alternatively, their action may have been the result of panic, for they had reason to fear the reprisals to which they

¹ Diod., XVIII, 12, 3.

would be subjected if, as seemed highly probable, Greece successfully threw off the Macedonian yoke. All Thessaly except Pelinna is said to have joined the allies,¹ but enthusiasm for the Hellenic cause cannot have been universal. Thessalian hoplites, who would have been called out in full force if the war had been a national one, are never mentioned, and it is clear from the recorded figures of the other Greek contingents that at the most only two or three thousand can have been mobilized. This indicates that the movement against Macedon was largely aristocratic. Further, the Thessalian cavalry only amounted to 2,000,² a number which, in spite of losses sustained in Asia, does not represent the total cavalry strength of the country, so that it may be assumed that the whole of north-western Thessaly, the Pelinnean sphere of influence, refused to desert Antipater. The attitude of other cities is unknown, but the centre of the rebellion was at Pharsalus, hitherto a loyal adherent of Macedon. Here the ascendancy of the Daochid family had been broken down by Meno, a bitter enemy of Macedonia and a man of outstanding ability, who, had he lived in more promising times, might have been a great figure in Thessalian history. It was no doubt through his influence that Achaea, apart from Thebes, and Malis, apart from Lamia, deserted with the Thessalians.

¹ Ibid., 11, 1.

² Ibid., 15, 2.

Antipater was compelled to seek refuge behind the walls of Lamia, where he was blockaded, and anxiously awaited the arrival of Leonnatus and a relieving force from the north. Meanwhile the Greek army was reduced in numbers by the departure of the Aetolians and its efficiency impaired by the death of Leosthenes, who was mortally wounded during a Macedonian sortie and succeeded by a less inspiring leader named Antiphilus.¹ In the early spring of 322 Leonnatus appeared with an army of 20,000 infantry but only 1,500 cavalry, whereupon the Greeks raised the siege of Lamia and marched to meet him. In the ensuing battle, which was exclusively a cavalry engagement—this being greatly to the advantage of the rebels—fought probably in the south of the Pelasgiotid plain, the Thessalians under the command of Meno once more distinguished themselves, and owing to their efforts the Macedonians were defeated. Leonnatus was slain, and his infantry took to the hills to escape from the attacks of the Thessalian cavalry.² However, Antipater was able next day to join forces with the defeated army, which he led away northwards leaving Greece free from Macedonian control.³

The success of the Greek cause was short-lived. Command of the sea was lost through the defeat

¹ Diod., XVIII, 13, 4-6.

² Ibid., 15, 2-4.

³ It is not stated whether he withdrew to Macedonia or only to the Perrhaebian highlands.

of the Athenian fleet, the allied army began to display the lack of cohesion and staying power ¹ so common in composite Greek armies, and towards midsummer Antipater was reinforced by Craterus with an overwhelming army of veterans from the eastern satrapies.² The Macedonian host encamped on the banks of the Peneius and then moved forward to battle, which the Greeks, who were expecting reinforcements, for a time refused. The Thes-salians, who, since Meno held joint command with Antiphilus, formed a most important section of the allied army, must have been anxious to save their lands from further plundering and may have insisted on fighting a pitched battle. This took place in August in the neighbourhood of Crannon.³ Again the Thessalians proved at least a match for the best Macedonian cavalry, but the Greek hoplites were forced to retire, though their ranks remained unbroken.⁴ The losses on both sides were extra-ordinarily small, but the victory lay with Antipater, who proceeded to besiege several Thessalian cities and storm them.⁵ The Greeks made no attempt to relieve these cities and allowed even Pharsalus, whose leaders deserved to pay dearly for their mis-calculation, to share the fate of the others.⁶ The

¹ Cp. the trenchant criticism of Phocion (Plut., *Phoc.*, 23).

² Diod., XVIII, 16, 4-5.

³ Plut., *Demetr.*, 10 and *Mor.*, p. 849 A.

⁴ Diod., XVIII, 17, 3-5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ Plut., *Mor.*, p. 846 E.

motive of Antipater in exercising this severity was to intimidate the rest of the allies and, while he refused to negotiate with the Greeks as a whole, he signified that he would deal leniently with any state which chose to submit. Recognizing the futility of a prolonged struggle against a power whose reserves appeared limitless, all the states of Greece except Athens and Aetolia availed themselves of this offer so that the League of Corinth ceased to exist.

Athens surrendered shortly afterwards, but the Aetolians were undaunted and in the following year (321), after negotiating an alliance with Perdiccas, they took advantage of the absence of Antipater in Asia to break into Thessaly.¹ They had already defeated a Macedonian force in Locris and found no difficulty in persuading most of the Thessalian cities to join them, so that the combined army was indeed a formidable one.² However, the Aetolians were soon compelled by an Acarnanian raid to return in defence of their homes, leaving the Thessalians under the command of Meno to bear the brunt of a Macedonian invasion. No

¹ Diod., XVIII, 38, 1.

² From *ibid.*, 2-3, the Thessalian contribution appears to have amounted to 13,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry—a strangely large proportion of infantry to cavalry in a Thessalian army. Schwahn, p. 8, regards the Aetolian numbers as suspiciously high, and perhaps all the figures given by Diodorus in this chapter are based upon one of his not infrequent miscalculations.

details of the ensuing campaign are recorded, but Polyperchon, the deputy governor of Macedonia, won a victory in which Meno was slain, and Thessaly fell once more under Macedonian control.¹

It was many years since the Thessalians had been politically independent of Macedon and from this date they may be said to have lost the last traces of historical independence also. Henceforward the history of Thessaly is no longer separable in any way from that of Macedonia and the Hellenistic world in general, just as at the same date Greek history ceases to be intelligible as a separate unit and becomes indissolubly merged with world history. During the wars of the Successors, which tore asunder the empire of Alexander, Thessaly is a pawn of such insignificance in a highly complex game that ancient writers may readily be forgiven for their failure to preserve any continuous account of its fortunes. It is recorded that in 317 Cassander operated successfully in Thessaly against Polyperchon² and with less success fifteen years later against Demetrius.³ But these events belong to the history of the Successors and not to that of the Thessalians, who had no power to prevent the use of their lands as a battlefield and could only hope to save themselves from hardship by submission to

¹ Diod., XVIII, 38, 6.

² Ibid., XIX, 35-6.

³ Ibid., XX, 110-12.

the stronger party. Even in their own narrow sphere of northern Greece they were now eclipsed by the Aetolians, who early in the third century usurped their control of the Amphictyonic Council.¹ Further, with the foundation of Demetrias on the shores of the Gulf of Pagasae, Thessaly became yet more 'macedonized,' until a century later the coming of the Romans brought to birth a new and very different Thessalian League. But, even when their country became the possession of Rome, the Thessalians, thanks to their geographical position between Macedon and Greece, were not always given the opportunity to cultivate their lands in peace. And on Thessalian soil was fought the most vital battle in the history of the Roman Republic.

¹ Ditt.³, 405.

APPENDIX

ANCIENT DESCRIPTIONS OF THESSALY

SEVERAL monographs on Thessalian geography and history were written in antiquity (see above p. 44), but none of these is preserved, and their existence is only known to us through the survival of the most meagre fragments. Consequently our knowledge of ancient Thessaly is perforce to be derived from incidental notices by authors of more general works, of whom few had ever visited the district and yet fewer had any deep interest in it.

Herodotus is a notable exception. A large part of Book VII is devoted to the movements of the Persian army in northern Greece, and a characteristic excursus describes the peculiarities of Thessalian geography, which evidently attracted the historian (128-130). It has even been suggested that the story of Xerxes' expedition to the mouth of the Peneius, which gives rise to the excursus, is fictitious and that Herodotus has fostered on the king a researcher's interest which is in reality his own (cp. Macan's notes ad loc.). This account may conceivably have its origin in Hecataeus' *Description of the World*, which is known to have included Thessaly (fr. 133-137, Jacoby) ; but, though Herodotus fails to distinguish the two separate plains and has confused the passes leading from Macedonia, his narrative is so vivid and accurate that he must at least have

visited Tempe and some part of the Magnesian coast (Jacoby art. Herodotos in *P.W.*, Supplbd. II, col. 270-1).

Thucydides seldom has occasion to mention Thessaly. His account of Brasidas's passage through the country shows knowledge both of topography and of local politics (IV, 78), but this is probably due not to autopsy but rather to his lively interest in the career of Brasidas, whom he may have met and questioned at Amphipolis.

Xenophon makes a special study of Jason, and some attempt has been included in preceding chapters to examine the credibility of his narrative, for which Polydamas may be the authority. After his adventures in the East Xenophon accompanied the army of Agesilaus on its return from Asia (Diog. Laert., II, 51) and thus experienced the peculiar difficulties of passing through a hostile Thessaly. Though his *Hellenica* is an invaluable source for Thessalian history, he seems to assume that his readers are familiar with the country and was clearly more concerned with the personality of Jason than with Thessaly and the Thessalians.

Ephorus is probably responsible for most of the information on Thessalian affairs which appears in the work of Diodorus. Since the latter displays little understanding of Greek history and less of Greek geography, it is impossible to decide whether Ephorus was acquainted with Thessaly.

Theopompus had a wide personal knowledge of northern Greece, and the Thessalians were prominent in his *Philippica*. Unfortunately nearly all the extant fragments of this work consist either of mere place-names collected by Stephanus of Byzantium, the lexicographer, or of scandalous anecdotes and reports of curious natural phenomena, two features of his historical

writing which appealed to such indefatigable compilers as Athenaeus.

Polybius traversed Thessaly when, as representative of the Achaean League, he was sent with an embassy to the Roman army operating in Perrhaebia (XXVIII, 13). No one realized better than he the value of autopsy, and his occasional notes on Thessaly well illustrate his acute powers of observation; in many cases these are preserved only in the paraphrases of Livy, who did not share his conception of an historian's duty.

Oratory naturally supplies little. Isocrates may have been entertained by Jason, while Aeschines and Demosthenes were present at Pherae when Philip finally ratified the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes made a close study of Thessalian constitutional development under the Macedonian régime, but his references to it are always tinged with prejudice.

Of the geographers Strabo devotes a long chapter to Thessaly (IX, 5, pp. 429-44); this contains valuable material, but is little more than a geographical commentary on the Homeric Catalogue. Moreover he derives almost the whole of his account of Greece proper from the works of others and certainly has no intimate knowledge of the north. The elder Pliny includes a very summary description of the country (*N.H.*, IV, 28-32) and Ptolemy a list of cities (III, 13-14 and 39-44), while a few details are supplied by minor geographers (Ps.-Scylax, 64; Ps.-Dicaearchus (Heracleides), II-III; Ps.-Scymnus, 607-613).

•

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. THESSALIAN GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY

FRIEDRICH STÄHLIN, *Das hellenische Thessalien* (Stuttgart, 1924).
(Also many articles in *P.W.*)

B. THESSALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

G. BUSOLT, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich, 1920-6) (esp. Vol. II, pp. 1478-89).

V. COSTANZI, *Riv. Fil.*, XXIX, 1901, pp. 436-72, and XLII, 1914, pp. 529-59.

A. FERRABINO, *Entaphia in Memoria di E. Pozzi*, pp. 71-128 (Turin, 1913).

S. FERRI, *Riv. Fil.* (New Series), VII, 1929, pp. 359-70, and VIII, 1930, pp. 300-5.

H. VON GAERTRINGEN, *Aus der Anomia*, pp. 1-16 (Halle, 1890).

U. KAHRSTEDT, *Gött. Nach.* (Phil.-hist. Klasse), 1925, pp. 128-55.

G. KIP, *Thessalische Studien* (Dissert. Halle, 1910).

E. MEYER, *Theopomps Hellenika mit einer Beilage*, pp. 199-283 (Halle, 1909).

A. MOMIGLIANO, *Athenaeum* (New Series), X, 1932, pp. 47-53.

H. SWOBODA, *Griechische Staatsaltertümer* (Tübingen, 1913) (esp. pp. 227-36).

H. T. WADE-GERY, *J.H.S.*, XLIV, 1924, pp. 51-64.

C. THESSALIAN HISTORY

(General works containing occasional accounts of Thessalian affairs are not here included)


V. COSTANZI, *Saggio di storia tessalica* (published in *Annali delle Università toscane*, XXVI, 1906, and XXVII, 1907).

- E. FABRICIUS, *Rh. Mus.*, XLVI, 1891, pp. 589-95.
P. FOUCART, *Rev. Phil.*, XXIII, 1899, pp. 105-11.
G. GLOTZ, *B.C.H.*, XXXIII, 1909, pp. 526-46.
E. MEYER, *op. cit.*
B. NIESE, *Hermes*, XXXIX, 1904, pp. 100-21.
FELIX STÄHELIN, Art. Jason (3) in *P.W.* (1914).
FRIEDRICH STÄHLIN, Art. Larisa (3) in *P.W.* (1924) and many other articles in *P.W.*
H. SWOBODA, *Jahreshefte d. österr. archäol. Institutes in Wien*, VI, 1903, pp. 200-14.
G. TROPEA, *Giasone il tago della Tessaglia* (Messina, 1898).
U. WILCKEN, *Hermes*, LIX, 1924, pp. 123-7.

D. THESSALIAN COINAGE

- F. HERRMANN, *Z.N.*, XXXII, 1921, pp. 33-43, and XXXV, 1924, pp. 1-69.
E. ROGERS, *The Copper Coinage of Thessaly* (London, 1932).

THE TYRANT-HOUSE OF PHERAE



INDEX

- Achaea (Peloponnesian), 177
 Achaea Phthiotis, 12-18, 20, 25,
 36, 63, 134, 144-5, 151, 179,
 186, 192, 207, 211, 231
 Achelous, r., 18
 Achilles, 12, 43, 222
 Aegae, 217
 Aeginion, 18
 Aenianes, 17
 Aeschines, 163, 207, 209, 228,
 239
 Actolia, 211, 230, 232, 234, 236
 Agathocles (of Crannon), 195
 Agathocles (the Penestes), 179
 Agelaus, 155
 Agesilaus, 61-4, 76, 117-18, 238
 Agesipolis, 66, 77
 Agias, 45
 Agis II, 39
 Agis III, 227-8
 Alcetas, 72, 75
 Aleuadae, 30-1, 35, 41, 45 ; and
 Lycophron, 50, 54, 59 ; and
 Jason, 72, 102, 104-5, 115 ;
 and Alexander, 129-30, 137,
 146-7 ; and Philip, 166-7,
 182, 190-2
 Aleuas, coin, 115, 146-7
 Aleuas, system of, 25-7 ;
 adapted by Jason, 104-5,
 111, 114
 Alexander the Lyncestian, 224
 Alexander II, 129-33, 146
 Alexander III (the Great), 5,
 18, 109, 121, 150, 195, 200,
 211-12, 217-29, 235
 Alexander of Pherae, 113, 115,
 Alexander of Pherae—*continued*
 160-2, 165-6, 172 ; accession,
 128 ; and Alexander II of
 Macedon, 129-33 ; and
 Boeotia, 131-44, 147-52, 155 ;
 and Athens, 142, 153-4 ;
 coinage, 145-7 ; murder, 156,
 159 ; character, 156-9
 Alponus, 173
 Ambracia, 18, 178
 Amphictyonic League, 29, 98,
 137, 163, 169-70, 180, 185-9,
 207-8, 211, 220, 236
 Amphipolis, 140, 222, 238
 Amphissa, 164, 207-10
 Amyntas III, 65, 85-7, 113
 Anaxis, 131
 Andronicus, 169
 Antipater, 213, 227-34
 Antiphilus, 233
 Apidanus, r., 12
 Archelaus, 51-2, 56-8, 85
 Archidamus, 93
 Argolas, Mt., 171
 Argos, 60-2, 66, 97
 Aristippus, 55-6, 59-60
 Aristodemus, 199-200
 Aristomedes, 206, 225
 Aristotle, 44, 50, 52, 63-4, 77,
 104, 109, 123, 157
 Arne, 22
 Artaxerxes, 117
 Artemis, 43
 Asclepius, 13, 43
 Asia, 55, 61, 109, 118-19, 211,
 216-17, 220-1, 227, 229, 231,
 234

244 THESSALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

- Athamania, 18, 179
 Athena Itonia, 43
 Athens, 17, 20, 31, 33, 37, 41, 48, 51, 60; and Jason, 70-5, 80, 82, 86-90, 92, 96, 112-13; and Alexander, 136, 140-2, 148, 153-5; and the sons of Jason, 165-6, 182-4; and Philip, 175, 177, 185-6, 199-200, 204-8, 210, 213-14; and Alexander the Great, 219-20; and the Lamian War, 229-30, 233-4
 Attalus, 217
 Attica, 18, 109, 210-11
 Autocles, 142
 Azorus, 17
 Boebe, Lake, 6, 9
 Boeotia, 3, 20, 22, 29, 33, 37, 43, 46; for later references see Thebes (Boeotian)
 Brasidas, 39, 238
 Byzantium, 205
 Calas, 224
 Callias, 204
 Cassander, 235
 Cephissus, r., 17
 Chabrias, 70, 124
 Chaeronea, Battle of, 127, 207, 211-13
 Chalcidice, 39, 69, 77-8, 86, 148, 183
 Chares, 154, 176
 Charidemus, 153
 Cilicia, 224
 Cineas (historian), 44
 Cineas (politician), 166
 Cirrha, 208
 Cleombrotus, 80
 Cleomenes, 143
 Coinage, 4, 12, 14, 32-4, 36; under Jason, 115-16; under Alexander, 145-7; under Philip, 178, 204; Simus coins, 191
 Colosimmus, 189, 209
 Corcyra, 87
 Corinth, 60; League of, 213, 219-21, 227, 234
 Cottyphus, 189, 208-9
 Crannon, 13, 62, 130, 159, 172, 195, 233
 Critias, 44, 48
 Crocion plain, 176
 Cynoscephalae, Battle of, 111, 137, 149-50
 Cyrus, 55-6, 117
 Cytinion, 210
 Damascus, 225
 Daochus, 45, 162, 202, 209-10, 229, 231; inscription, 61, 155
 Darius, 225-6
 Decadarchies, 196-9
 Declea, 39
 Deinias, 130, 172-3
 Delphi, 29, 45, 98-101, 163, 169, 171, 185, 188-9, 203, 208-9
 Demetrias, 236
 Demetrius Poliorcetes, 235
 Demosthenes, 163, 175, 177, 183-7, 192-4, 197-9, 203, 205-11, 217, 220, 239
 Derdas, 85
 Diodorus, 52, 60, 84, 91, 96, 101, 103, 131, 163, 166, 174, 191, 198, 211, 222, 238
 Diogeiton, 151
 Dionysodorus, 131
 Dioscoreion, 187
 Dolopia, 16, 72, 211
 Doris, 210
 Ecbatana, 227
 Echeatidae, 30-1
 Echinus, 134, 207
 Elatea, 210
 Elis, 53, 57
 Enipeus, r., 12, 149, 180
 Epaminondas, 89-92, 95, 97, 110, 116, 129, 135, 138, 143, 148, 150-2

- Ephorus, 91, 101, 238
 Epirus, 18, 40, 72, 200
 Euboea, 16, 18, 33, 69-70, 88,
 148
 Eudamidas, 65
 Eudicus, 182, 190

 Fersala, 12

 Gaugamela, Battle of, 226
 Gomphi, 18, 178
 Gordium, 224
 Gorgias, 41, 45, 69
 Granicus, r., Battle of, 224
 Gravia, 213

 Haliacmon, r., 19
 Haliartus, 61
 Halmyros, 176
 Halus, 16, 186
 Hecate, 43, 146
 Hegesippus, 192
 Hellanicus, 44
 Hellanocrates, 147
 Heraclea in Trachis, 38-9, 51,
 56, 59-62, 65, 70, 76, 95, 128,
 210, 230
 Heracleides, 239
 Herippidas, 59
 Herodes Atticus, 52-3
 Hestiacotis (tetrad), 7, 14, 24,
 34, 177-8
 Histiaea, 18, 69-70
 Hyampolis, 94
 Hypatus, 143
 Hypereia, 10

 Illyria, 18, 180, 191
 Iolcus, 15-16
 Iphicrates, 87, 124, 140
 Iphitus, 61
 Ismenias, 135, 139, 141
 Isocrates, 41, 68, 119, 152, 164,
 213, 239
 Issus, Battle of, 224-6

 Jason of Pherae, 10, 17, 26, 37,
 50, 65, 126-32, 144-5, 155-9,
 170, 177, 181, 194, 202, 238;
 rise to power, 68-73; and
 Athens, 73-6, 87-8; and
 Pharsalus, 76-83; and Per-
 rhaebia, 84-5; and Mace-
 donia, 85-7; and Thebes,
 88-9; and the Leuctra cam-
 paign, 90-5; after Leuctra,
 95-100; murder, 100-2;
 resources, 103-16; ambitions,
 116-22; character, 122-5
 Justin, 163, 167

 Karditsa, 14

 Lamia, 20, 210, 231-2
 Lamian War, 228-34
 Larisa (Pelagis), 4, 7-10, 12-13,
 20, 30-6, 41-2, 77; and
 Lycophron, 49-64; and
 Jason, 71-2, 85; and Alex-
 ander, 128-33, 145-7; and
 Philip, 166, 168, 170, 173,
 177, 182, 187, 189-92
 Larisa Cremaste, 16
 Leonnatus, 232
 Leosthenes (admiral), 153-4
 Leosthenes (general in Lamian
 War), 229-30
 Leuctra, Battle of, 84, 88-97,
 108, 113, 117, 120-1, 170
 Livy, 2, 239
 Locris, 95, 128, 170, 207, 211-12,
 230, 234
 Lycophron I (father of Jason),
 48-9, 54, 56-64, 67-8, 70, 85,
 127
 Lycophron II (son of Jason),
 156, 165, 172-3, 176-7, 183
 Lysander, 58, 196
 Lysimachus, 195

 Macedonia, 2-3, 6-7, 9, 13, 15,
 18, 21-2, 40, 62, 112-13, 127,
 157, 229-37; see also under

246 THESSALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

Macedonia—*continued*

- Perdikkas II, Archelaus,
 Amyntas III, Alexander II,
 Ptolemy the Alorite, Philip II,
 Alexander III (the Great)
 Magnesia, 3, 7, 9, 11, 14-15, 17,
 144-5, 151, 170, 179, 184,
 189, 199-200, 238
 Malcidas, 151
 Malis, 17, 95, 128, 207, 221, 231
 Mantinea, Battle of, 106, 112,
 120, 152-3
 Maracians, 72
 Mazaeus, 226
 Medius (friend of Alexander the
 Great), 195
 Medius (politician), 59-64, 76
 Megalopolis, Battle of, 228
 Meliboea, 4, 145
 Meluna Pass, 15
 Meno (general in Lamian War),
 231-5
 Meno (officer of Cyrus), 55
 Methone, 173
 Molossia, 72
 Mouzaki, 18
 Mycenae, 11, 21

 Narthacium, Mt., 63
 Neogenes, 69
 Neon, Battle of, 171
 Nessonis, Lake, 6
 Nicaea, 134, 173, 188, 206-7,
 210-12
 Nicasippus, 229
 Nicesipolis, 181

 Oeta, Mt., 16
 Oetaca, 17, 95, 230
 Oloosson, 9, 15, 19
 Olympia, 42
 Olympias, 168
 Olympus, Mt., 19, 42-3
 Onomarchus, 172-7, 181
 Orestes, 31-2
 Oreus, 69
 Orman Magula, 149

 Ossa, Mt., 4, 15, 19, 218
 Othrys, Mts., 2, 16-17, 20, 63
 Oxus, r., 228

 Pagasae, 11-13, 15, 18, 49, 70,
 113, 148, 151, 162, 175-6, 181,
 184, 205, 236
 Parapotamii, 213
 Parmenio, 186, 224-6
 Parnassus, Mt., 171
 Pausanias, 140
 Peiraeus, 153
 Peitholaus (son of Jason), 156,
 165, 176, 182, 184, 191
 Pelasgians, 8, 22, 40
 Pelasgiotis (tetrad), 7, 9, 15,
 24-5, 33-4, 130, 137, 144,
 218, 232
 Pelinna, 14, 18, 177-8, 220, 229,
 231
 Pelion, Mt., 4, 15
 Pella, 187, 195
 Pelopidas, 89, 127, 131-5, 138-
 44, 146, 148-51, 157, 201-2
 Peneius, r., 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 233,
 237
 Penestae, 22, 27, 32-7, 47-8,
 112-13, 144, 179
 Peparethus, 17, 153
 Perdikkas II, 39, 51
 Perdikkas (regent), 234
 Perioecis, 2, 14-16, 22, 25-7,
 36, 65, 84, 95, 98, 111-15,
 169, 179, 215, 223
 Perrhaebia, 9, 14-15, 25, 36, 56,
 84-5, 112, 120, 179, 189, 193,
 228, 239
 Persepolis, 227
 Persia, 5, 57, 100, 114, 116-19,
 216, 225-6, 237
 Petra Pass, 15, 19-20
 Phalaecus, 188
 Phalanna, 180
 Pharcadon, 6, 14, 177-8
 Pharsalus, 9-13, 20, 30-7, 41,
 45, 55; and Medius, 59-64;
 and Jason, 70-82; and Poly-

Pharsalus—continued

- phron, 127-9; and Alexander, 140-1, 149, 155; and Philip, 186-7, 189-92, 202; and Alexander the Great, 224, 226; and the Lamian War, 231-3
- Phayllus, 174, 176
- Pherae, 7, 9-13, 33-5, 43, 187, 191-2, 196, 206, 225, 239; see also under Lycophron I, Polyalces, Jason, Polydorus, Polyphron, Alexander, Tisiphonus, Lycophron II, Peitholaus
- Pheraeus, 229
- Philinna, 168
- Philip Arrhidaeus, 168, 178
- Philip (officer of Alexander the Great), 224, 226, 228
- Philip II, 11, 13, 15, 27, 38, 94, 98, 115-16, 119-20, 122, 152, 161-4, 217-21, 230, 239; first interference in Thessaly, 166-8; campaigns against Onomarchus, 173-6; annexation of Thessaly, 176-95; decadarchies, 196-9; political reconstruction, 200-4; as archon, 204-16
- Philippi, 178
- Philippopolis, 178
- Philocrates, Peace of, 180, 185, 192, 199, 206, 239
- Philomelus, 171-2
- Phocis, 15, 29-30, 33, 62-3, 80, 93-4, 99, 128, 169, 171, 174-7, 182, 185-8, 207, 230
- Phoebeidas, 65
- Phthia, 11, 21
- Phthiotis (tetrad), 7, 12, 25, 79
- Phylace, 19
- Pieria, 19
- Pilaftepe, 3
- Pindar, 40-1
- Pindus, Mts., 6, 9, 14, 16, 18, 22, 72, 178
- Pleuratus, 191
- Pliny, 239
- Plutarch, 63, 128, 131, 135, 143, 157
- Politas, 229
- Polyaenus, 69, 87, 132, 218
- Polyalces, 68
- Polybius, 10, 203, 239
- Polycharmus, 63
- Polydamas, 41, 64, 73-81, 86-9, 96, 114, 116, 118, 121, 123, 129, 238
- Polydorus (brother of Jason), 101, 127-9
- Polycidus, 205
- Polyperchon, 178, 235
- Polyphron (brother of Jason), 127-9
- Porta, 18
- Poseidon, 43
- Pras, 63
- Prometheus, 48
- Ptolemy the Alorite, 133-4, 139-41
- Ptolemy (geographer), 239
- Pulydamas, 42
- Pythian Festival, 97, 100, 108, 117
- Rhizus, 4
- Sardis, 224
- Satrap's Revolt, 118
- Sciathos, 17
- Scopadae, 30
- Scopas, system of, 26, 114
- Scotussa, 13, 24, 42, 62, 145, 149-50
- Scyros, 17, 33
- Scythia, 206
- Simus, 182, 190-1
- Sisyphus, 61
- Sparta, 31, 87, 126, 140, 177, 182, 196, 228; intervention in Thessaly, 38-9, 51, 53, 56-66; and Jason, 69-70, 74-81, 90-6, 121, 123

248 THESSALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

- Spercheius, r., 16-17, 20, 38, 59,
 62, 131, 144, 192
 Staphylus, 44
 Stephanus of Byzantium, 238
 Strabo, 239
 Strymon, r., 148
 Suidas (Thessalian historian) 44,
 Susa, 135, 144, 227
 Syria, 224

 Tanagra, Battle of, 31
 Tarsus, 224
 Teleutias, 65
 Tempe, 2, 6, 19, 218, 238
 Tenos, 153
 Tetrarchies, 8, 24-7, 136-7, 198,
 202-3
 Thaumaci, 2, 20
 Thebe (daughter of Jason), 89,
 155-6, 159
 Thebes (Boeotian), including
 Boeotia, 60-1, 75, 126, 128,
 160, 175, 201-2, 206-7, 210-
 211, 213-14, 220; and Jason,
 70-1, 80, 88-90, 93-7, 100,
 118, 120; and Alexander,
 130-58; and Tisiphonus,
 165-6; and the Sacred War,
 169-72, 174, 182, 186-8
 Thebes (Phthiotic), 16, 231
 Theopompus, 159-60, 163, 168,
 203, 238
 Theripidas, 69

 Thermopylae, 134, 170-1, 173,
 176-7, 186, 188-9, 194, 206-7,
 215, 220, 230
 Thesprotia, 22
 Thessaliotis (tetrad), 7, 14, 16,
 22
 Thetideion, 149
 Thorax, 41
 Thrace, 148, 181, 191, 200, 205,
 213-14
 Thrasydaeus, 203, 209-10, 229
 Thronion, 173
 Thucydides, 37, 238
 Timotheus, 72, 75, 87-8, 121,
 148
 Tisiphonus (son of Jason), 156,
 165-6, 172
 Trachis, 9, 13-14, 43, 178
 Tripolis, 85

 Volo, 3, 11
 Volustana Pass, 15, 19-20

 Xenophon, 41, 52, 55, 57, 68,
 76-9, 91-4, 97-8, 100-2,
 106-7, 109, 111, 116, 120,
 123, 128, 155, 157, 159, 238
 Xerxes, 30, 237
 Xynias, Lake, 16, 20

 Zeus, 43
 Zygos Pass, 18



